Dr Christopher Bartley read Theology at
He maintains an interest in all schools of Vedanta. He is currently researching the dialectic between Kashmiri Shaiva philosopher-theologians Ramakantha (a Shaiva-Siddhantin realist), the absolute idealists Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, and anti-essentialist theories propounded by Buddhist thinkers. He is particularly concerned with the opposition between process and substance ontologies; the problems implicit in the concept of personality as a series of experiential events; the Pratyabhijna school’s critique of Buddhist idealism; arguments for the existence of God according to Ramanuja, Ramakantha and Utpaladeva..
He is writing a book provisionally entitled Indian Concepts of Divinity which deals with the Vedanta, Nyaya, Mimamsa, Kashmiri Shaiva and Buddhist arguments.
He has taught Sanskrit for many years and recommends the use of Walter Maurer, The Sanskrit Language (RoutledgeCurzon) and Michael Coulson, Teach Yourself Sanskrit.
Address: c.j.bartley@liverpool.ac.uk & cjbartley98@aol.com
The RŒmŒnuja school according to the Sarvadar§anasaµgraha: a translation
Text: Sarvadar§anasaµgraha
of SŒyaöa
MŒdhava,
ed. V.S.Abhyankar,
[92.33-39] Three real categories of being are established in accordance with the differences between subjects of experience, objects of experience and the regulator, corresponding to the differences between what is conscious, what is material and God. It is stated: God, the conscious and the material are the three real categories. Vi·öu is God, the conscious is the individual souls, and the material is what is observable. [ii]
[92.37- 93.48] But others (i.e. Advaita-VedŒntins) say that in reality (paramŒrthaú) there is only Brahman, which is just simple awareness (cinmŒtra) opposite to every differentiating feature (vi§e·a). That Brahman, although its nature is always pure, -conscious, exempt from rebirth and whose identity with the individual soul (j´va) is understood from co-referential (sŒmŒnŒdhikaraöya) Scriptures (§rutis) such as ‘You are that’ (Ch.Up. 6.8.7: ‘tat tvam asi’), is bound to rebirth and is liberated.[iii] Appealing to the epistemic authority (prŒmŒöya) of a host of scriptural statements such as ‘In the beginning, all this was just being, one without a second’ (Ch.Up. 6.2.1), they say that the entire manifold, which is other than Brahman and which consists of differences such as those between multifarious experiencers and spheres of experience, is attributed to that Absolute due to causative misconception (avidyŒ). They accept the termination of beginningless misconception by intuitive insight into the identity of the soul and the featureless Absolute, in accordance with hundreds of Upani·adic statements such as ‘Who knows the soul transcends misery’ (Ch.Up. 6.1.3). They do not allow the tripartition of three real categories, thinking themselves clever in rejecting the fundamental reality of difference: given scriptural censure of duality in ‘From death he reaches death, who sees plurality here’ (Ka ha Up. 4.11).
This is the statement of their position and it might be true, were there a means of knowing causative misconception.
[p.93.48-95.61] Advaitin: this beginningless causative and actual (bhŒva-rèpa) misconception, which is removable by knowledge, is known through inner perception (pratyak·apramŒöasiddham) in thoughts such as ‘I am ignorant’, ‘I do not know myself or any others’. As it is stated: The enlightened propound the definition that ignorance is dissolved by knowledge, is beginningless, and is positive (bhŒvarèpa).[iv]
And it is not to be supposed that the topic here is the absence of knowledge of an object prior to its apprehension (j–ŒnŒbhŒva). Who would say that is? The follower of PrabhŒkara or the follower of KumŒrila? Not the first because he does not accept absence as a category distinct from actualities, when he says: An entity can always be considered as what it is and what it is not, in accordance with its own properties and the things from which it differs, according to circumstances. Under one description, absence is just another mode of being. Absence is not something in its own right since it is never discerned apart from being.[v]
And not the second, since absence of knowledge cannot be the object of perception because absence is the object of the sixth means of knowledge (anupalabdhi- pramΚa) and because the occurrence of a cognition is something that has always to be inferred.[vi]
[95.61-96.66] But if someone who holds that absence is perceptible (sc.a NyŒya-Vai§e·ika) should argue thus, we Advaitins reply: In the thought, ‘I am ignorant’ is there or is there not understanding of the soul as the substrate of an absence, and of knowledge [of something] as the absentee (pratiyogin)? [cf. SB p.87.1-8]
If there is, experience of the absence of knowledge is not possible on pain of contradiction. If there is not, experience of the absence of knowledge, which depends upon knowledge of the absentee and the substrate, is all the more impossible. But if ignorance is positive (bhŒva-rèpa) these problems do not arise and this experience of ignorance must be admitted as referring to ignorance as a positive factor.
Vi§i· Œdvaitin: This is chewing the sky, since ignorance as a positive factor and the privation of knowledge are on a par. That is to say: [in the thought, ‘I am ignorant’] is there or is there not awareness of one’s identity, which gives definition (vyŒvartaka) to ignorance, by being its substrate and its object? If there is, how can ignorance persist in this awareness since it is eliminated by valid cognition? If not, how can there be experience of an ignorance, which lacks an object or a subject, which lend it definition?
If you say that a clear and determinate manifestation of one’s identity is what is opposed to ignorance and because that does not appear in a state of ignorance, then there is no contradiction between awareness of a substrate and an object and the awareness of non-knowledge then we reply that this also applies if ignorance is construed as the absence of knowledge.[vii] Thus it must be accepted that the thoughts, ‘I do not know’ etc. relate to the simple absence of knowledge accepted by both sides. [cf. SB p.88.9-18]
[p.96.77-96.79] Advaitin: Then let there be inferential knowledge [of ignorance as a positive factor]:
Valid cognition [pak·a] presupposes another reality that exists in the same place as knowledge, that is eliminable by knowledge, that conceals the object of knowledge and that is distinct from the prior absence of knowledge [sŒdhya], since knowledge enubilates an object hitherto unrevealed [hetu]: like the light of a lamp appearing for the first time in darkness. [cf. SB p.88.1-5 & PrakŒ§Œtman, Pa–capŒdikavivaraöa p.85 for the original pèrva-pak·a]
[97.80-85] Vi§i· Œdvaitin: This will not survive analysis: if the argument proves ignorance as another unintended entity, it conflicts with Advaitin tenets.[viii] If it does not prove it, it is inconclusive; and also because the example vitiates the argument. The light of a lamp cannot reveal a hitherto unrevealed object, since it is only consciousness that illuminates. Even if there is a lamp, only cognition can reveal objects. The light of the lamp assists the organ of sight, which generates the cognition and is instrumental in removing obstructive darkness. (cf. SB p.92.2-10)
[97.86- 99.104] And there is a counter-syllogism: The ignorance under discussion does not occur in Brahman that is simple awareness, because it is misconception, like the mistake that mother of pearl is silver [whose substrate is the finite subject of cognition]. [SB 93.1-2]
Do not worry if the Advaitin says that the nature of the inner self which is subject to the misconception about the mother of pearl is also pure awareness, since the reply is: Conscious experience (anubhèti) is a specific property of the experiencing self. Variously called ‘j–Œna’, ‘avagati’, ‘saµvid’ etc., it is always intentional (sakarmaka) and its intrinsic nature is to render any entity susceptible of thought, speech and action. [cf. SB p.39.9-11] It belongs to the identity of the experiencer since it is one of the quality-particulars (guöa) found only in the soul. If it is asked, ‘cognition is a quality, how can the self be conscious essentially?’, the answer is: It is like the case of radiant substances (dravya) such as crystals that exist in the form of light and as the substrate of the attribute light. Light, albeit a substance, existing elsewhere than its substrate and having different colours, is practically treated as an attribute dependent upon a substrate. [SB p.41.14-20].
Likewise the soul just has the form of reflexive consciousness (svaprakŒ§a-cidrèpa), and consciousness is its quality (guöa). [SB p.42.7] Thus Scripture (§ruti) says:
‘A heap of salt is one entire mass of flavour through and through, so also this soul is through and through an entire mass of awareness’ (Br.Up. 4.5.13).
‘In that place this person becomes self-luminous’ (Br.Up. 4.3.9)
‘There
is no interruption of the knower’s knowledge’ (Br.Up. 4.3.30)
‘The one who thinks, ’let me smell this’, that is the soul’ (Ch.Up. 8.12.4)
[100.105-118] One cannot appeal to Scripture as the means of knowing (pramŒöa) causally effective ignorance on the grounds of the text, ’misled by the unreal’ ‘an¨tena pratyè¶hŒú’(Ch.Up. 8.3.2). The word ‘an¨ta’ means what is other than ¨ta and the word ‘¨ta’ has a ritual sense as in ‘drinking ¨ta’ [in the world of rites duly performed] (Ka ha Up. 3.1). ôta means ritual action undertaken without a desire for results, whose fruit is the attainment of God through devotional liturgy. An¨ta means ritual undertaken with a view to personal advantages, whose scant transmigratory result is opposed to the attainment of Brahman. The text means that those who are misled by an¨ta do not find the world of Brahman. (SB p.101.8-15)
In ‘Let him understand that mŒyŒ is prime matter (prak¨ti)’ (Svet.Up. 4.10), the word ‘mŒyŒ’ denotes the material cause (prak¨ti) consisting of the three genetic constituents (guöas) which generates the diversified cosmos. It does not express an ignorance that is indeterminable as real or unreal (anirvacan´ya).[ix]
In ‘ The thousand-fold mŒyŒ of the demon êambara was destroyed piece by piece by the swiftly moving one defending the body of the child’ (Vi·öu PurŒöa 1.19.20), we understand that the referent of the word ‘mŒyŒ’ is the real specific weapon of the demons which is capable of manifold diversification. So no scripture teaches indeterminable ignorance. (SB p.102.1-10)
[101.119-101.126] Nor is a principle of ignorance needed to explain Scriptures [such as Tat tvam asi] teaching the unity of the Soul and Brahman, which would otherwise be unintelligible [unless they deny the reality of difference]. This hypothetical inference (arthŒpatti)[x] does not get off the ground because it is not possible to understand the essential identity of the different individual and highest selves, given that the words ‘tat’ and ‘tvam’ denote Brahman with characteristics. To explain: the word ‘tat’ conveys Brahman free from every imperfection, the substrate of innumerable exalted qualities unlimited in their pre-eminence, whose unmotivated activity (l´lŒ) is the creation, the continued existence and the dissolution of the cosmos. Such a Brahman is the subject of texts such as ‘That reflected ‘May I become many, may I produce” ’ (Ch.Up. 6.2.3). The word ‘tvam’ used co-referentially (samŒnŒdhikaraöa) with the word ‘tat’ denotes Brahman qua embodied by the individual souls when qualified by their bodies. This is because co-referentiality expresses one entity qualified by two modes (prakŒra). [SB 110.10-15. Veds 20].
[102.127- 134] Advaitin: the statement ‘tat tvam asi’ is like the statement, ‘this is that Devadatta’ where the meaning of the co-referentiality is the unity of a featureless essence via non-literal, secondary predication (lak·aöayŒ) which eliminates conflicting meaning components of the two words.[xi] In ‘this is that’, the word ‘that’ conveys a person related to some other time and place. And by the word ‘this’ is understood relation with a near place and the present time. But identity is understood because they are used co-referentially. Since there cannot be a concept of identity of something simultaneously related to incompatible times and places, the two words must refer to an essence and unity of essence can be understood. Likewise in the statement ‘tat tvam asi’ there is indicated an impartite essence by elimination of the conflicting meaning components, to wit finite knowledge and infinite knowledge. (SB p.191.1-5; Veds 25; TR p.102)
[102.135-103-145] Vi§i· Œdvaitin: This submission is wrong. There is not a whiff of non-literal meaning in the example because there is no contradiction. The relation of one entity with two times past and present is not contradictory. Contradiction in relation to different places is removed by temporal difference because existence in the distant place belongs to the past and existence here is now. (SB p.193.4-9; TR p.107)
When the adoption of a non-literal signification is appropriate [i.e. when the literal meaning is clearly impossible in a particular context], it is not permissible to adopt a secondary meaning for two terms when contradiction is eliminated by recourse to a secondary meaning for one term. Otherwise, in rejecting the epistemic authority (prŒmŒöya) of recognition by disallowing that a single entity may have different characteristics at different times, the substantial continuity of enduring entities will be unproved and the Buddhists’ theory of temporal parts (k·aöabhaºga) will prevail. (SB p.39.20ff)[xii]
So here it is taught that there is no contradiction in the identity (tŒdŒtmya) of the individual and supreme selves in that they are related as body and soul. Brahman ensouls the individual self because it is an essentially dependent mode (prakŒra) in that it is the body of Brahman. Elsewhere Scripture says, ‘who dwells in the soul, who is within the soul, whom the soul does not know, whose body is the soul.’ (Br.Up. (MŒdhyandina recension) 3.7.22).[xiii]
[104.146-107.167] But the semantic principle that the denotative scope of words for essentially dependent modes, such as bodies, extends to the mode-possessor is not restricted to the pronoun ‘you’ (tvam)’. All nouns literally denote the Supreme Soul and they are not synonymous since they have different grounds for their applications.[xiv] All entities are ensouled by Brahman, because all entities that have the physical structures (saµsthŒna) of divinities, humans etc are modes by virtue of constituting the body of some individual self. Hence all nouns (including deity, human, yak·a, goblin, snake, demon, bird, tree, creeper, wood, stone, grass, pot and cloth) which are in current usage and referential (abhidhŒyaka) due to the connection of a base-element and suffix, while referring directly to an entity with a physical structure which is understood their usual referent (vŒcya), are also denoters of a complex which is included in the Supreme Self qua inner regulator of the individual soul which is represented by that physical structure.(Veds 17 & 85: TR pp.76-7)
It is stated in the fourth chapter of VedŒntade§ika’s TattvamuktŒval´ (c.1300 – the work is usually called TattvamuktŒkalŒpa) that the physical structures proper to deities etc are included in the Supreme Soul:
‘Words such as ‘deva’ etc also denote the individual soul by standing for (abhidhŒnŒt) what cannot exist apart from it (tadap¨thaksiddhabhŒva). This complex denotation is established usage in both Vedic and ordinary language, whenever a word lacks a restricted meaning. Existence of the physical forms of gods and men is unknown without relation to a soul. By entering them through the individual souls, the all-pervasive one has diversified names and forms in the world.’ (ibid.4.82)
Having taught by this that the reference of words such as deva includes the individual soul that is qualified by such a body and having defined the body in the passage beginning ‘given the absence of a single type of physical configuration’ (TattvamuktŒval´ 4.83), having next propounded the inseparability (ap¨thaksiddhatvam) of everything from God in, ‘by words for body-aspects’ (ibid. 4.84), he has established that the reference of all nouns includes the Supreme Self in the passage beginning ‘restricted reference’ (ibid. 4.85). All this may be confirmed from that work. The same has been established by RŒmŒnuja in the exegesis of the Scripture about Name and Form. (Veds paras 13-22: exegesis of Ch.Up. 6.1-15))
[107.168- 171] Moreover, since every instrument of knowledge (pramŒöa) refers to something with differentiating features (savi§e·avi·ayatŒ), there can be no epistemic warrant for a featureless reality.[xv] (cf. SB p.28.2-3; Veds 30; TR pp. 31ff). A differentiated entity is cognised in even non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpaka-pratyak·a). Otherwise in the conceptual perception, ‘this is that’, there could be no thought content qualified by a mode that has previously been grasped. (cf. SB pp. 29.9-30.2: TR pp. 34-43).
[108.172- 109.185] Moreover, the statement, ‘That thou art’ does not sublate the cosmos as something based on error. It is not like the statement that a rope has been mistaken for a snake. And knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the soul does not terminate the cosmos. We have already established that there is no epistemic warrant for these views. And the position establishing the reality of the plural universe does not conflict with the Scriptural affirmation (pratij–Œ) that there is understanding of everything from an understanding of the one. This is because it is readily comprehensible that there is understanding of reality as a whole by an understanding of the one if knowledge of all arises when there is knowledge of Brahman as substrative cause of a universe that is also Brahman-as-effect consisting in the complex of specific configurations all of which are Its modes: gods, animals, humans, and immovables which are derived from the ‘Egg of Brahma’ comprising primal matter, the soul, intellect, ego, the subtle elements, the gross elements, the organs of sensation and action, and the fourteen worlds.(Veds 69)
Besides, if everything other than Brahman were unreal, the affirmation that ‘by the understanding of one there is understanding of all’ would be contradicted given the unreality of all. (Veds 12)
Brahman has a causal state when embodied by prime matter and spirits in their subtle unmanifest condition devoid of differentiation by name and form. Dissolution (pralaya) is when the cosmos is in that condition. Brahman has its effect-state when embodied by gross and manifest conscious and non-conscious entities individuated by the distribution of names and forms. The gross, macroscopic condition of Brahman is called creation. The non-difference of cause and effect is propounded in the section of Scripture dealing with names and forms. (SB pp. 119-20) [xvi]
[110.186-190] Statements that Brahman is without qualities (nirguöa) are to be interpreted as expressing a denial of undesirable qualities mentioned in the scriptural context. (Veds 84)
Texts denying diversity are explained by the tenet that they deny the reality of entities apart from Brahman, the soul of all, which actually exists with everything as his modes in that he is the soul of all because the whole of reality comprising conscious and non-conscious entities has dependent modal status in virtue of being the body of the one Brahman. (Veds 84)
[110.191-111.203] What is the truth about reality? Difference, non-difference or a combination of the two? All are true. Non-difference is accommodated because Brahman alone exists having all as His modes in that everything is His body. Difference and no-difference are valid because the one Brahman exists in plural form since the various conscious and non-conscious entities are His modes. Difference is valid given the fundamental differences between the essences and concrete existences of God, souls and material things, which are not intermingled. (Veds 85)
The basic characteristics of the conscious entities, the individual souls, whose proper forms are uncontracted and unlimited untainted awareness but which are afflicted by avidyŒ in the form of beginningless karma (VP 6.7.61-3 & Veds 43 cf Veds 78), their consciousness being subject to expansion and contraction in conformity with their karma are: (i) Involvement in retributive experience (bhok¨tŒ) whose dual form is participation in felicity and frustration in accordance with their karma-stocks when they are associated with the non-conscious empirical sphere, and: (ii) the capacity to attain release through worship of God. The basic features of the non-conscious entities, the empirical sphere, are being material, being contrary to human well being and being subject to change. The features of God are: existence in the form of the inner regulator of subjects and objects of retributive experience; being a host of innumerable exalted qualities whose pre-eminence is unlimited, such as omniscience, supremacy, strength, power and radiance; the spontaneous activity of producing conscious and non-conscious entities other than himself, unsurpassed diverse and infinite adornment by a supernatural manifestation that is both worthy of and congenial to him. (Veds 87)
[111.204-112.213] VedŒnta De§ika provides this distribution of real categories:
Those who know say that reality is twofold: substance (dravya) and non-substance. Substance is divided into the insentient and the sentient. The former includes the unmanifest substrative cause and time. The latter is interior and remote. The interior is differentiated into the individual souls and God. The remote is the supernatural manifestation. (TattvamuktŒval´ 1.6)
Substance
has a variety of states. Prime matter has sattva and the other genetic
constituents. Time has the form of years and days, soul is atomic and
conscious; the other soul is God. The supernatural manifestation is declared to
be beyond the genetic constituents although connected with sattva. Mind is the
manifestation of the knowable to the knower. Thus are the characteristics of
substance related in brief. (TattvamuktŒval´
1.7)
[113.215-114.230] The individual selves, referents of the word ‘cit’ are both other than the supreme
soul and eternal. Thus the Scripture: ‘there
are two birds, companions and friends’ (Mund.Up.3.1.1.; Svet.Up.4.6). And it is stated (ad Vai§e·ika
Sètra
3.2.20): That there are many selves is in
accordance with the different states that people enjoy. Scripture
establishes their permanent existence: The
wise one is not born and does not die. He has not come into being and will not
become anything else. He is unborn, permanent, primeval and everlasting. He is
not killed when the body is killed. (Ka ha
Up 2.18)
Otherwise there would be the undesired consequence of the destruction of merit appropriate to what one has done well and benefits from what one has not done.
Thus it has been said, We don’t encounter the birth of one void of passion. (NyŒya-Sètra 3.1.25).
The atomic nature (aöutva)
of soul is Scripturally established: When
the tip of a hair is split into a hundred parts and one of those parts further
into one hundred parts, the individual soul, on the one hand, is the size of
one such part and on the other it partakes of infinity. (Svet. Up. 5.9) ; ‘the
person is the size of the point of an awl’ (Svet. Up.5.8); the atomic soul is to be known by the mind (Mund.Up
3.1.9)[xvii]
The empirical material cosmos
denoted by ‘acid’ is divided
threefold into the consequences, instruments and occasions of retributive experience.
[115.231- 116.243] God, known by words such as Supreme Person and VŒsudeva, is the efficient and substrative cause of the cosmos. ‘VŒsudeva is the highest Brahman, possessed of exalted qualities. The substrative and efficient cause of the world, the regulator of souls.’
This very VŒsudeva, supremely compassionate, loving to his devotees, the Supreme Person, in order to provide various rewards according to the merits of his worshippers, is spontaneously accessible in five forms: the temple image (arcŒ); power (vibhava); creative emanation (vyèha); the subtle (sèk·ma) and the inner regulator (antaryŒm´).
ArcŒ means iconic representations etc; ‘power’ means avatŒras such as RŒma; creative emanation is fourfold and known as VŒsudeva, Saµkar·aöa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. The Subtle is the Supreme Brahman called VŒsudeva who is replete with the six qualities (frequently attributed to the divine nature in the PŒ–carŒtra îgamas; j–Œna: immediate knowledge of everything, §akti: creativity, bala: regulative power, ai§varya: dominion, v´rya: immutability and tejas: power to overcome opposition.) His qualities include freedom from evil, as the Scripture has it, ‘That is free from evils, free from old age and death, free from sorrow, free from hunger and thirst, whose desires and intentions are realised.’ (Ch.Up. 8.7.3) The antaryŒm´ is the karmic regulator of all the individual selves, as the Scripture says, ‘who exists in the soul and rules the soul from within’ (Br.Up. 3.7.22 (MŒdhyandina recension).
[116.244-117.263] By worshipping each earlier form, on the
destruction of masses of misconduct that are contrary to human welfare, the
initiate worships the next form. VŒsudeva,
out of affection for his devotees, according to the initiates’ merits, provides
the many benefits that they desire. With that in view, he spontaneously creates
his own five forms; icons are representations, powers are avatŒras,
the four vyèhas
are Saµkar·aöa,
VŒsudeva,
Pradyumna and Aniruddha, the subtle is the collectivity of the ‘six-guöas’.
The Absolute is named VŒsudeva.
He is the inner regulator, immanent in the soul, the actuator of the soul.
Described in many Upani·adic
texts such as ‘who abides in the soul’. Having thrown away impurity by the
worship of temple icons, one becomes qualified. By the subsequent worship of
the powers he is qualified to worship the vyèhas,
by worship of the subtle he become capable of seeing the inner regulator.
The Pa–carŒtra ritual lays down a five-fold worship of God – introduction (abhigamana), preparation (upŒdŒna), sacrifice (ijyŒ), recitation (svŒdhyŒya) and yoga. Introduction is the sweeping and anointing of the path to the temple. Preparation is the provision of means of worship such as perfumes and flowers. Sacrifice is worship (pèjŒ) of deities. Recitation is repetition of mantras after understanding their meanings, the singing of Vaishnava hymns, the praise of Vi·öu’s names and the study of the §Œstras that propound the truth. Yoga is contemplation of the deity.
[117.264-118.285] When the vision of the visible [empirical
experience] has been ended by knowledge accompanied by ritual and devotion, the
infinitely compassionate Supreme Person who is affectionate to his devotees, bestows
upon the God-centred devotee his own place, which is the infinite bliss
commensurate to the divine reality, and from which there is no rebirth. As the sm¨ti
says, When they have come to me, the
great-souled no longer undergo future birth, a site of suffering, impermanent,
having attained the supreme perfection. (BG 8.15). VŒsudeva,
having reached his devotee, imparts his own state, blissful, undecaying and
from which there is no rebirth.
After storing all this up in his heart, relying on the Upani·ads and finding the commentary on the VedŒnta-sètras by the revered BodhŒyanŒcŒrya too long, RŒmŒnuja composed the êr´bhŒ·ya. The first Brahmasètra reads, ‘Now therefore the enquiry into Brahman’ (‘atha-ato brahma-jij–ŒsŒ) and this is what it means: ‘atha’ means immediately after studying the rituals that are being performed. Immediately after studying the rituals, he wants to know the Absolute. ‘Ataú’ states the reason: one who has read the Vedas and its appendages and understands its meaning becomes detached from rituals because their results are impermanent. The wish to know the Absolute arises in one who wants permanent release from rebirth, since it is the means of such liberation. ‘Brahma’ denotes for the Supreme Person, essentially free from imperfection, who has innumerable exalted qualities of limitless pre-eminence. Since understanding of rituals and their performance constitute a means to knowledge of the Absolute through producing detachment and purifying the mind, the two are related as cause and effect and the earlier and later Investigations (mimŒµsŒ i.e. into ritual performance (Vedic karma-kŒö¶a) and the nature of the Absolute (j–Œna-kŒö¶a) respectively) form a single body of teaching (§Œstra). That is why BodhŒyanŒcŒrya has said that this system is one with the sixteen-fold system of Jaimini (i.e. the Pèrva-MimŒµsŒ or enquiry into ritual duty). (SB pp.1-2)
[118.286-120.311] That the result of rituals is transitory and that of the knowledge of the Absolute permanent, has been stated in Scriptures such as ‘Scanning the worlds built by rituals, a Brahmin should be disinterested, realising that the permanent is not obtained by human action’ (Mund.Up.1.2.12). This is reinforced by inference (anumŒna) and hypothetical reasoning (arthŒpatti). By criticising each when taken singly, Scripture shows that the means to liberation is knowledge associated with ritual: They who worship avidyŒ enter blind darkness; but those delighting in knowledge enter a greater darkness (Br.Up. 4.4.10 & ç§a Up. 9). Knowledge and ignorance, he who knows both, passing beyond death and ignorance, tastes immortality by knowledge. (ç§a Up. 11) (SB pp.3-4)
As it is stated in the PŒ–carŒtrarahasya: That ocean of compassion, the Lord, affectionate to his devotees, for the sake of his worshippers assumes a fivefold form called icon, power, creative emanation, the subtle and the inner regulator. Taking refuge therein, souls reach different levels of understanding and become qualified for the worship of the next form as pollutants are exhausted. VŒsudeva become favourably disposed to those following daily §rauta and smŒrta duties and worshipping him in the manner stated. God, gratified by devotion in the form of contemplation immediately terminates avidyŒ consisting in one’s karma-stock. Then the souls’ natural and exalted attributes, such as omniscience, which have been occluded in saµsŒra are manifest. These attributes are the same for God and the released souls: only omnipotence is specific to the deity. Released souls are ancillaries to the divine master and enjoy all delights along with that wise one.
[121.312-123.343] Hence it is stated that Brahman known under personal designations such as ‘Supreme Person’ is to be investigated for the sake of immortality by those afflicted by the thee kinds of suffering. The grammarians say that where there is a verbal base and affix (prak¨ti-pratyayau), the meaning of the affix predominates. So in the desiderative form ‘jij–ŒsŒ, since the notion of being desired predominates (i·yamŒöa-pradhŒnatvŒd), the sètra enjoins knowledge as what is desired (i·yamŒöaµ j–Œnam iha vidheyam; SB p.2.13-15) And the understanding that has to be brought about is the referent of words such as ‘contemplation’ (dhyŒna) and ‘worship’ (upŒsana): it is not propositional knowledge immediately derived from sentences since that is accessible without an injunction to activity by any hearer who understands a collection of words.
In accordance with the Scriptures: ‘The soul indeed is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected upon and to be contemplated’ (Br.Up. 2.4.5); ‘Let him meditate upon the soul’ (Br.Up. 1,4.7); ‘Having known it, let him practice insight’ (Br.Up. 4.4.21); ’After knowing it, he reflects’ (Ch.Up. 8.7.1). Here, ‘to be heard’ is a statement about something already known (anuvŒda) since a person who, in accordance with the injunction to study has learned the Veda and understood its proper contents and its supplementary material, sees that it contains teachings about certain definite purposes, then of his own accord applies himself to hearing in order definitely to ascertain said purposes.
And that recollection has the same form as visualisation: ‘The knot in the heart is cut and all doubts are dispelled and the karma is exhausted in one who has seen the high and the low.’ (Mund.Up. 2.2.8). Given that Scripture has a single meaning, this is the type of visualisation enjoined in ’The soul indeed is to be seen’. Recollection assumes the form of seeing because of the intensity of visualisation. The VŒkyakŒra (sc. éaºka)[xviii] has expounded all this in the statement, ‘meditation would be knowing for this follows from the Scriptures on the topic. Meditation would be constant recollection for it is visualisation’ (quoted SB p.9). Scripture analyses this contemplation: ‘The soul is not to be attained by statements or by intelligence or even by much learning. He can only be attained by the one he chooses. To him the soul reveals its own nature’ (Ka hŒ Up. 2.23).
What is actually dearest is to be chosen. As one finds the soul most dear, so the Lord takes the initiate to himself (SB p.10.9f). It has been said by the Lord, ‘To those who are constantly disciplined, who worship me full of joy, I give the yoga of intelligence by which they come to me’ (BG.10.10) and ‘the Supreme Person can only be attained by exclusive devotion’ (BG 8.22).
[123.344-124.356] Devotion (bhakti)
is a type of cognition with no goal other than unsurpassed bliss, free from
desire for anything else. As the VŒkyakŒra
says (SB pp.11-12), it is acquired by discrimination etc.: ‘It is obtained by discrimination,
detachment, repeated practice, rituals, moral virtues, freedom from despondency
and complacency, since this agrees with Scripture and is revealed.’
There discrimination (viveka) is keeping the mind pure by pure food. Here the exegesis (nirvacana)[xix] is, ‘there is purification of the intellect by pure food and from purity of intellect there is retentive memory’. (Ch.Up. 7.26.2). Detachment (vimoka) is indifference to desires. The exegesis is ‘Let the tranquil one meditate’ (Ch.Up. 3.14.1). Repeated practice (abhyŒsa) is the diligent daily performance of prescribed ritual (saµ§´lanam v. RŒmŒnuja’s G´tŒBhŒ·ya 8.9). The exegesis from sm¨ti used by RŒmŒnuja is, ‘ineluctably transformed into that state’ (BG 8.6). Ritual (kriyŒ) is the capacity to perform §rauta and smŒrta observances. The exegesis is ‘the ritualist is the best of those whose know the Absolute’. The moral virtues (kalyŒöŒni) are truthfulness, sincerity, sympathy, generosity etc. The exegesis is ‘it is attained by truth’. Freedom from despondency (anavasŒda) is the opposite of abject depression. The exegesis is, ‘The soul is not attained by the weak’ (Mund.Up. 3.2.4). Complacency is the self-satisfaction arising from whatever is counter to the above virtues. Non-complacency arises from their practice. The exegesis is, ‘tranquil, controlled’ (Br.Up. 4.4.23).
[124.357-125.361] In this way it is established that the place of the Supreme Person (sc. liberation from rebirth) is attained by devotion in the form of contemplation which has reached a lucid presentation of the soul that is whole-hearted, incessant and surpassingly dear in one whose internal darkness has been dispelled by the grace of the Supreme Person which has been secured by specific religious prescriptions. (Veds 91). This has been stated by YŒmuna: ‘ Excusive and absolute bhakti-yoga is achieved by one whose mind has been disciplined by both’ which means someone whose mind has been cultivated by the yoga of action and by the yoga of knowledge. (îtmasiddhi p.5, quoted Veds 91 p.126)
[125.362-125.368] What about the definition about Brahman which one must desire to know, ‘Whence the origin etc of this (universe)’ (Brahmasètra 1.1.2)? ‘Origin etc’ stands for creation, continued existence and dissolution. It is an exocentric compound conveying the attributes of something. The meaning of the sètra is that the creation, continued existence and dissolution of the universe (asya) of inconceivably complex organisation which is intermingled with embodied souls from BrahmŒ down to a clump of grass, where the fruits of their karma are experienced at determinate (i.e. non-random) times and places, proceed from (yataú) a Person who is omnipotent, omniscient, who possesses innumerable all-surpassing exalted qualities, whose purposes are ever fulfilled, whose proper form is opposed to all evil and who is the Lord of all. (SB p.132.6-13)
[126.369-126.376] What is the means of knowing (pramŒöa) about such an Absolute? Brahma-sètra 1.1.3: ‘Because its source is scripture’ states that the corpus of scriptures is the means of knowing appropriate to the desire to know it. ‘Source’ means cause in the sense of means of knowledge (pramŒöa). The meaning is that scripture is the source of Brahman because it is the cause of the knowledge of Brahman.
Nor is it possible to suppose that Brahman is knowable by another means of knowledge. Sensory perception cannot operate in respect of something supra-sensible.
Nor is it knowable by inferences in the form, ‘oceans etc have a maker, because they are effects, like pots’ since such reasoning is like a putrid pumpkin.[xx] It is settled that texts such as ‘Whence these beings’ ( Taittir´ya Up 3.1.1) convey the Brahman characterised above. (SBh p.136ff)
.
[126.378-127.384] But even if Brahman does not fall within the range of the non-scriptural means of knowing, still Scripture cannot convey a Brahman that is an already existent entity independent of texts that treat of ritual activity and non-activity. To prevent such questioning there is Brahmasètra 1.1.4 ‘tat tu samanvayŒt’. The word ‘but’ excludes the query raised. Scripture can be the means of knowing Brahman. Why. Because of harmony. The meaning is that there is consistent reference to Brahman as the supreme good for human beings. It is not the case that that which has nothing to do with activity or non-activity is void of purpose. We see that statements about already existent things such as ‘a son has been born to you’ and ‘this isn’t a snake’ have a purpose in the form of the cessation of fear and the production of joy and so there is no problem. (SB pp. 146-7)
These are only general directions. The details may be gleaned from the originals.
[i] The
text is datable c.1350. The colophons
say it is the work of SŒyaöa
MŒdhava
who is sometimes identified with the prolific Advaitin author VidyŒraöya,
a minister of the king of the south Indian Vijayanagara empire established in
1336 after two centuries of Muslim influence. Hacker (Halbfass 1995 p.29) says
that MŒdhava
took the name VidyŒraöya
when he became a renouncer. He understands the Sarvadar§anasaµgraha
as an aspect of a doxographical
attempt restore Hindu identity by recovering and rehabilitating what was known
about sundry non-Islamic traditions during the early years of the Vijayanagara.
What is certain is that he presented Advaita as the final truth, the crown of
all other systems, which are nonetheless expressive of partial truths.
‘The RŒmŒnuja System’ was translated by A.E.Gough in The
Sarva-Dar§ana-Saµgraha or
Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy by Madhava-îchŒrya, translated by E.B.Cowell and A.E.Gough,
[ii] For statements of RŒmŒnuja’s three-level ontology, which is primarily directed against the bhedŒbheda realistic and pantheistic theory of emanation that understands the cosmos as a real transformation of the divine nature: Veds 65; SB p.116 inter alia. This is discussed in TR Ch.3 pp. 74-82.
The sophisticated intellectual articulation of the êr´ Vai·öava cult is called ‘Vi§i· Œdvaita VedŒnta’. The tradition understands the terms as a ·a· h´- tatpurur·a-samŒsa meaning ‘unity of a pluriform reality’ and not as a karmadhŒraya meaning ‘qualified non-dualism’.
[iv] Citsukh´ 1.9 (by Citsukha c.1295). The work is also known as the Tattvaprad´pikŒ. On non-knowledge as a projective cosmic force, occlusive of truth, v. TR pp. 12-17.
[v] êlokavŒrttika , AbhŒvapariccheda 12-13.
[vi] The quote attributed
to the PrŒbhŒkara is
from KumŒrila. But
it conveys their view that absences are not realities (padŒrtha) in opposition to the NyŒya-Vai§e·ika tenet
that absences are both real and knowable
through sensory perception. (The NaiyŒyikas also hold that
absences may be knowable by inference or by testimony). According to that view,
when I am looking for a pen and see that there isn’t one on the table, I
perceive an absence-of-pen whose locus is the table. So most NyŒya-Vai§e·ikas reify absences, treating absence-of-pen
as a type of entity (padŒrtha) which is discriminated by its
counter-positive or absentee (pratiyogin).
The PrŒbhŒkaras hold
that the non-perception of an object in a locus is just perception of an empty
locus. The absence of a pen on the table is just an empty table.
KumŒrila thinks
that when I notice the absence of a pot on the ground, this awareness is not
strictly perceptual, there being no data for the senses to appropriate, but the
product of a mode of cognition called ‘non-perception’ (anupalabdhi). The absence of the pot is a real feature of the
ground. But the subject must have a concept of the relevant object that is the
absentee.
According to the BhΠas,
cognitions are not intrinsically reflexive or self-revealing. Cognition brings
about the property ‘knowness’ (j–ŒtatŒ) in its
objects and the fact that something is observed generates the hypothetical
inference (arthŒpatti) that a
cognition has occurred in the soul. This means that there can be no internal
perception of ignorance as a prior absence. v. TR 67-8.
[vii] That is to say: If aj–Œna is just j–Œna-prŒg-abhŒva, awareness of the substrate and object of non-knowledge refers to an obscure presentation of the self.
[viii] RŒmŒnuja denies that there can be any inferential proof of ignorance as a postive entity. But what the inference may disastrously prove is a pernicious ignorance additional to bhŒva-rèpa and pragabhŒva, which (real not anirvacan´ya) ignorance will prevent, with no possibility of remedy, the very realisation that one is ignorant. Ignorance thus being the natural and inescapable condition of conscious beings, Advaitin praxis would be pointless.
[ix] The featureless, unitary Authentic Reality is conventionally interpreted as the complex world of entities and individual conscious agents due to avidyŒ, which both conceals the truth and projects diversity. This causative avidyŒ cannot be characterised as either being or non-being (and the cosmic appearance for which is responsible is sad-asad-vilak·aöa). It cannot be real because it would then be unintelligible that we could realise that the cosmic appearance is false (which would defeat Advaitic soteriological praxis). It cannot be non-existent, since then the origin of the cosmic appearance, as well as its elimination, would be impossible. (Ex nihilo nihil fit). So avidyŒ is characterised as ‘indeterminable as real or unreal’. v. TR p.66-67.
[x] This is a pattern of reasoning to the effect that if p is unintelligible without the truth of q, then it is legitimate to infer q. If Devadatta, who is fat, does not eat during the day, it is legitimate to infer that he eats by night. The BhŒ as regard arthŒpatti as a pramŒöa in its own right. Most NaiyŒyikas include it under inference
[xi] On the Advaitic use of lak·aöŒ and RŒmŒnuja’s response v. TR pp. 99-107.
[xii] A temporal
parts theory about the persistence of entities is one that analyses them
exhaustively into successive phases. So it says that objects are best understood
as processes or sequences of events. An example of an entity, which
uncontroversially has temporal parts, is a play, which is spread out in time
through its acts. The play is never present as a whole at any one time. This is
like the Buddhist anti-essentialist account of persisting entities such as
human personalities. They reduce personal identity to a sequence of mental and
physical occurrences. The Buddhist maintains that the human subject is
essentially temporal (k·aöika). By contrast, the Œtman is a stable continuant that is
entirely present at all times. (At BSBh. 2.3.7 êaµkara
attributes constant presence (vartamŒna-svabhŒva) to the Œtman.) The Œtman, while involved in temporal
processes through the life of the body, mind, senses and public circumstances
with which it is associated, persists through time without being essentially
constituted by temporal phases. On this understanding, events in one’s life do
not properly belong to one’s essential self but are parts of the embodied life
with which it is associated.
[xiii] For the ramifications of the theory that the universe of conscious and non-conscious entities constitutes the body of Brahman v. TR Chapter 3. The key feature of the model is that it articulates the essential dependence of the universe of conscious and non-conscious entities on God while also affirming their difference. It is in the field of Scriptural exegesis that the soul-body model really comes into its own. For a definitive statement of the idea v. Veds 76
The discrepancy between the two recensions (the other is called the KŒöva) of the B¨hadŒraöyaka Upani·ad is mentioned by RŒmŒnuja ad. SB 1.4.27; 2.1.9 & 2.3.19. It does not appear to worry him, although it raises problem about the status of the supernatural Vedic revelation comparable to those raised by the existence of different versions of New Testament texts for theories of the divine inspiration of Holy Scripture.
[xiv] cf Veds 21: People who do not know VedŒnta do not see that all individual souls are ensouled by Brahman and they think that the full meaning of words is exhausted by the entities which they conventionally denote when this is only one aspect their reference.
I suppose that this is compatible with the principle that the meanings of Vedic words are inherent in them (Veds 137-8). RŒmŒnuja never discusses the question.
[xv] This is not a verificationist point: RŒmŒnuja is not an anti-realist espousing an epistemically constrained criterion of reality to the effect that ‘what there really is’ is actually restricted to what we can conceive and refer to. The point is rather that if Authentic Reality (other candidates include Kantian noumena, Lockean substances, Cartesian pure extension, Democritus’ atoms and the void) is radically other than our lived experience which is but a fabric of ‘appearances’, then ‘it’ is just that, wholly dissociated from us, an unthinkable and literally unspeakable nothing. (Relatedly, there is a problem in characterising reality as unarticulated, chaotic, indeterminate and indescribable, since the three predicates are descriptive.)
[xvi] The satkŒryavŒda theory of causation propounded by
the Sεkhyas and
accepted by all VedŒntins is
that what will be treated as the effect pre-exists in a potential form in its
causal substrate (upŒdŒna-kŒraöa) as a
modality of a future state, prior to its actualisation as an identifiable
entity. An effect is not a new whole
entity distinct from its causal substrate: effects emerge as transformations (pariöŒma) of their
substrative causes. When Brahman is the cause and the cosmos is effect, there
is a direct ontic continuity between creator and creation.
The NaiyŒyikas
espouse the asatkŒrya theory of
causation that denies that effects pre-exist in their causal substrates. One of
their cardinal tenets is that an integrated whole product (avayavin) comes into being as a novel unit with its own identity,
over and above the sum of its parts (dravyŒntarabhèta) to which it is not reducible. The whole is not the
substrate of the parts, although it inheres in them. The whole cannot exist
without the parts, but the parts can exist without the whole. While whole and
parts are distinct, they may occupy the same physical space. According to the
NyŒya-Vai·e·ikas, the
whole occurs in its parts by the relation of inherence that joins things that
are distinct but which co-occur, one of the terms being incapable of existence
apart from the relation. The superadditional whole cannot occur without its
parts, and since they are different, inherence is the appropriate relation. The
notion of the irreducible whole is crucial in the NyŒya-Vai·e·ika
ontology. According to their asatkŒrya theory of causation, familiar
material objects as produced as new entities
that are combined out of their constituents. The origination of a product is
the re-arrangement of factors that are already existent. They think that
opposition to the Buddhist reductionism about of substance requires that
wholes, integrated by inherence, are more than a collection of parts and
properties. Spatio-temporal stability is explained in terms of integral natures
that are held together by inherence. According to the NyŒya-Vai§e·ikas, a
cloth is a whole whose component threads are combined by the relations of
inherence (samavŒya) and conjunction (saµyoga). A bundle of threads is just a
collection linked by conjunction. A cloth is a synthetic unity that is
ontologically different from the threads, which are its substrative or material
cause (samavŒyi-kŒraöa: the effect inheres in its causes and parts). Both
the conjunction (saµyoga) of the threads and their various
qualities (guöas) are classified as non-inherent causes (asamavŒyi-kŒraöa).
Other anti-Buddhist systems do not
require this formulation of the part-whole relation in order to defend the
spatio-temporal continuity of substances. According to satkŒrya theory of causation, familiar
material entities pre-exist potentially as whole individuals, combinations
analysable in a subject-property relation, in the causal substrates of which
they are modifications or manifestations. They are naturally integrated
synthetic unities from the start, as it were. This makes sense for organic
processes: it is much less convincing where human artefacts such as pots and
cloths are concerned. Some NaiyŒyikas say
that when a tree grows or has its branches lopped, it turns into a different
tree. This is problematic. It must be allowed that an entity can change some of
its properties without changing its identity, otherwise, all its properties are
necessary - e.g. a piece of wood could not be stained without its becoming a
completely different thing. This contradicts the principle that the whole is
not identical with its parts. An integrated whole or synthetic unity must be
able to survive the destruction or removal of some of its parts.
v. TR pp.71-3.
[xvii] On the soul’s atomicity, a PŒ–carŒtrika tenet, v. TR p.139. RŒmŒnuja includes subservience to God in the essential definition of the soul. This underpins devotional religion.
[xviii] The ancient master éaºka (aka Brahmanandin) wrote a commentary (long lost) on the ChŒndogya Upani·ad that was evidently congenial to RŒmŒnuja, although interestingly not to YŒmuna. v.Veds p.24f & p.302f.
[xix]Nirvacana-§Œstra began as a tradition of hermeneutics aiming to establish the meaning of obscure words in the Vedas by comparing them with other words with a similar phonetic formation, however tenuous the similarity. All nouns were thought to be related to some action expressed by a verb which is the reason for a noun’s signifying what it signifies. v. Kahrs (1998 & 2001).
For an example v. Veds 76: Œpnoti-iti-ŒtmŒ sarvŒtmŒdheyatayŒ niyŒmyatayŒ §e·atayŒ ca. Ap¨thaksiddhaµ prakŒrabhètam iti-ŒkŒraú §ar´ram iti ca ucyate.
[xx] Slightly expanded, the inference would be: Oceans etc (pak·a) have an intelligent maker (sŒdhya), because they are effects (hetu). Whatever is an effect has a maker – like a pot (sapak·a); whatever is not an effect has no maker – like the soul (vipak·a).
The inference to a unique omniscient and omnipotent Supreme Being that is the cause of the universe on the analogy of causes and effects known to us is problematic for a number of reasons.
In the first place a subsidiary argument that everything is an effect because it is partite is required. It would be possible separately to frame valid inferences about a whole range of particulars that they are effects because they are partite but that will not do here. In the first place, we cannot frame all of the relevant inferences. In the second place, the subject here is the cosmos taken collectively as a whole. Such an argument faces the formal difficult shared by all inferences where the pak·a is universal and of unrestricted generality. That is to say, there is neither a sapak·a nor a vipak·a external to it. Since the pak·a is by definition open to doubt, this means that any statement of vyŒpti will similarly be doubtful.
But even granting that everything is an effect, the most that the inference can prove is that entities are produced by intelligent creators with adequate powers. It does not prove that there is a single divine creator. Moreover, does the reason ‘being an effect’ apply collectively or distributively? The first option is simply not known – the totality of reality is never accessible to us. If its applies distributively to particular entities or states of affairs produced successively, it can only prove different creators. (Unless one has convincing reasons for insisting on a principle of economy.)
Bibliography
Abhyankar, V.S. (1914). êr´bhŒ·ya by RŒmŒnujŒcŒrya,
Buitenen, J.A.B. van (1956). RŒmŒnuja’s VedŒrthasaµgraha, Introduction, Critical Edition and Annotated
Translation,
Cowell, E.B. and Gough, A.E.
(1894). (trans.), The
Sarva-Dar§ana-Saµgraha or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu
Philosophy by Madhava-îchŒrya,
Halbfass, W. (1995). (ed.), Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on
Traditional and Modern Vedanta,
Johnson, W.J.
(1994). (trans.) The Bhagavad G´tŒ,
Kahrs. E.
(1998). Indian Semantic Analysis: The Nirvacana Tradition,
Kahrs, E.
(2001). ‘Nirukta’ in O.Leaman (ed.), Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy,
Olivelle, P., (trans.) Upani·ads,
Sadhale, Shastri G.S., 1935--8, The
Bhagavad-G´tŒ with Eleven Commentaries,
YŒmuna, Sri Yamunacharya's Siddhi
Trayam, ed. R.Ramanujachari & K.Srinivasacharya,
C.J.Bartley
Department of Philosophy