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Political Shakespeare

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Proud Majesty Made a Subject: Shakespeare and the Spectacle of Rule

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> No man can have in his mind a conception of the future, for the future is not yet. But of our conceptions of the past, we make a future.—Thomas Hobbes, "Human Nature"

FREUD OFFERS AS AN EXAMPLE OF HUMOR the story of Louis XV and one of his courtiers renowned for his wit. The King commanded "the cavalier to concoct a joke at his [the King's] expense. He wanted to be the 'subject' of the witticism. The courtier answered him with the clever *bon mot, 'le roi n'est pas sujet'*"[1]—the king is not a subject. If this is not a brilliant comic moment, it is at least a skillful political maneuver. The courtier's own subjection to the King's authority demands the pun in order to permit him simultaneously to satisfy and to decline the assignment. The wordplay is ingeniously responsive to the uncertainty of whether the greater danger lies in the risk of offending the King by refusing to provide a jest, or in the risk of offending him in actually providing one.

In mid-seventeenth-century England, however, any similar jest would have had a bitter flavor. To be sure, Renaissance absolutism had insisted that the king was not a subject. "A subject and a sovereign are clean different things,"[2] Charles I defiantly claimed, but the words were among Charles's last, spoken in 1649 as he stood on the black scaffold against the Banqueting House awaiting his execution.

Charles's trial and beheading testify unequivocally that in England the King had become a subject, no longer privileged as "a little GOD," in his father's phrase, "to sit upon [God's] throne and rule over other men."[3] The English king was held subject to "the authority of The Commons of England," as John Bradshaw, who presided at the King's trial, repeatedly asserted.[4] Alvise Contarini, a Venetian ambassador, sympathetically wrote to the Doge:

> The poor king of England has at last lost both crown and life by the hand of the executioner, like a common criminal, in London, before all the people, without anyone speaking in his favor and by the judicial sentence of his own subjects.[5]

[1] "Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious," in *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, ed. A. A. Brill (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 650.

[2] Pauline Gregg, *King Charles I* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1981), p. 444.

[3] *The Political Works of James I*, ed. Charles Howard McIlwain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1918), p. 12.

[4] Gregg, pp. 437–40.

[5] "Venetian Ambassador at Munster, to the Doge and Senate, 26 February 1649," in *The Puritan Revolution: A Documentary History*, ed. Stuart E. Prall (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).

In France, on the other hand, with Louis XV's power intact, the King could be the subject only of a witty courtier's jest, of a grammatical rather than a judicial sentence.

I am interested in what in England permits the King to become the subject of a judicial rather than merely a grammatical sentence; what, that is, permits the erasure of the distinction between sovereign and subject that had been at the center of the English political formation. In Shakespeare's *Richard II*, Carlisle asks angrily as Richard is forced to abdicate his throne:

> What subject can give sentence on his king?
> And who sits here that is not Richard's subject?
> (IV.i.121–22)[6]

Those that tried Charles were no less his subjects (as the King persisted in reminding them) but felt themselves qualified to pass judgment on the monarch. The trial was the final and obviously decisive step in a complex series of attacks on the royal prerogative and person. In spite of the protests of some Parliamentarians that their intentions were neither radical nor republican, the King all along knew exactly what was at stake. He knew that the Houses' desire to make law by majority vote was a program for

> The ruine . . . of Monarchy it Self (Which Wee may justly say, is more than ever was offered in any of Our Predecessours times; for though the Person of the King hath been sometimes unjustly deposed, yet the Regall Power was never before this time stricken at). . . .[7]

In 1649, the Court at Westminster Hall struck directly and powerfully at "the Regall Power"; it decreed Charles's treason and ordered his execution. Other English kings had been killed, of course, but, unlike Edward II or Richard II who were secretly murdered by subjects, Charles I was publicly tried and executed in the name of the "good people of this nation."[8]

I want to argue that the process that ended in the Monarch's unwilling subjection to the authority of the "people" was encouraged by a subjection, that, like the courtier's jest, was verbal—or, more precisely, verbal and visual. The Elizabethan theatre and especially the history play, which critics as different as E.M.W. Tillyard and Stephen Greenblatt agree effectively served the interests of royal power, seem to me to be at least as effective as a subversion of that authority, functioning as a significant cultural intervention in a process of political re-formation.[9] In setting English kings before an audience of commoners, the theatre nourished the cultural conditions that eventually permitted

[6] All Shakespeare quotations are from *The Complete Works of Shakespeare*, ed. David Bevington (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman and Company, 1980).

[7] Quoted in Perez Zagorin, *The Court and the Country: The Beginning of The English Revolution* (New York: Atheneum, 1970), p. 312.

[8] "The Sentence of the High Court of Justice Upon the King [27 January 1649]," in *The Puritan Revolution: A Documentary History*, p. 192.

[9] E.M.W. Tillyard, *Shakespeare's History Plays* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1944); and Stephen Greenblatt, "Invisible bullets: Renaissance authority and its subversions, *Henry IV* and *Henry V*," in *Political Shakespeare: New Essays in Cultural Materialism*, eds. Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield (Ithaca and London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 18–47. For important challenges to the assumptions of Tillyard and Greenblatt about the functioning of both the popular theatre and royal spectacle, however, see the suggestive essays of Franco Moretti, "'A Huge Eclipse': Tragic Form and the Deconsecration of Sovereignty," in *The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (Norman, Okla.: Pilgrim Books, 1982), pp. 7–40; and Christopher Pye, "The Sovereign, the Theater, and the Kingdome of Darknesse: Hobbes and the Spectacle of Power," *Representations*, 8 (1984), 85–106.

the nation to bring its King to trial, not because the theatre approvingly represented subversive acts, but rather because representation became itself subversive. Whatever their overt ideological content, history plays inevitably, if unconsciously, weakened the structure of authority: on stage the king became a subject—the subject of the author's imaginings and the subject of the attention and judgment of an audience of subjects. If, then, English history plays recollect and rehearse the past, they also prophesy the future, as they place the king on a scaffold before a judging public.

Though conceived of quite differently, the dangers of representation, of course, were a recurring theme of the anti-theatrical sentiment that we conveniently if inaccurately label "Puritan."[10] This hostility to the theatre obsessively focused on its threat to conventional moral and political authority. Plays, according to Phillip Stubbes in his *Anatomie of Abuses* (1583), "are quite contrarie to the Word of grace, and sucked out of the Devills teates to nourish us in ydolatrie, heathenrie, and sinne."[11] But the anti-theatrical argument is not merely that immoral behavior is acted on stage but that acting on stage is immoral. "The very forme of acting Playes," William Prynne declares, is "nought else but grosse hypocrisie." In the theatre, he asserts, everything is "counterfeited, feined, dissembled; nothing really or sincerely acted."[12]

Though some of the theatre's opponents, like Stubbes, would exempt religious drama from their denunciation,[13] most found that, rather than relaxing their concerns, the religious drama in fact intensified them. The problematic of representation becomes acute when what is counterfeited is the Godhead itself. First, of course, there is the practical problem of how to represent a God that is defined, according to the first of the Articles of Religion, as a being "without body, parts, or passion." One solution is revealed in the Late Banns to the Chester cycle. The organizers decided that God will be "a Voyce onlye to heare / And not god in shape or person to appeare."[14] But the problem is not merely mimetic; it is moral. It is not, as the Late Banns say, that "noe man can *pro*portion that Godhead"; the crucial issue is whether any man should try. In 1576, when a Court of High Commission received "intelligence" that the Corpus Christi play was to be staged in Wakefield, it ordered

> that in the said playe no pageant be used or set furthe wherin the Ma'ye of God the Father, God the Sonne, or God the Holie Ghoste or the administration of either the Sacramentes of baptisme or the Lordes Supper be counterfeyted or represented, or anythinge plaied which tende to the maintenaunce of superstition and idolatrie or which be contrarie to the lawes of God or of the realme.

Revealingly the Commission's concern is as much with the play's aesthetic

[10] See Jonas Barish, *The Anti-Theatrical Prejudice* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1981), esp. pp. 80–131. The case demonstrating the inadequacy of the label "Puritan" for all anti-theatrical sentiment is well made in Margot Heinemann's *Puritanism and Theatre: Thomas Middleton and Opposition Drama under the Early Stuarts* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 18–48.

[11] *Anatomy of the Abuses in England in Shakespeare's Youth*, ed. Frederick J. Furnivall (London: New Shakespeare Society, 1877–79), Part I, p. 142.

[12] *Histrio-Mastix* (London, 1633), sig. X2[r].

[13] Stubbes, *Anatomy of the Abuses in Shakespeare's Youth*, Part I, p. x.

[14] *Records of Early English Drama: Chester*, ed. Lawrence M. Clopper (Toronto and Buffalo: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 247.

form as with its theological content. Having the sacred matter of the play "counterfeited and represented," the Commission feared, would "tende to the derogation of the Maiestie and glorie of God. . . ."[15]

The York Commission holds that representation "derogates," that is, it diminishes and weakens the authority of what is represented. A similar consideration determines the decision of the Merchant Taylors' School in 1574 to suspend their playing. Here the issue is not sacred representation but secular: "our comon playes and suche lyke exercises . . . bringeth the youthe to such an impudente famyliaritie with theire betters that often tymes greite contempte of maisters, parents, and magistrats foloweth thereof, as experience of late in this our comon hall hath sufficyently declared. . . ,"[16]

Since the plays put on by the Merchant Taylors' School were not likely to be either scurrilous or subversive, it is clear that the problem lies not with the plays but with their playing. Merely by representing images of authority on stage, the Merchant Taylors' School's directive claims, plays induce in the audience "an impudent famyliaritie" with its "betters." Representation thus undermines rather than confirms authority, denying it its presumptive dignity by subjecting it to common view, as Sir Henry Wotton's account of a performance of *Henry VIII* reveals. The new play, he wrote, "which was set forth with many extraordinary circumstances of pomp and majesty, even to the matting of the stage" was "sufficient in truth within a while to make greatness very familiar, if not ridiculous."[17]

Artistic representation apparently leads "to the derogation," in the phrase of the York Commission, of secular majesty no less than of its sacred prototype, demystifying and diminishing its images of authority. Exactly this concern led Elizabeth to regulate royal portraiture. In 1563, a proclamation was drafted "that some special commission painter might be permitted, by access to her majesty to take the natural representation of her majesty, whereof she has always been very unwilling, but also to prohibit all manner of other persons to draw, paint, grave, or portray her majesty's personage or visage for a time until, by some perfect patron and example, the same may be by others followed."[18] In 1596, the Privy Council in fact ordered "defaced" all "unseemly and improperly paintinge, gravinge and printing of her Majesty's person and vysage, to her Majesty's great offence and disgrace of that beautyfull and magnanimious Majesty wherwith God hathe blessed her."[19]

Elizabeth understood that it would not do to allow the Queen to be subject to the artist's vision; always it must be subject to the Queen's. And so it was. Royal portraiture, as Roy Strong has shown,[20] effectively served the purposes of the monarchy, glorifying its power. Unregulated, however, the representation of the monarch was potentially dangerous; it might not enforce the desired

[15] Quoted in Harold C. Gardiner, *Mysteries' End* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1946), p. 78. See also Michael O'Connell's suggestive essay, "The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm, Anti-theatricalism, and the Image of the Elizabethan Theatre," *ELH*, 52 (1985), 279–310.

[16] Quoted in *The Elizabethan Stage*, ed. E. K. Chambers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), II, 75.

[17] *The Elizabethan Stage*, II, 419.

[18] *Tudor Royal Proclamations: The Later Tudors*, eds. Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1969), II, 240–41.

[19] *Acts of the Privy Council of England: 1596–97* (London: Mackie and Co., 1902), XXVI, 69.

[20] Roy C. Strong, *Portraits of Queen Elizabeth I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963); and Marianna Jenkins, "The State Portrait, Its Origin and Evolution," *Monographs on Archaeology and Fine Arts*, 3 (1947), 23–24.

distinction between ruler and ruled but might rather erode it, derogating majesty by subjecting it to the impudent gaze of its subjects. In 1603, just after James took the throne, Henry Crosse protested that in the theatres "there is no passion wherwith the king, the soueraigne maiestie of the Realme was possest, but is amplified, and openly sported with, and made a May-game to all the beholders."[21] It is no wonder, then, that English monarchs tried to ensure that they controlled the means of theatrical representation as well. As Charles happily recalled in 1624, in the face of the Spanish Ambassador's bitter complaint about Middleton's *Game at Chess*, "there was a commandment and restraint given against the representing of any modern Christian kings in those stage-plays."[22] Elizabeth could herself appear in plays like Peele's *Arraignment of Paris* or the court performance of Jonson's *Every Man Out of His Humor*, but, as Jonson discovered, an actor could not impersonate the Queen. In spite of her enthusiasm for the theatre, which led her in 1574 to issue a license to the Earl of Leicester's players to perform "for the recreation of oure loving subiectes as for oure solace and pleasure when we shall thincke good to see them,"[23] Elizabeth was well aware of the dangers of unregulated playing. She understood that a license was necessary, that is, that actors' representations must be subject to statutory control no less than artists'.

Although she drew considerable "solace and pleasure" from the theatre, Elizabeth was quick to smell a fault. She never would permit her passions openly to be sported with or made a May-game to the beholder—unless, of course, it was her May-game. "Sometimes Kings are content in Playes and Maskes to be admonished of divers things,"[24] wrote Thomas Scott in 1622; but rarely was Elizabeth so. She was always unusually sensitive to being subjected to her subject's representations. In 1565, Guzman de Silva, the Spanish ambassador, wrote to Philip that, at a dramatic debate between Juno and Diana on the virtues of marriage and chastity, Elizabeth angrily asserted, "This is all against me." However obscure the text, Elizabeth was able to find evidence of a personal application. At an entertainment put on by Essex in 1595, there was much discussion of the meaning of his devise. "The World makes many vntrue Constructions of these Speaches," wrote Rowland Whyte, but Elizabeth was sure of the proper one. Though from the description Whyte supplies, Elizabeth was not portrayed and was mentioned only flatteringly (as the source of "Vertue which made all his [Essex's] thoughts Deuine, whose Wisdom taught him all true Policy, whose Beauty and Worth, were at all Times able to make him fitt to comand armies") nonetheless, Whyte reports, "the Queen said, if she had thought their had bene so much said of her, she wold not haue bene their that Night, and soe went to Bed." Burghley's remark about a similar episode earlier that same year seems shrewd: "I thinke never a ladye besides her, nor a decipherer in the court, would have dissolved the figure to have found the sense as her Majestie hath done."[25]

[21] *The Elizabethan Stage*, IV, 247.

[22] Quoted in Virginia Crocheron Gildersleeve, *Government Regulation of the Elizabethan Drama* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1908), p. 119.

[23] *Collections, Part III* (Oxford: Malone Society, 1909), p. 263.

[24] *Vox Regis* (London, 1622), p. 34–35.

[25] This paragraph is indebted to David Bevington, *Tudor Drama and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), p. 9. He quotes all three examples that I use here, though I have used additional material from Rowland White's letter to Sir Robert Sidney, 22 November 1595, in *Letters and Memorials of State . . . Written and Collected by Sir Henry Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney, Robert Earl of Leicester, and Viscount Lisle*, ed. Arthur Collins (London, 1746), I, 362.

Elizabeth was not merely being paranoid. As David Bevington has demonstrated, the theatre did often engage sensitive political issues.[26] But perhaps more to the point is that the theatre itself became a sensitive political issue, and its control a matter of contention between the Court and the City. The theatre's defenders and detractors each understood that dramatic representation has a powerful political effect. Defenders held that playing performed a valuable ideological function: "Playes are writ with this ayme, and carryed with this methode," wrote Thomas Heywood, "to teach the subjects obedience to their King, to shew the people the vntimely ends of such as haue moued tumults, commotions, and insurrections, to present them with the flourishing estate of such as liue in obedience, exhorting them to allegeance, dehorting them from all trayterous and fellonious stratagems."[27] The theatre's opponents argued exactly the reverse: plays were irreligious and seditious, and the playhouses themselves were at best nuisances and at worst serious threats to the public weal. As the Lord Mayor and the Aldermen of London wrote to the Privy Council in 1597, "They give opportunity to the refuze sort of euill disposed & vngodly people, that are within and abowte this Cytie, to assemble themselves & to make their matches for all their lewd and vngodly practices."[28] In general, it is the opponents of the theatre, however obsessive their hostility appears, who seem to have the best of the argument. The defenders offer only a narrowly homiletic conception of drama that is belied by virtually every play of the period. The detractors come closer to understanding how the plays actually function; their fears respond to the subversive threat the theatre potentially posed.

What underlies their anxieties about playing is the awareness that representation offers an inherent challenge to the fundamental categories of a culture that would organize itself hierarchically and present that organization as inevitable and permanent. Certainly that is Gosson's objection to a theatre which makes it necessary "for a boy to put one the attyre, the gesture, the passions of a woman; for a meane person to take vpon him the title of a Prince with counterfeit porte, and traine."[29] The "lye" of the theatre demystifies the idealization of the social order that the ideology of degree demanded. The author of the character "Of an Excellent Actor" (1615) writes that "All men haue beene of his occupation: and indeed, what hee doth fainedly that doe others essentially: this day one plaies a Monarch, the next a priuate person. Heere one Acts a Tyrant, on the morrow an Exile: A Parasite this man to night, to morow a Precisian, and so of diuers others."[30] The actor's ability to represent the full range of social roles disturbingly identifies them as "roles"—"actions," as Hamlet says, "that a man might play"—rather than essential and immutable identities.

The theatre thus works to expose the mystifications of power. Its counterfeit of royalty raises the possibility that royalty is a counterfeit. Erasmus, in his *Education of a Christian Prince*, had asked:

> If a necklace, a scepter, royal purple robes, a train of attendants are all that make a king, what is to prevent the actors who come on the stage decked with all the pomp of state from being called king?[31]

[26] Bevington, *passim*.

[27] *Apology for Actors* (London, 1612), sig. F3^{v}.

[28] *The Elizabethan Stage*, IV, 321.

[29] *Playes Confuted in fiue Actions*, in *The English Drama and Stage Under the Tudor and Stuart Princes*, ed. William C. Hazlitt (London: Roxburghe Library, 1869), p. 197.

[30] *The Elizabethan Stage*, IV, 258.

The answer, in the highly theatricalized world of Renaissance politics and the highly politicized world of the Renaissance stage, is perhaps not quite as obvious as Erasmus presumes. Certainly "the actors who come on the stage decked with all the pomp of state" are "*called* king," at least within the play (and in Ford's *Perkin Warbeck* that is precisely the point, as the difficulty of enforcing a distinction between an actor playing the king and an actor playing an actor playing a king is turned into the "strange truth" of the drama. "The player's on the stage still, 'tis his part; / 'A does but act" [V.ii.68–69], says Henry scornfully of Perkin; but exactly the same could be said of Henry as he stands before an audience in the theatre[32]). In *1 Henry IV*, Douglas discovers the difficulty of differentiating the King and his counterfeits. When he claims to have slain King Henry, Hotspur has to tell him that he has only killed "Blunt, / Semblably furnish'd like the King himself" (V.iii.20–21). Seeking the King, Douglas discovers a surplus of royal representations, which he presumes can be made single by a process of trial and error:

> Now, by my sword, I will kill all his coats!
> I'll murder all his wardrobe, piece by piece,
> Until I meet the King.
> (V.iii.26–28)

Yet, though he works his way through the King's "wardrobe" with murderous efficiency, he is unable to recognize royalty when he finally confronts it. In *The Merchant of Venice*, Portia confidently asserts that "A substitute shines brightly as a king / Until a king be by" (V.i.94–95), but when Douglas does at last "meet the King," Henry shines no more brightly than any of the substitutes Douglas has killed:

> What art thou
> That counterfeit'st the person of a king?
> *Henry*: The King himself . . .
> *Douglas*: I fear thou art another counterfeit. . . .
> (V.iv.27–35)

On the battlefield at Shrewsbury at the end of *1 Henry IV*, the King cannot be distinguished from his counterfeits; Henry's majesty is effectively mimed. But even with real rather than represented kings the distinction that Erasmus would sharply draw between king and actor is blurred, though not by actors successfully playing the monarch but by the monarch successfully playing the monarch. Elizabeth, of course, was a brilliant actor, as perhaps she had to be in the absence of effective instruments of coercion. In his *Fragmenta Regalia* (1641), Sir Robert Naunton wrote that he knew

[31] *The Education of a Christian Prince*, ed. Lester K. Born (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1936), p. 152.

[32] *Perkin Warbeck*, ed. Donald K. Anderson, Jr. (Omaha: Univ. of Nebraska, 1965). See Jonas A. Barish, "*Perkin Warbeck* as Anti-History," *Essays in Criticism*, 20 (1970), 151–71; and Jackson I. Cope, *The Theater and the Dream: From Metaphor to Form in Renaissance Drama* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 122–33.

> no prince living that was so tender of honor and so exactly stood for the preservation of sovereignty, that was so great a courter of her people, yea, of the commons, and that stooped and descended lower in presenting her person to the public view as she passed in her progresses and perambulations. . . .[33]

From the moment her accession to the throne was announced, she was almost compulsively concerned with "presenting her person to the public view," recognizing that her rule could be—and in her case perhaps could *only* be—celebrated and confirmed theatrically.

On 14 January 1559, the day before her coronation, Elizabeth, dressed in cloth of gold and wearing her princess's crown, was carried through London in an open litter trimmed with gold brocade, accompanied by 1000 attendants on horseback. The procession, beginning at the Tower and ending at Westminster, spectacularly demonstrated her mastery of the dramaturgy of royal power. "[I]f a man should say well," wrote the author of *The Quene's Majestie's Passage*, "he could not better tearme the citie of London that time, than a stage wherin was shewed the wonderfull spectacle, of a noble hearted princesse toward her most loving people, and the people's exceding comfort in beholding so worthy a sovereign, and hearing so princelike a voice. . . ."[34] Here and throughout her reign Elizabeth's use of pageant and progress enabled her to transform her country into a theatre, and, in the absence of a standing army, create an audience, troops of loyal admirers, to guarantee her rule.

Renaissance rulers, as we know from the work of Stephen Orgel and Roy Strong, habitually expressed their power theatrically.[35] A spectacular sovereignty works to subject its audience to—and through—the royal power on display, captivating, in several senses, its onlookers. But this theatrical strategy of what Stephen Greenblatt has called "privileged visibility"[36] carries with it considerable risks. Significantly, it makes power contingent upon the spectators' assent (even if that assent is assumed as an aspect of the royal script).[37] However much it insists upon its audience's admiration and respect, sovereignty's visible presence demands and authorizes an audience of commoners as a condition of its authority (and it is precisely the anxieties produced by this, rather than any delight in theatricality, that generates the now familiar comments by Elizabeth and James that they are on "stage").

In addition, the effectiveness of the strategy depends on the effective control of the theatrical space. As early as May of 1559, Elizabeth had ordered that no plays be permitted

> . . . wherein either matters of religion or of the gouernaunce of the estate of the common weale shalbe handled or treated, beyng no meete matters to be wrytten or treated vpon, but by menne of aucthoritie, learning and wisedome, nor to be handled before any audience, but of graue and discreete persons.

[33] *Fragmenta Regalia*, ed. John C. Cerovski (Washington, D.C.: Folger Shakespeare Library, 1985), p. 44.

[34] In *Elizabethan Backgrounds: Historical Documents of the Age of Elizabeth I*, ed. Arthur F. Kinney (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1975), p. 16. For a suggestive analysis of the royal entry see Mark Breitenberg, "'. . . the hole matter opened': Iconic Representation and Interpretation in 'the Quenes Majesties Passage,'" *Criticism*, 28 (1986), 1–26.

[35] See Stephen Orgel, *The Illusion of Power* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1975); and Roy Strong, *Art and Power: Renaissance Festivals 1450–1650* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1984).

[36] "Invisible bullets: Renaissance authority and its subversion, *Henry IV* and *Henry V*," p. 44.

[37] Peter Stallybrass similarly argued this in his paper delivered at the MLA meeting in December 1985, at a session entitled "The Elizabethan Theatre-State" arranged by the Division on Literature of the English Renaissance, excluding Shakespeare.

"Matters of religion or of the gouernance of the estate of the common weale" can be played only before an audience of "graue and discreete persons"; before an audience of commoners the representation of such matters is dangerous and "not conuenient," as the Proclamation states, "in any good ordred Christian Common weale to be suffred."[38] What makes it "not conuenient . . . to be suffred" is that in the theatre images of authority become subject to the approval of an audience. The pageantry of state, however, would presume—even co-opt—that approval. Near the end of Elizabeth's 1559 progress, for example, the Queen observed "an auncient citizen, which wepte, and turned his head backe." The report wonders, "How may it be interpreted that he so doth, for sorowe or for gladnes"; but Elizabeth, who "wold turne the doutefull to the best," is certain of the citizen's response: "I warrant you it is for gladnes." The ambiguous reaction of the citizen is appropriated and converted by Elizabeth into an opportunity to display, as the report terms it, the "gracious interpretation of a noble courage."[39]

On the other hand, in the theatre the actors do not have the option of interpreting, and incorporating, the audience's response. The theatre creates and authorizes a critical "public," as Stephen Gosson nervously observed:

> If the common people which resorte to Theaters being but an assemblie of Tailers, Tinkers, Cordwayners, Saylers, olde Men, yong Men, Women, Boyes, Girles, and such like, be the iudges of faultes there painted out, the rebuking of manners in that place, is neyther lawfull nor conuenient, but to be helde for a kinde of libelling, and defaming.[40]

In the theatre the audience of commoners becomes "the iudges of faultes there painted out." Its assembly of marginal persons is established as an authoritative body, as Dekker, if less anxiously than Gosson, also recognizes. He explains to his Gull that the theatre

> is so free in entertainment, allowing a stool as well to the farmer's son as to your Templar, that your stinkard has the selfsame liberty to be there in his tobacco fumes which your sweet courtier hath, and that your carman and tinker claim as strong a voice in their suffrage, and sit to give judgment on the play's life and death as well as the proudest Momus among the Tribe of Critic. . . .[41]

In the Renaissance playhouses, the audience need not—and did not—keep a respectful distance (unlike in the spectacle of state or, for that matter, in the modern theatre). The mode of representation in the Elizabethan popular theatre refuses to privilege what is represented. Renaissance staging practices, as Rob-

[38] *The Elizabethan Stage*, IV, 263.

[39] "The Quene's Majesty's Passage," in *Elizabethan Backgrounds*, ed. Kinney, p. 37. I am grateful to Peter Stallybrass for this reference.

[40] *Playes Confuted in fiue Actions*, p. 184. Ann Jennalie Cook, of course, has recently argued, in her *The Privileged Playgoers of Shakespeare's London* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1981), that the audience of Shakespeare's theatre was drawn mainly "from the upper levels of the social order"; but see appendix 2 of Martin Butler's *Theatre and Crisis 1632–1642* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), pp. 293–306, which effectively challenges Cook's conclusions.

[41] *The Gull's Hornbook*, in *Thomas Dekker: Selected Writings*, ed. E. D. Pendry (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1968), p. 98.

ert Weimann has shown, in shifting the action between the upstage *locus* and the downstage *plataea*, literally displace the dominant aristocratic ideology;[42] but this dislocating perspective, which submits aristocratic postures and assumptions to the interrogation of clowns and commoners, is enacted on a larger scale in the theatre itself—as the action is thrust into the space of the audience. There farmer's son and Templar, stinkard and courtier, carman and tinker, democratically come together, transcending, if only temporarily, the stratified social structure of Jacobean England, and are empowered, by the anti-aristocratic, commercial logic of the theatre, to "give judgment on the play's life and death."

Reading history backwards, it is no doubt tempting to see only a narrow gap between this kind of judgment on the life and death of plays in 1606 and the judgment on the King's life and death in 1649, but even without the imposed teleology and the misleading foreshortening of such a perspective, we cannot be surprised that the authorities found it "neyther lawfull nor conuenient" for an audience of commoners to begin to think of itself as a competent judge—whether of manners, plays, or matters of state. And when the theatrical space is the city itself rather than the playhouse, the immediate danger of unregulated representation increases. Elizabeth, like the Lord Mayors, had used the city streets to stage pageants of authority, but the streets were not to serve as public-access theatres. Elizabeth bitterly remarked to William Lambarde, when she was reminded of Essex's use of (what was presumably Shakespeare's) *Richard II* as prologue to his abortive rebellion: "this tragedy was played 40tie times in open streets and houses."[43] Obviously, the play itself, as the story of the deposition of a lawful (and self-dramatizing) monarch, all too clearly served Essex's political purposes, but, as Stephen Orgel has suggested, perhaps as serious to Elizabeth's mind is that Essex had appropriated her own political strategy, turning the city, as she claimed, into a stage on which her character and fate in the figure of Richard was represented—and some "40tie times" re-presented—in the open streets.[44]

Essex's appropriation of Elizabeth's politics of pageantry reveals an inherent weakness of the strategy: it is appropriable. Essex can play to the city and might well have stolen Elizabeth's audience. Camden reports that Essex and his "most intimate Friends" discussed "whether it were better forthwith to seize on the Court; or to try first the Affections of the *Londoners*, and with their Assistance to set upon the Court by force; or to save themselves by Flight."

> Whilst disputation was holden about love of the *Londoners*, and the uncertaine disposition of the vulgar, behold one came in of set purpose, as if he had been sent from the Citizens, making most large promises of aide from them against all his adversaries. Herewith the Earle being cheered, began to discourse how much he was favoured throughout the City, and persuaded himselfe by the former acclamations of the people, and their hatefull murmurings against his adversaries, that very many were devoted to his fame and fortune. . . . He resolved therefore . . . to enter the next day which was Sunday with 200. Gentlemen into the City . . . there to informe the Aldermen and people of the causes of his comming, and to crave their aid against his adversaries: And if the Citizens shewed themselves hard to be drawne, to depart presently to some other part of the kingdome; but if they shewed themselves easie, then to make himselfe a way unto the Queene with their helpe.[45]

[42] Robert Weimann, *Shakespeare and the Popular Tradition in the Theatre*, ed. Robert Schwartz (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 208–52.

[43] Quoted in the Arden *King Richard II*, ed. Peter Ure (London: Methuen, 1954), p. lix.

[44] Stephen Orgel, "Making Greatness Familiar," *The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (Norman, Okla.: Pilgrim Books, 1982), p. 45.

In the event, of course, his efforts failed: the city did not respond. He "besought [the citizens] to arme themselves," but all in vain. The citizens remained "unshaken in their untainted fidelity to their Prince," but clearly Elizabeth's rule depended on her ability to maintain the loyalty of the audience she had wooed and won rather than on any power or authority vested in the office. Had Essex been able to command the "love of the *Londoners*," he would have succeeded in his design to "change the forme of the Common-wealth."[46]

What, then, to reverse the terms of Erasmus's question, is to prevent the king who comes on stage decked with all the pomp of state from being called an actor? This, I take it, is the central—and potentially subversive—question posed by Shakespeare's histories. In play after play we are confronted not with order but with turbulence, with the instability of rule and relationship. Yet, if in the almost continuous contention for the crown we see a dispiriting drama of human motives, we see also the power of the symbolic structures erected against anarchy and decay—and kingship itself stands chief among these. "King is a name of continuance,"[47] wrote Plowden, and the histories declare at once the lie of the jurist's assertion and the need. The ruler becomes an icon of immortality, and the struggle to establish and ensure "fair sequence and succession" (*Richard II*, II.i.199) takes urgency from the necessity of the commonwealth to conceive of itself as permanent. In the "hapless time" of the history plays the fictions of stability insistently assert themselves, but the plays may be read virtually as the discovery that they are fictions, as England moves, in Kernan's phrase, "from ceremony and ritual to history."[48]

The plays reveal that the pageantry and props of rule are largely factitious, that their value is strategic rather than sacramental. Neither custom nor grace preserves the crown, though their ceremonies often dress it gaudily. Henry V, Shakespeare's most successful—perhaps his only successful—king, knows that "ceremony"—"the balm, the scepter, and the ball, / The sword, the mace, the crown imperial, / The intertissued robe of gold and pearl" (IV.i.257–59)—are props for the mystification of power:

> Art thou aught else but place, degree, and form,
> Creating awe and fear in other men?
> (IV.i.243–44)

The histories expose the idealizations of political power by presenting rule as role, by revealing that power passes to him who can best control and manipulate the visual and verbal symbols of authority. At their most radical, their theatricality reveals that ceremony is, as Sir Henry Wotton understood, an instru-

[45] William Camden, *The History of . . . Elizabeth, Late Queen of England* (London, 1635), Bk. IV, p. 538.

[46] Camden, pp. 540, 537.

[47] Quoted in Corinne Comstock Weston and Janelle Renfrow Greenberg, *Subjects and Sovereigns: The Grand Controversy over Legal Sovereignty in Stuart England* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), p. 8.

[48] Alvin Kernan, "The Henriad: Shakespeare's History Plays," in *Modern Shakespearean Criticism*, ed. Alvin Kernan (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970), p. 245. See also my "'To Set a Form upon that Indigest': Shakespeare's Fictions of History," *Comparative Drama*, 17 (1983), 1–15, from which I have borrowed a few phrases.

mental "solemnity to contain the people still in good order with superstition, the foolish band of obedience."[49] But the recognition of people who need to be contained "in good order" simultaneously acknowledges their power of resistance and dissent. Even Henry's "greatness" is, as he understands (and resents), "subject to the breath / Of every fool" (IV.i.230–31). The King must continually play to his subjects, subjecting himself to their admiration and awe that they may be subjected to his power.

Thus Bolingbroke triumphs over the anointed King Richard. York describes Henry's triumphant entrance into London (which Charles Kean spectacularly staged in his 1857 production of the play):

> . . . Bolingbroke,
> Mounted upon a hot and fiery steed
> Which his aspiring rider seem'd to know,
> With slow but stately pace kept on his course,
> Whilst all tongues cried, "God save thee, Bolingbroke!"
> You would have thought the very windows spake,
> So many greedy looks of young and old
> Through casements darted their desiring eyes
> Upon his visage, and that all the walls
> With painted imagery had said at once,
> "Jesu preserve thee! Welcome, Bolingbroke!"
> Whilst he, from the one side to the other turning,
> Bareheaded, lower than his proud steed's neck,
> Bespake them thus: "I thank you, countrymen."
> And thus still doing, thus he pass'd along.
> (V.ii.7–21)

Bolingbroke satisfies the "desiring eyes" of the city; he agrees to be the subject of their gaze and they become the subjects of his rule. When the Duchess asks about Richard, York replies:

> As in a theatre the eyes of men,
> After a well-grac'd actor leaves the stage,
> Are idly bent on him that enters next,
> Thinking his prattle to be tedious,
> Even so, or with much more contempt, men's eyes
> Did scowl on gentle Richard. No man cried, "God save him!"
> No joyful tongue gave him his welcome home,
> But dust was thrown upon his sacred head. . . .
> (V.ii.23–30)

It is not only Richard's theatricality, as is often claimed, that the play explores, but, as York's simile makes clear, Bolingbroke's as well. His progress through the city is, if more consciously restrained, much like Elizabeth's in 1559, a pageant which at once confers, clarifies, and celebrates rule. Richard's mystified notions of numinous authority leave him quiescent, unwilling to act—in any sense of the word—to preserve his title, and consequently his "sacred head" becomes the object not of reverence but defilement—of "dust" thrown down by the spectators who line the streets of the royal progress.

Richard takes refuge in concepts of charismatic majesty that even the Bishop of Carlisle seeks to animate and direct more practically:

[49] *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton*, ed. L. Pearsall Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [illegible]

> That Power that made you king
> Hath power to keep you king in spite of all.
> The means that Heavens yield must be embrac'd,
> And not neglected; else, heaven would,
> And we will not.
> (III.ii.27–31)

And Aumerle, impatient with Richard's passivity (and with the sacramental language that sustains it), translates the Bishop's prompting into even more explicitly pragmatic terms:

> He means, my lord, that we are too remiss,
> Whilst Bolingbroke, through our security,
> Grows strong and great in substance and in power.
> (III.ii.33–35)

In the face of Bolingbroke's substance and power, Richard holds to the efficacy of insubstantial assertions of sacred authority, assertions that are powerless before "the rage of Bolingbroke" which now covers Richard's "fearful land / With hard bright steel and hearts harder than steel" (III.ii.109–11). As Northumberland prophesies, Bolingbroke does successfully

> Redeem from broking pawn the blemish'd crown,
> Wipe off the dust that hides our scepter's gilt,
> And make high majesty look like itself. . . .
> (II.i.293–95)

The homonymic pun on "gilt" signals that the symbols of rule in Bolingbroke's usurping hand have been "derogated," we might say, tainted and diminished by the process of their attainment. "Gilt" has been tarnished by Henry's guilt, and if "high majesty" now looks "like itself" it may well be because Henry's presence on—and progress to—the throne effectively demystifies the character of domination. Richard is "unkinged" essentially because he understands far less than Henry about what "in this new world" (IV.i.78), to use Fitzwater's phrase, it means to be a king.

Knowledge here is power, or at least power depends on the knowledge that power is power. When Richard finally learns the lesson of this brutal tautology it is too late to translate it into action. All he can do is force Henry publicly to enact the reality of their exchange of power rather than the privileged Lancastrian version that Henry wishes to have staged before Parliament. Though Richard can affect the formalization of the exchange, he cannot, however, prevent the exchange itself. "Do we must what force would have us do" (III.iii.207), he admits; yet when he resigns he will stage the event not as the abdication that Henry expects ("I thought you had been willing to resign" [IV.i.191], Henry irritably remarks) but as a deposition. "Here, cousin, seize the crown" (IV.i.182), Richard taunts, holding it, I assume, just out of Henry's comfortable reach.

Belatedly Richard has come to understand something about the drama of public power, but even though he is successful in exposing the reality that Henry would disguise in the formal "resignation of . . . state and crown" (IV.i.179) he cannot avoid staging his own defeat. Whether he is deposed or is resigned, he is, in either case, no longer king. He bids to become the subject of his

power; and well may he ask, "Subjected thus, / How can you say to me I am a king?" (III.ii.176–77).

"Subjected," he is no longer king. Richard will be Henry's subject—for at least as long as he stays alive (though ex-kings unlike ex-presidents should not expect long and prosperous retirements). But Richard comes to see that in agreeing to make his political subjection the subject of his dramatizing, he has become complicit in the political act:

> . . . I find myself a traitor with the rest;
> For I have given here my soul's consent
> T'undeck the pompous body of a king,
> Made glory base and sovereignty a slave,
> Proud majesty a subject. . . .
> (IV.i.248–52)

I am not worrying the word "subject" here merely because the pun is available and attractive but because, as the jest of Louis XV's courtier shows, the pun focuses and clarifies certain significant structures of authority. When Spenser in *The Faerie Queene* writes about—and for—his "dred sovereign" Elizabeth, his own complex relationship to her power, his need for her approval and patronage, releases anxieties, even resentments, that he contains by turning her into his subject, thereby at least temporarily neutralizing the asymmetry of power that exists between a monarch and a would-be laureate.[50]

Representation is powerful and dangerous, and its subversions are not, I think, as easily contained or co-opted as the New Historicists would suggest. Stephen Greenblatt argues ingeniously that "actions that should have the effect of radically undermining authority turn out to be the props of that authority." But the argument is suspect on historical grounds alone: if subversion, as Greenblatt writes, is "the very condition of power,"[51] then how can we account for social change? If the mechanisms of Renaissance absolutism for dealing with cultural contradiction and challenge are as efficient as the New Historicists would show them, then how is it that Charles I, that "Royal Actor," as Marvell terms him in the "Horatian Ode upon Cromwell's Return from Ireland," is put to death on 30 January 1649, on the "tragic scaffold" erected at Whitehall?

It is not that Greenblatt is wrong, only that his argument is unnecessarily totalized. He idealizes the operations of a culture that are more various, complex, even contradictory than he allows. Stephen Orgel suggests, more persuasively I think, that "To mime the monarch was a potentially revolutionary act—as both Essex and Elizabeth were well aware."[52] Certainly both Essex and Elizabeth understood the playing of *Richard II* on the eve of the rebellion as part of the treasonous imagining, as an invitation to the populace to participate—either in the fiction or in fact—in the deposition of an anointed king.

[50] For provocative accounts of Spenser's complex relation with Elizabeth, see Louis Adrian Montrose, "The Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text," in *Literary Theory / Renaissance Texts*, eds. Patricia Parker and David Quint (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 303–40; and Richard Helgerson, *Self-Crowned Laureates: Spenser, Jonson, Milton, and the Literary System* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1983), pp. 55–100. Frank Whigham, in his *Ambition and Privilege: The Social Tropes of Elizabethan Courtesy Theory* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: Univ. of California Press, 1984), provides an interesting analysis of the tensions and anxieties of the Elizabethan courtier.

[51] "Invisible bullets: Renaissance authority and its subversion, *Henry IV* and *Henry V*," pp. 39–40, 45.

[52] "Making Greatness Familiar," p. 45.

Indeed, imagining the death of a king was literally treasonous. In response to Elizabeth's notorious recognition of herself in the figure of Richard II, William Lambarde condemned the "wicked imagination"[53] of Essex's rebellion, and the word "imagination," in his phrase, is a technical legal term. Treason, in the language of the Tudor law derived from a statute of 1352, is in part defined as "imagining and compassing the death of a king." (And Essex, indeed, was formally charged with "conspiring and imagining at London . . . to depose and then slay the Queen and to subvert the Government."[54]) While in practice this section of the law was the source of juridical confusion and debate, the letter of the law itself acknowledges that imagining—that is, plotting (itself a word with both a political and literary sense)—the deposition and death of the king was to be guilty of treason.[55]

Richard II, of course, does imagine—and invites its audience to imagine—the deposition and death of a king; and this is obviously the exact reason Essex and his followers paid forty shillings to have it played. We must, however, be careful not to idealize, in turn, the subversive power of theatrical representation. In the playhouse, divorced from any specific political intent, such imaginings are not treasonous (a similar argument was the basis of Sir John Hayward's defense when he was tried for treason for his history of *The Life and Reign of King Henry IV*; and Bacon claimed in court, noting Hayward's extensive borrowings from Tacitus, that, in any case, it was for plagiarism, not treason, that he should justly be charged[56]); though the sensitivity of *Richard II*'s subject matter is acknowledged in the fact that none of the quartos of the play published during Elizabeth's lifetime includes the deposition scene. Under Elizabeth, in an atmosphere of growing cultural conflict, the theatre's subversive potential came under ever greater governmental scrutiny and control, as the authorities sought ways of limiting and containing the actors' unnerving freedoms: the Master of the Revels began to license—and censor—plays; players were permitted to act only as members of licensed acting companies under noble patronage; and the theatres themselves were banished—by the city fathers—to the liberties.

In the prologue to *Henry V*, the Chorus fantasizes about having

> A kingdom for a stage, princes to act,
> And monarchs to behold the swelling scene!

In such an idealized dramatic environment the contradictions of playing would disappear: representation would be simply presentation and history plays would be history itself—and significantly a history from which all social inequality

[53] *King Richard II*, ed. Peter Ure, p. lix.

[54] "Calendar of the Contents of the *Baga de Secretis*," in *Fourth Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records*, Appendix II, (London, 1843), p. 293.

[55] See John Bellamy, *The Tudor Law of Treason: an Introduction* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), esp. pp. 30–33.

[56] In "Apophthegms New and Old," in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath (Boston: Brown and Taggard, 1860), p. 341. As Jonathan Dollimore writes, "what makes an idea subversive is not so much what is intrinsic to it or the mere thinking of it, but the context of its articulation—to whom, and to how many and in what circumstances it is said and written" (*Radical Tragedy: Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries* [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984], p. 10). It was precisely on these grounds that Hayward was found guilty. See Annabel Patterson, *Censorship and Interpretation: The Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early Modern England* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1984), esp. pp. 44–48.

is gone, though not through the democratization of the kingdom, but through the complete erasure of the lower classes from it. The reality of Shakespeare's "wooden O" was of course quite different: a platform stage in Southwark, bourgeois actors, and an audience, not "gentles all," but fully reflective of the social stratification of the kingdom.[57]

Shakespeare's theatre was oddly liminal—geographically, socially, and politically.[58] Located in a Liberty, it was both part and not part of the City, which no doubt was appropriate for the home of a commercial acting company that was both dependent and not dependent upon its aristocratic patron; and the actors themselves, deemed to be rogues, vagabonds, and beggars by the 1572 *Acte for the punishement of Vacabondes and for Releif of the Poore & Impotent* (14 Eliz. C. 5), were elevated to gentlemen, formally members of the Royal Household, when the company became the King's Men.

These contradictions of the Elizabethan theatre are inescapable and irreconcilable—the essential conditions of its functioning—and are exactly what the Chorus in *Henry V* wishes to avoid. He wants a unified, aristocratic world (similar perhaps to what Richard Venner's *England's Joy* promised: a play about the monarch to be performed, as Venner's playbill advertised, "only by certain gentlemen and gentlewomen of account"[59]). If one could produce such theatrical conditions—and Venner, of course, tried to run off with the receipts without ever presenting his play—the problematics of representation, if not resolved, are at least reduced.

Ideally, in such a theatre we could have "the warlike Harry, like himself"—not an actor looking like Harry or acting like Harry, but Harry looking and acting "like himself." This would be a theatre in which we know not seems, but such a theatre is impossible. It is not theatre (and as Hamlet learns it is not life either). The theatre is and tells us about a world of seeming. It sets before us images of authority that depend upon our cooperation to "piece out" the necessary "imperfections" of their representation. What must "deck our kings" is *our* "thoughts" rather than *their* inherent majesty. The theatre, then, it could be said, enacts, not necessarily on stage, but in its fundamental transaction with the audience, the exact shift in the conception of authority that brings a king to trial and ultimately locates sovereignty in the common will of its subjects. The audience becomes, as the political discourse of the seventeenth-century increasingly maintained of the community, the ultimate source of authority in its willingness to credit and approve the representation of rule.

> The king's a beggar, now the play is done.
> All is well ended, if this suit be won,
> That you express content; which we will pay,
> With strife to please you, day exceeding day.

[57] Martin Butler, in his rejection of Ann Jennalie Cook's assertion of an audience of "privileged playgoers" (see n. 39), not only cites the numerous references to "unprivileged" playgoers by contemporary theatregoers, but also challenges Cook's statistical analyses. For Butler, "the ratio between population and theatre capacity seems to point in the opposite direction from Cook's conclusions, towards inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness" (p. 298).

[58] See Louis Adrian Montrose, "The Purpose of Playing: Reflections on a Shakespearean Anthropology," *Helios*, ns 7 (1980); and Steven Mullaney's *The Place of the Stage: License, Play, and Power in Renaissance England*, forthcoming, University of Chicago Press.

[59] *The Elizabethan Stage*, III, 501. Stephen Orgel, in "Making Greatness Familiar," calls attention to the implications of Venner's notorious fraud which, he says, "actualizes one of the deepest corporate fantasies of the Elizabethan theater and its audience" (p. 46).

> Ours be your patience then, and yours our parts;
> Your gentle hands lend us, and take our hearts.
> (*All's Well That Ends Well*, epilogue)

This defines almost exactly the relation between subject and sovereign that was held to exist in 1649 at the trial of Charles I—but instead of taking his heart they took his head.[60]

[60] I would like to thank my hosts at Nazareth College, Ohio State University, and Columbia University where earlier versions of this paper were read and improved by the discussion. Among the friends and colleagues who have thoughtfully and generously contributed to the development of this essay, Lynda Boose, Claire McEachern, Donald Pease, and Peter Stallybrass deserve special thanks.