The Administration of the Achaemenid Empire

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INTRODUCTION

Imperial administration concerns above all two things: the extraction of profit for the ruling power and the maintenance of control (and hence of the possibility of exploitation). The former presupposes structures for collecting tribute or exploiting resources more directly (e.g. by reallocation of ownership); the latter is partly a matter of eradicating or (better) manipulating high status local interest groups and taking advantage of low status groups' indifference to the identity of the ruling power (administratively speaking both favour maximum use of existing structures) and partly a matter of force—the threat of large scale reprisal for revolt and the permanent presence of garrisons—of which the second at any rate is a standard administrative feature. The purpose of the present paper is not to reveal any particularly new interpretation of its subject but to provide a (doubtless far from complete) conspectus of relevant material, some of it not perhaps very familiar to Greek historians and numismatists who have not made special study of the Achaemenid empire. To find a convenient arrangement of the material is not easy and I have chosen to use two approaches: delineation of some geographically defined administrative units of the empire and description of the tribute system.

I begin with three preliminary points. Bureaucratic tendencies were highly developed in the Persian Empire. This is reflected even in literary sources. Ezra speaks of archives where royal edicts might be consulted.¹ The particular case in question is somewhat controversial (Cyrus' decree about the Jerusalem temple). No copy could be found at Babylon (the expected location) but one did turn up at Ecbatana. (The possibility of a Persepolitan copy is not even considered). Taking things at face value this suggests that storage was rather haphazard and the bureaucracy far from perfect. Alternatively one could wonder whether the decree (or at least the copy) was not after all spurious. But even so the imposture presupposes the existence of a document-oriented bureaucracy of some sort. The same perhaps goes for the belief of Ctesias (688F1 = Diod. 2.22.5, F5 = Diod. 2.32.4) and the authors of Ezra and Esther in various Persian 'historical' chronicles (though the status and subject matter of these is debatable).² And the statement in

¹ Ezra 5.17, 6.1–2 (cf. 1 Esdr. 6.21 f., Joseph. AJ 11.94, 98). According to Ezra 6.1 the Babylonian archive was in a treasury. Note: for Abbreviations and Bibliography see end of article.
² Ezra 4.15, 19 (1 Esdr. 2.21 f., Joseph. AJ 11.24 f.)
Esther (1.22, 3.12, 8.9) that royal edicts were sent ‘to each province in its own script and each people in its own language’, though doubtless hyperbolic (especially since the author takes there to be 127 provinces), does reflect a multilingual empire with which central authority communicated in writing and not exclusively in Persian. Hellanicus’ observation (687A F7) that Queen Atossa ‘invented’ the transmission of royal decisions through epistolai and bibloi belongs in the same category: people knew that the empire was a literate system, and Greeks loved to have a protos heuretés. (The clearest example of a royal text communicated to all parts of the empire in various tongues is Darius’ Behistun narrative: his own statement ‘This inscription I sent off everywhere among the lands/people’ (DB70) is confirmed by an Aramaic fragment from Egypt (Greenfield & Porten 1982) and an Akkadian one from Babylon (Voigtlander 1978:63.).

But it is the evidence revealed by archaeology that makes the point about bureaucracy most emphatically: the caches of Achaemenid bullae which are all that remain of such administrative centres as Dascyleium (Balkan 1959) or Memphis (Petrie 1910:xxxv, xxxvi, Bresciani 1958:182) and the Elamite tablets from the Persepolis administration, which reveal, for example, the bureaucratic aspect of the Royal Road. What Greek sources have to say should already have suggested that a considerable organization was needed to keep 111 stathmoi between Sardis and Susa in commission for royal despatch riders. But their tendency to concentrate on the latter distracted attention from the generality of travellers (except for a few stories suggesting that such people could expect police surveillance). We now see that there was a system of travel authorizations by king, satrap, or other high official, which entitled the traveller to draw provisions at daily stopping places and we can understand what lies behind Alcibiades’ need to


These cases are only special because of large concentrations at one site: Achaemenid seals are found in small numbers all over the empire, as are non-Achaemenid seals and seals displaying varying degrees of influence from pure Achaemenid style. The large caches are generally associated with finds in these latter categories, so all sorts of design might evidently be found in any given administrative centre and we may e.g. legitimately regard the provenances of the pyramidal seals in Boardman 1970 as reflecting Sardis’ role as administrative centre.


The basic source is Hdt. 5.52; cf. also id. 3.126.2, 8.98, Xen. Cyr. 8.6.17, Esther 3.13f., 8.9 (all on despatch riders). Substantial ‘royal stathmoi’ are mentioned in Plut. Artax. 25 (Median/Cadusian border), Hdt. 6.119.2 (Cissia); and cf. Ael. VH 1.32, NA 15.26. The Royal Road (Sardis-Susa) is not the only ‘royal road’: cf. Ps. Ar. Orch. 1348.25 (Lycia), BP 3.8, 10, 4.10, 12.19 (Elephantine), P. Louvre E. 2430 (Thebes), VS 3.153, 156, 158, 160, 165, 5.110 (Dilbar), FP 18, 30, 44, 63, Ball 1892:167 (Babylon), VS 4.98 (Borsippa), YOS 7.136 (Ur), TCL 13.203 (Nippur), Dar. 140.

Hdt. 5.35, 7.239 (secret messages), Xen. An. 1.9.13 (roads in Cyrus’ provinces ‘kept safe’), Diod. 11.56.6, Plut. Them. 26 (travel in purdah to avoid surveillance).
have Pharnabazus 'arrange' a projected trip to the king. Nor was this the only way to travel. The Egyptian satrap Arsames issued an Aramaic passport to his personal estate-manager allowing him to get provisions from counterparts in Babylonia, Assyria, and Syria (AD 6). But Arsames' estates did not run continuously from Susa to Memphis, so the manager presumably carried other provision authorizations as well.

Secondly, the Persian approach to administration did not involve abolishing existing structures and replacing them with a unified Persian one. There could be interference, of course: the bow-fief system in Babylonia (below, pp. 153 f.) was a Persian innovation and must have involved considerable dislocation of the previous status quo, and this would no doubt be generally true of landholding throughout the empire. Surveillance of the appointment of lesonis priests in Egypt belongs in the same category, since they were temple presidents concerned with financial administration—though even in native practice they would theoretically be (and perhaps were actually) royal appointees (Lloyd 1983:303). But equally typical is the continued functioning of the Elders and the 'popular' assemblies of Babylonian temple/city communities which had jurisdiction in various sorts of property dispute (Dandamayev 1976:473 f., 1977:590 f., 1982:38 f.) or the Jewish community assembly at Elephantine (AP 15.22, 26, BP 2.7, 7.2: also a judicial body) or similar foreign community institutions in Babylonia (Eph'al 1978:76, Dandamayev 1982:41, 1984a:339) and maybe even Persia (Stolper 1984:309) or (of course) the Phoenician or Cypriot or Anatolian Greek city-state. The Persians might interfere in the political matter of which individual or class controlled a particular city-state; they might visit enslavement, deportation, and destruction upon the population and buildings of a rebel polis, but they did not eradicate the institution (even in the latter cases), and did not necessarily object to the union of several cities in leagues or the like. It is also typical that Achaemenid rulers were eager to adopt the titles and status of some of the monarchs whom they displaced and that viewing pre- and post-Persian conquest native documentary evidence

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8 Diod. 14.11.2 f., Plut. Ale. 37 (Pharnabazus would authorize safe passage and provide a hodegos)—Naveh 1975 suggests that some Arad ostraca reveal the place to have been a way station. For Achaemenid roads and associated way stations in the Persepolis/Pasargadae region and on the road to Susa cf. Stroach 1978:166 f., Kleiss 1981, Summer 1984:17.

9 Briant 1982a:311, n.d.(a) thinks the text more strictly comparable to Persepolis travel documents, identifying the officials as 'intendants qui gèrent les Magasins royaux', not private estate-managers; but that Arsames speaks of his byt' (house) not bg (domain) is of little significance (the terms being used interchangeably of personal estates) and the uneven distribution of the managers over the area through which the passport-holder was travelling favours the traditional interpretation.


11 The continued existence of city-states hardly requires proof; there are inscriptions recording public acts and coinage to supplement the literary evidence.

12 e.g. Miletus (Hdt. 6.18.1, 20.1, 25.5), other Ionian rebels (id. 6.9.4 f., 32), Eretria (id. 6.101, 119, Strab. 747), Barca (Hdt. 4.204). For continued existence of Ionian cities after 494 cf. Hdt. 6.42, 43.3.

13 Phoenicia: Diod. 16.41.1 (Tripolis, a Phoenician synhedrion). Ionia: Tod 113 (Strousha delegates initial arbitration of border-dispute to Ionian league). Bryce 1983:33, 35, 41 suggests the Persians actually promoted a Lycian federation under Xanthus, but this is decidedly speculative.

14 cf. Cambyses (Posener 1936:no. 1) and Darius (Winlock 1941:7) in Egypt, and all Kings up to Artaxerxes I in Babylonia (Cameron 1941: with additional, later information in Kuhrt & Sherwin-White n.d.). Ackroyd n.d. argues that Achaemenid kings also saw themselves as Kings of Judah, successors to the Davidic line.
from Babylonia or Egypt as a whole one is conscious of considerable continuity, especially in the fairly immediate vicinity of the Persians' arrival. (In Babylonia more than a generation passes before changes in legal practice and terminology begin to manifest themselves: Meuleau 1969:381, Dandamayev 1984:332, Kuhrt n.d.). In short, it was the Persian way to use existing institutions and seek to harness the energies and interests of native dominant classes to their own ends. Hence just as Asiatic Greek cities always contained those who looked to Persia (and might flee 'to the Mede' if things went wrong), so in Egypt we encounter not only the notorious Udjahorresnet (Posener 1936:no. 1, Lloyd 1982) and Somtutefnekhet (Tresson 1931) but also Khnemibre (chief of works and military commander) and Ahmose (another military commander) (Posener 1936:nos. 6–7 and 11–23). Their titles may in the last analysis have been empty (Briant n.d.(b)) but their status was maintained and they are the sort of people who make up 'the Egyptians who did not join the rebellion' (Thuc. 1. 104) in c. 460; and in the right contexts (e.g. the provinces of Beyond the River: below p. 122) native dignitaries need not have lacked for some enjoyment of a real sense of power.

Lack of imperial uniformity can be highlighted by considering some phenomena which are occasionally and misleadingly adduced to demonstrate its presence. Elsewhere in this volume Dr. Carradice describes a standardized royal coinage which was not, however, the coinage of the empire. A Babylonian weight system ('the stones of the King') was imported into Egypt (and has been presumed in Palestine), but it was only Babylonian in name (the shekel being 8.76 g not 8.4 g), and it coexisted with a separate, native standard ('the stones of Ptah') which is the normal point of reference in demotic texts. Moreover, certain formulae in Aramaic texts imply that the Babylonian karš (ten 8.4 g shekels) was a familiar unit in the same region. At least three weight standards, therefore: no uniformity here. In Babylonia itself there is occasional reference to disbursement of commodities by 'royal measure' (Dar. 158, TCL 13.128, 159, VS 3.131–2, TuM 2/3 137) but temple measures are also encountered, and the commonest measure in debt-payments is that of the creditor (San Nicolò/Unghnad 1935:233). Then there is the question of law. Darius speaks of the peoples of the empire obeying his law; Ezra was told to punish those who disregarded the King's Law (Ezra 7.25, I Esdr. 8.23); and royal data is mentioned in Babylonian documents after 519 BC in connection with slave-sales, tolls, and cash deposits (Dar. 53, VS 3.159, UET 4.101; cf. also VS 6.99, using the Akkadian word for 'law', and VS 6.128 mentioning a man 'set over the data'). But the legal codification ordered in Egypt by Darius was of Egyptian law as it stood in 525 (and the law of the demotic papyri is largely unchanged from Saite times), Ezra was also told to enforce the 'law of your God', and the Elephantine Jews had their own legal code (with Babylonian and Egyptian elements), as did Babylonians and Greeks within their cities. All Darius' boast need mean is that, if a

15 Stones of the King: AP 5, 6, 8–10, 14–15, 20, 25, 28, 43, 46, BP 3–5, 5, 7–10, 12. Stones of Ptah: AP 11, P. Berlin 3078, 3110, P. Loeb 44, 45, 48, 49, 68, P. Louvre E 9292, P. Turin 228. Palestine: Stern 1962:215 ff. (but there will have been local standards too, ibid.).
16 Porten 1968:305–7; and ibid. 62–72 on the whole metrological topic.
17 DB8, DNk 3, DSè 4, XPh 3 (and cf. Aesch. Pers. 594 f.).
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place was within the empire, there would be some matters in which Persian-imposed legal regulations might apply—and the king could in principle multiply these endlessly if he wished (which he often did not). Alternatively (or additionally) we may accept the argument of Frei 1984, that there was a procedure for royal authorization of the laws of local communities. Either way it would be misleading to speak of the empire being bound together by a uniform legal code.

Thirdly, ‘it is notoriously difficult to separate military and court ranks in the Achaemenid empire and may indeed be a pointless exercise’ (Smith & Kuhrt 1982:207). This is true, and one possible implication is that even persons who are attested in purely military capacities and without a title or other indication to ‘place’ them in the structure of permanent garrisons or civil functionaries may nonetheless deserve consideration in the present context. I have not, however, succumbed to this line of thought and attempted to catalogue such persons exhaustively in order to guess at their possible administrative significance: there are enough uncertainties as it is. Nor, indeed, shall I say as much about the garrison structure as the present subject would perhaps warrant: some amends may be made for this by the discussion in Tuplin n.d.(b).

I GEOGRAPHICAL DIVISIONS

1 SATRAPIES AND THE PERSEPOLIS DISTRICT

Let us turn now to the constituent parts of the Achaemenid empire. In seeking to delineate these, we dispose of various sorts of systematic description or (more crudely) lists. Many Persian royal inscriptions provide lists of the lands/peoples (daḥyāva) of the empire. Thirty-one different peoples appear at one time or another (counting various types of Ionian and Scythian as one, though more than one can appear at once), though no list has more than 26. Although these lists are sometimes accompanied by formulae stressing the King’s possession of the people in question, their fear of and obedience to him and his law, and their provision of tribute (DB 8, DPe 2, DNA 3, DSe 2, Dsv, XPh 3), there is no explicit indication (nor any reason to infer) that they are administrative units. They simply express the empire’s extent in terms of ethnic groupings (Cameron 1973). Similarly unhelpful are the ethnē in Herodotus’ and other sources’ extensive listings of the constituents of royal armies. Of more use is Herodotus’ list of 20 tribute-paying nomoi = arkhai = satrapies, mostly comprising several ethnē (3.89 ff.). Its status as ‘document’ is decidedly controversial (its geographical order certainly tells against an immediate Persian official origin) but it does bear some relation to parts of a third list, the one which we can compile for ourselves from the whole range of written evidence of the regions and places named in titles of attested imperial officials. This

20 DB6, DPe 2, DNA 3, DN 1–XXX, DSe 2, DSM 2, Dsv, XPh 3, A?P, Suez canal stelae (Posener 1936: nos. 8–10), Susa statue base (Roaf 1974). The sources of materials for the Susa palace in D5f and DSz amount to a list of peoples, and in the shorter DSaa they are actually presented in that form (cf. Herrnenschmidt 1983). In addition there are unlabelled representatives of imperial peoples on four royal tombs and at various points in the Persepolis palace (cf. Roaf 1974).
21 Hdt. 7.61–99 (Xerxes); Arr. An. 3.8.3 f., 11.3, Curt. 4.12.6 f., Diod. 17.59 (Gaugamela); Curt. 3.2.1 f. (army review prior to Issus). The only other moderately extensive listing (of a non-royal army) is Nep. Dat. 8 (army of Autophradates).
is much the most voluminous evidence (though it suffers from variations of date and inconsistencies of terminology). Once it is compiled we can, as a first step, assemble a list of relatively large regions attested (with, admittedly, occasional changes of boundary and combination) as the responsibility of officials whom Greek sources regularly call satraps (a term also used e.g. in the OP text of DB). We can for convenience call these regions satrapies (the term is actually not specially common in ancient sources), and then recognize further satraps in individuals associated with the appropriate areas but given a large variety of other titles or periphrastic descriptions. Satraps are not the highest level officers ever attested in provincial contexts. In the early years of Persian rule Babylonia was governed by Nabuahhebullit the šakin mati (governor of the land), an office already established in pre-Achaemenid times (and indeed held by Nabuahhebullit himself since at least 548/7) which was abolished in favour of an Iranian satrap of Babylonia and Beyond the River at the end of Cyrus' fourth year (San Nicolò 1941:61 ff., Oppenheim 1985:544); and the circumstances of war with Greek powers over possession of western Anatolia led intermittently to the creation of superior officials of various sorts. Nor do the satrapies exhaustively fill the imperial area: some largish regions which were under satraps in the fourth century were earlier ruled by local dynasts—Caria, Lycia and Cilicia are clear instances—and no Achaemenid satrap is ever recorded for e.g. Cyprus or (for all their regular appearance in lists of peoples) Sogdiana, the Arabs, or the Scythians. Moreover, there were always some peoples inside the empire who paid scarcely any attention at all to the King's rule and

22 An inexhaustive list of examples/references: hyparch (Hdt. 3.70, 126, 6.35, Arr. An. 1.12.8, Robert 1975), praefectus (Nep. Dat. 2.5, Curt. 4.6.2, Plin. N. H. 6.120), præses (Curt. 3.4.3, Nep. Con. 5.3), praepone (Just. 1.6.16, 5.5.1), eparch (Joseph A. 11.9), ἱέργεως (Xen. An. 3.15.7, Theop. 115 F389, Hdt. 3.120.2), ἀρματαρχεὺς (Diod. 17.21), ιεραρχὸς (Hdt. 1.153, 7.7), εἰσαγάγων (Isoc. 4.162), combinations of ἱέργεως/ἱεραρχός, συμβάσιος or GN (Thuc. 1.115.4, Hdt. 1.192, 3.127 and—pace Cook 1983:178—5.102), provinocial habens (Nep. Dat. 1.1), κρασαρός (Polyaen. 7.28.2), 'to whom Egypt is entrusted' (P. Berlin 13539-40), phl. pihat or LU.NAM (Camb. 344, Oelsner 1976:316, BE 10.101, 118), cf (Cooke 1903:149A6). The reasonably clear satrapies are: Lydia, Hellespontine Phrygia, Great Phrygia, Cappadocia (latterly divided in two), Caria (+ Lycia) (cf. n. 24), Armenia, Cilicia (cf. n. 24), Beyond the River ('Syria'), Egypt, Babylonia, Media, Susa, (?) Persis (cf. p. 115), Hycrania/Parthia, Arachosia/Drangiana, Aria, Carmania, Bactria. But this list is probably incomplete (in particular there is the question of a possible Indian satrap at some dates).

23 Some are also satraps, e.g. Tissaphernes (Thuc. 8.5.4, Diod. 13.36.5, Xen. Hell. 3.2.13, 4.1.37; the import of ib. 3.1.3, Diod. 14.26.4 is arguable); Cyrus (Xen. Hell. 1.43, An. 1.1.2.9, 9.7, (? Plut. Artaxerxes 2, Diod. 14.12.5, 19.2), (?) Tiribazus (Xen. Hell. 4.8.12, Diod. 14.85.4), (?) Struthas (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17, Diod. 14.99). Others are not, e.g. Tithraustes (Diod. 14.80.7), (?) Artemis and Paipheres (Hecat. 19.4), Mentor (Diod. 16.50.8, 52.2), Memon (Arr. An. 1.20.2, 2.1.1, Diod. 17.23.6, 29.1), Pharnabazus (Curt. 3.13.14). There are many uncertainties here, to which can be added individuals who are generals or 'rulers' or satraps of (coastal) Asia or the coast: Artabazus (epist. Them. 16), Orontes (Diod. 15.90), Harpagus (Diod. 9.35.1), Otoes (Hdt. 5.25), Artaphernes (id. 5.30.5), Hydarnes (id. 7.135.1).

24 Caria: Hornblower 1982:1-34; Lycia: 'never subdued by Persia' (Isoc. 4.161); no satrap of Lycia attested until TL 44b 26 (precise import obscure) or thereafter until FX VI pp. 32 f. SEG 27.942 (a satrap of Caria and Lycia). Coinage establishes the existence of many dynasts. Cilicia: local ruler called Symennes (Hdt. 5.118, 7.98, Xen. An. 1.2.12.4, 4.4, Diod. 14.20.1). Non-satrapal according to Xen. Cyr. 7.4.2, 8.6.7, Iranian satraps appear in the last generation of the empire, with Cilicia sometimes combined with Beyond the River.

25 Cyprus: non-satrapal in Xen. Cyr. 8.6.7. Literary/numismatic evidence reveals only city-kings/dynasts etc. (The case of Phoenicia for most of the imperial period is perhaps only different in that, not being an island wholly separate from the Levant, it is more easily assumed to be part of Beyond the River.). A satrap of Paphgalonos (anonymous) appears in Diod. 14.11.3, but the remainder of the evidence is consistent with Xenophon's view (Cyr. 8.6.7) that it was non-satrapal.

26 e.g. mountainous hinterland of Mysia (Xen. Hell. 3.1.13, An. 3.2.23, Mem. 3.5.26, Hell. Oxy. 21; contrast Hdt. 3.90.1, 7.74.1, 9.32.1); Psidia/Lycania (absent in Hdt. 3.90; and cf. Diod. 11.61, Ephor. 70 P91.54f., Xen. Mem. loc. cit., Hell. loc.
others (notably the 'agro-pastoralists' of the Zagros) whose relation with him consisted rather in receiving regular 'gifts' than in paying tribute, though they did furnish manpower for royal armies (Briant 1982b:57–112). The former were certainly not effectively within satrapies and the latter probably scarcely more so, except insofar as they might be commanded by the appropriate satrap in the context of military service. But, despite these important qualifications, satrapies do constitute a basic large-scale administrative framework of the empire; and more detailed discussion of Achaemenid administration is generally concerned with the structures and procedures one might find within a satrapy.

There is, however, one voluminously important exception. The Persepolis Fortification tablets, though emanating from an imperial capital, do not relate to the whole empire. But neither do they relate to the satrapy of Persis. There may indeed have been no such satrapy at the time (the first attested satrap of Persis appears in 331/O and even he is only so designated by one source (Arr. An. 3.18.2)), but in any case one of the four subregions covered by the archive is beyond the Persian Gates and arguably not in Persis (Hallock 1977) and some of the tablets relate to operations at Susa (PF 88–92, 136, 318, 337, 1752–3). We can see various administrative elements in this exceptional region (cf. studies cited in n. 4). There is a chief administrator, notably Pharmaces, the King's uncle, with an attendant chancellery. There is the Persepolis treasurer, presumably also the ultimate controller of other treasury sites (below pp. 130 f.). There are two types of person associated with the worker-groups whose sustenance is so prominent a subject in the archive: (i) those (not numerous) who 'assign' them—the three commonest are 'chiefs of workers', their seals help to define the subregions and Hinz 1971 regards them as the chiefs of the whole system of food-stores, itself divided into five commodity departments (grain, wine/beer, fruit, animals, and fowls); and (ii) those who 'apportion' them, i.e. produce lists of workers and indications of size of rations. Then there are the supply officers at particular locations (though sometimes responsible for several) who provide the commodities for workers' rations and in the other contexts which the archive covers. There are also a couple of tantalizingly uninformative references to what may be a dahyupati (Hinz 1975:92), i.e. a man in charge of a dahyu, the word used for entities in royal lists of lands/peoples. On a different tack, Sumner has recently pursued the principles laid down by Hallock for analysing the geography of the area covered by the archive and, by charting the associations of individual places in the transfer of produce or issue of rations, has produced an analysis in which Hallock's subregions I and II (Persepolis/Shiraz/Narezzaš [seals 1, 32] and Kamfiruz [seals 3, 30] respectively: Hallock 1977:109) break down into 'a regional model centred on Persepolis...with three urban regions [viz. Matezziš, a place immediately adjacent to Persepolis, Kaupirriš, and Shiraz] and a dozen rural districts composed of large or smaller towns and associated villages' (Sumner 1986:18 f., esp. 21–22). The model is based on only a fraction of the possibly relevant material (for a more systematic treatment we are still awaiting the dissertation of A. M. Arfaee and, it seems, are likely to be doing so for some time to come). Moreover Sumner presents only his
results, not the detailed working that led to them, so it is difficult to evaluate them without immense labour. But any even casual reader of the texts will be aware that the operation is in principle feasible (and desirable), and Sumner’s preliminary report may represent the start of an analysis which will eventually reveal the medium-size administrative districts of Achaemenid Fars. If so, however, one will expect his very large Shiraz ‘urban region’ to dissolve into units closer in scale to the Matezzis and Kaupirris ones; and the prerequisite of any precise results in this direction must remain proper analyses of the interlocking workings of attested ‘officials’. From that goal we are still very distant, and the already evident fact that particular individuals can combine several functions is not going to make things easier. All the same, the general picture of individual supply points (which can include private estates), storehouses, granaries, treasuries, and various regions is clear enough, even if the precise interrelationships of the various stages are not. Also clear is the very great complexity. It is a major question whether we can assume quite this sort of complexity everywhere, especially in areas where there were not such huge numbers of quasi-servile workers (15,376 persons at 108 locations over the period 509–494 according to figures in Dandamayev 1975). These kurtaš, who are overwhelmingly non-Iranian, clearly include deported prisoners of war, literary evidence about whom almost always involves deportation to the central and eastern parts of the empire. If the Persepolis tablets are archives of the royal ‘palace economy’, their bearing on places far from royal palaces might be thought debatable. And yet the differences may be largely ones of scale. Moreover, not all deportees ended up geographically close to the royal capitals and there were certainly equivalents of kurtaš not only in Babylonia but also in Egypt. In fact the significance of the royal capitals should not be overstressed: after all, there was royal land and land in the hands of members of the royal family all over the empire.

Few officials, apart from the satrap, have titles suggesting an office applying to the whole of a satrapy. The ‘treasurers of Beyond the River’ in Ezra 7.21 would be an example, if the text refers to officials of a central satrapal treasury rather than

27 As Lewis 1984:594 remarks these figures are not entirely accurate (the number of locations, for example, is actually 112), but must be of the right order.


29 Babylonia: (i) gardu: VS 3.138/9, FP 32, BE 9.15, 101, 10.95, 118, 127, PBS 2/1 2, 204, CBS 12985, with Cardascia 1951:79, Dandamayev 1963:148, 1984c:568 f., Stolper 1974:100 f. In Murāsu texts the gardu are organized in fief-collectives (cf. p. 153), seem exclusively associated with royal possessions and include non-Babylonians. (ii) ḫanum: common in Murāsu texts, see also (earlier) VS 6.276, TCL 13.147, YOS 7.106, 111, 114, Cyrr 158. See Stolper 1974:120 f., Dandamayev 1984c:626 f. Egypt: AD 7, 9, 12 (grd’, who are branded, appropriated to estates, receive provisions and can have property; an estate-manager is expected to secure extra ones during local disturbances, presumably as prisoners), Saqqara 19.6 f. (grd’ on whom tax is paid). Arsames’ branded slaves (bd), appointed in my domain’ (AD 5) may be relevant. Pemîkī in AP 26.4 f. could be foremen of gardu like the *fisam- 

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collectively to the officials of all the satrapy’s treasuries, which is an open question. (A similar problem arises with the ‘inspectors of the province Beyond the River’ in ibid. 5.6, 6.6.) On the whole, officials operating within a satrapy are either not ‘placed’ at all (being on record without informative title or other indication of hierarchical position) or are presented either as subordinates/associates of the satrap himself or as officers of some area smaller than the complete satrapy. Xenophon’s Elder Cyrus tells his satraps to create courts modelled on the royal one (Cyr. 8.6.10 f.). Without pursuing all the implications of this (via evidence about the royal court), one can (as an example with other satrapal and royal parallels) register the evidence about the younger Cyrus’ philoi, homotrapezoi and skép toukhoi (who, inter alia, were constituents of the 600 cavalry who fought alongside him at Cunaxa) or the commanders of Pharmabuzus’ cavalry (Xen. Hell. 3.4.13, An. 6.4.24 f.) or, at a subsatrapal level, the ‘kinsmen’ and ‘men under the governor’ who appear in Nehemiah, a work which also speaks of the governor’s table. Cyrus’ entourage included people actually related to one another, and the notion of kinship recurs with the 40 syngeneis accompanying Spithridates at the Granicus (Diod. 17.20.2, 21.1). Their status is, however, debatable (they may simply be high-ranking persons who were members of the royal syngeneia), and we shall have to rely rather upon the Nehemiah passage just mentioned (referring strictly to a subsatrapal level) and upon speculation about the satrapal court cavalry of Xenophon Cyropaedia 8.6.10 if we wish to believe that a satrap’s aping of the King actually included the maintenance of an order of Satrapal Relatives. The absence of any corresponding evidence in connection with the younger Cyrus strikes me as a powerful reason for caution on this issue. (There seems, incidentally, to be no evidence for a satrapal order of Benefactors to match the royal one.)

When passing through Dana (i.e. Tyana) Cyrus had occasion to execute two

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30 e.g. Hieramenes (Xen. Hell. 2.1.8, Thuc. 8.58, TL 44c.12), Mithravahahit (AP 70: addressed with a quasi-pharaonic formula), Bagamarzidaia (named on a seal from Upper Egypt: Aïmè-Giron 1939-45), Armanidata, Spentadata (P. Aram. Berlin 23000 = Grelot 1972:no. 109), Syrty or Myrty, the army chief (Smith & Kuhrt 1982), Asaph, keeper of a royal paradeis (Neh. 2.8). Such a list could easily be greatly extended.
31 e.g. dautija (?) = OP *dasi-/dasya, ‘expert’: Zadok 1976b:5 f.): BE 10.91, ROMCT 2.48; ma trị (‘agent’): Pohl 1.61, Michigan 89; malenun: TuM 2/3 147, cf. p. 133; *vištirasa: cf. n. 44; scribe: cf. n. 39; and (of course) ‘servant/slave’ (BE 10.84-5, VS 4.152).
32 Philoi: Xen. An. 1.9.31, Oct. 4.19 (Other satraps: e.g. Nep. Dat. 9.2, Polyvaen. 7.23.1. The King: Diod. 15.10.3, 16.50.7, 17.35.2 f., Plut. Them. 29, Mor. 174B, Agath. 472 F6, Hdt. 7.39.1). Homotrapezoi: Xen. An. 1.8.25, 9.31. (Other satraps: Xen. Cyr. 8.6.11, 14. The King: Hdt. 4.132, Xen. Cyr. 8.1.39, 6.11, 14, Oct. 4.8. Ctes. 688 F14 (43), Heraclid. 689 F5, Curt. 3.3.21, 25, 6.2.7, 1 Esdr. 3.4 f., 442, Joseph. A] 11.34 f.—some of these texts imply that the relatives are a separate, higher status group, from mere philoi). On the other hand an élite cavalry unit of 1000 syngeneis appears at Gaugamela (Arr. An. 3.11.5, Diod. 17.59.2—and cf. perhaps the two units of 1000 picked horse in Hdt. 7.40 f.), and one might think that the satrap’s court cavalry, imitative of the King’s (Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10), was a copy of these ‘Relative Cavalry’.
33 Cf. Xen. An. 1.6.10—assuming (cf. 6-8) that Orontes had been a philos like those, including his relatives, who tried and condemned him.
34 Diod. loc. cit. implies they included persons of high status from outside Spithridates’ satrapy (e.g. Atizes, satrap of Phrygia; Mithrobuzanes, hyparch of Cappadocia) and the royal syngeneia is a well-attested honorific order whose members are not permanently attendant upon the king (cf. Arr. An. 7.11.1, 6, Xen. Cyr. 1.4.27, 22.31, Diod. 16.50.7, 17.35.3, Heraclid. 689 F5, Curt. 3.3.21, 25, 6.2.7, 1 Esdr. 3.4 f., 442, Joseph. Af 11.34 f.—some of these texts imply that the relatives are a separate, higher status group, from mere philoi). On the other hand an élite cavalry unit of 1000 syngeneis appears at Gaugamela (Arr. An. 3.11.5, Diod. 17.59.2—and cf. perhaps the two units of 1000 picked horse in Hdt. 7.40 f.), and one might think that the satrap’s court cavalry, imitative of the King’s (Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10), was a copy of these ‘Relative Cavalry’.
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36 Hdt. 8. 85, Thuc. 1.129.3, Arr. An. 3.27, 37, Strab. 724, Aelian V/F 12.40 etc.
dignitaries, one of whom had the title ‘royal phoinikistes’, i.e. scribe (Xen. An. 1.2.20, Lewis 1977:25 n. 134). This person was presumably a subordinate of Cyrus within the Cappadocian satrapy, and the title recalls Herodotus’ statement that every hyparch (the context shows this means, or includes, satraps) had a royal grammateus (3.128.4). Spiegelberg’s translation of a demotic letter of Pherendates includes a ‘royal scribe’ among its signatories (1928:605 f.), although a more recent rendering (Hughes ap. Porten 1968:56) expels the word ‘royal’. In any event, this text, together with signature formulae in Aramaic satrapal letters and in Elamite letters from Pharnaces at Persepolis, seems to reveal high functionaries in what can be called a satrapal chancellery, viz. a chancellor, a scribe, and other persons who communicate between the two. (It is important to note that these persons include many non-Iranians, and one of them is called Yauna, ‘the Greek’.) Some have also seen the Chancellor in the mysterious personage at Memphis to whom one Petesis appealed for protection against enemies at El Hibeh. He is clearly a high personage (though subordinate to the ‘Master of Egypt’—satrap or king?), addressed in quasi-pharaonic terms, possessors of a priesthood once the preserve of the Saite governor of upper Egypt, and surrounded by his own entourage of ‘notables’ as well as Egyptian subordinates. His demotic title is one used later of Hellenistic dioiketai, but it appears only once more in the Persian period, where it is held by an Egyptian. Alternative identifications include the satrap himself (Bresciani 1969:343) or the satrap’s juridicus (Seidl 1956:33). For the latter idea titular parallels could be adduced from Babylonia—the ‘judge of the satrap Gobryas’ and the ‘datumara of (the satrap) Artareme’ (PBS 2/1 134, 185, Stolper 1974:134 n. 67), of whom the latter is a Babylonian, despite his Iranian title. (Of course, titular parallel is no guarantee at all of substantial similarity.) And an Egyptian Aramaic text in turn mentions a ptyprsn—commonly interpreted as OP *patifrasa, i.e. inspector (cf. the cognate *frasaka of Beyond the River (Ezra 5.6, 6.6) and of the mazēmmu household (below, p. 133))—who is active at Memphis and could also be relevant.

37 AP 26.22 f.: ‘Anani the scribe (and) chancellor (btrf) m’u. Nahuqab wrote it’ (judging from handwriting neither is the scribe of the letter). AD 4, 6-10; all have the formula ‘X is cognizant of this order (ydr f’tu m znh), Y is scribe’ (again palaeographic arguments show Y is not the actual writer). Note also in Babylonia a Mede with the title bal te-e-mu who appears in Michigan 89 (a ‘palace account’ text) in some connection with the satrap Gobryas.

38 See Hallock 1969: 51 f., Hinz 1971:310 f., Lewis 1977:10, n. 38, Stolper 1984:305. Up to three persons are named, a scribe (often Iranian, even though the texts are Elamite—hence not the writer) and two others.

39 A ‘royal scribe’ appears in YOS 7.114, but he is actually a temple official (see below p. 151). Note also a palace scribe (CT 22.242)—perhaps involved in inspecting royal workers—and the King’s Son’s scribe (Cyr. 177, 199, 364). For scribes associated with satraps or governors cf. BE 9.48 (Rusunpati, scribe of Artareme, and landowner), Camb. 344 (of the governor of Egypt), Pohl 1.61 (of Gobryas the elder), PBS 2/1 70, 72, 133, BE 10.101, 118, CBS 12985 (Gobryas the younger), Amherst 258 (Us-

tanu). These need not be very senior persons (cf. Zadok 1978:70) though the Iranian Rusunpati could have been.


41 Master of Egypt: 2/16. Pharaonic address: 3/11 (and cf. 2/3, said to recall Egyptian idiom for the pharaoh’s travelling court). Prophet of Amun, once a priesthood of the Saite Master of Shipping: 8/2. Notables: 3/4, 4/12 (so too the Master of Shipping: e.g. 7/1, 10/2). Powerful subordinate agents: 1/1, 2/5, 3/5 ff., 5/2 ff.

42 Unpubl. Saqqara papyrus, mentioned in Tait 1977:30 f., and dated no more exactly than 525-332 BC. The holder is one Udjahorresnet, but there is apparently no particular indication of connection with the famous homonym (cf. p. 4).

43 PBS 2/1 105, 133, 224, BE 10.84, 97, 128, CBS 12961, 12966.

44 AP 37.3, 12. Compare Lloyd 1983:334, Ray n.d. Note, however, that the supposed Akkadian version of the same OP word in BE 10.97 (where the person involved is also a ‘judge of the satrap
ACHAEMENID ADMINISTRATION

The 'royal' scribe is not the only 'royal' official encountered in provincial contexts. A number of titles of this sort will be encountered in various contexts later in this paper, but this is the appropriate place to mention one with which readers of Herodotus and other Greek sources will be familiar, namely the 'royal judges'. These are persons appointed for life who 'try cases among the Persians and interpret ancestral customs' (Hdt. 3.31.2). They are often found in the entourage of the king himself, but the status was consistent with holding high office far from the royal court, in which case, however, it becomes effectively an honorific rank rather than an administrative position. Royal judges also appear in non-Greek sources. In Cyr. 312 a court variously called 'the king's nobles and the judges of Cyrus, king of Babylon, king of lands' or 'the nobles and judges in charge of the palace' deals with a marriage contracted in somewhat dubious circumstances. The setting of the affair is evidently exalted (one of the parties being a palace official who denied having acted as witness to the union), and the tribunal seems to be one within the palace and (witness the unusual use of the actual king's name) one standing in quite a close relationship with the monarch. We might therefore be dealing here with royal judges of the sort found in Greek sources. It is much less certain that this is the case in three other documents in which royal judges (YOS 7.159, 189) or 'the royal court-house' (YOS 7.31) are, a little surprisingly, concerned with thefts of temple property (San Nicolò 1932:338 suggested that we are dealing here with an appeal or with a case in which one party was not a temple-member); and the significance of the 'judge of the palace gate' and the 'man set over the data' who are encountered simply as witnesses of a determination of monthly rations (VS 6.128) is decidedly opaque.

Egyptian documents provide us with a single attestation of 'royal judges' at Elephantine (AP 1.3), a text in which they are responsible, together with the garrison commander, for reaching a decision about what may be colonial allotments (see below n. 150). It is hard to be sure whether they actually constitute a higher board than the 'provincial judges' of AP 16.7 and 27.9 or indeed than 'Damidata and his colleagues the judges' in AP 6.6. (After all, 'royal' sometimes simply designates someone who is part of the Persian system—i.e. on Persian rations—not merely of the native one, and the 'Royal House' of Elephantine might as well be called a 'provincial' treasury [see below pp. 128].) The fact that in AP 16 the provincial judges appear to sit with the prtky (assessors) of the garrison commander (Porten 1968:47, Grelot 1972:134), not with the latter himself, might seem to support a differentiation of the 'provincial' and 'royal' boards. However, a
homonym of the garrison-commander is mentioned in the preceding line of this lacunose text as one of three ‘judges’, and the three may after all be the commander plus two ‘provincial’ judges. Moreover, the Jews’ claim in AP 27 that the destruction of their temple should be investigated by provincial judges, typt$ and *gaušaka seems a little odd if there was in fact a higher judicial authority whose area of activity included the Elephantine garrison (as did that of the royal judges of AP 16). Of course, it is not impossible that the royal judges were too grand to undertake investigation themselves or that the anonymous addressee of the appeal in AP 27 was actually one such royal judge.

In the case of the satrap’s royal scribe, at least, it seems reasonable to suppose that he is appointed by the King, and he could therefore be construed as among other things a royal spy upon satrapal loyalty (cf. Xenophon’s remarks, Cyr. 8.6.1 f., on the role of royally appointed garrison commanders). Xenophon also mentions annual inspections of satrapies by the king or his agents, who could include the ‘King’s Eye’, a personage attested (in largely uninformative contexts) in other Greek texts.\(^{49}\) Another passage of Xenophon (Cyr. 8.2.10 f.) is sometimes taken to deny that there was only one ‘King’s Eye’ and to suggest a whole spy system of Kings’ Eyes and Ears, an interpretation in connection with which one could adduce the Egyptian provincial official called *gaušaka or ‘listener’ (AP 27.9), the didakka of BE 10.118 (chief of the hadru of ‘army scribes’) and the postulated *didiyaka (Hinz 1975:98 f.) of the Persepolis documents (both these words have the sense ‘one who sees’). But more careful reading of Xenophon suggests a different interpretation. His point is not that there were many officials called King’s Eyes and Ears (for however many there were they would all be open to the criticism of their utility which Xenophon advances against the King’s Eye, viz. that everyone knew who they were) but that, although there was only one ‘King’s Eye’ and to suggest a whole spy system from whatever source means that people behave as though he has many eyes and ears and is always looking and listening, because they have no idea who might betray any seditious utterances. In Xenophon’s view, therefore, surveillance is above all informal, exemplified by the sort of mutual criticism of officials to which he refers in Oeconomicus 4.9. Moreover, the whole run of Greek evidence requires us to postulate no more than a single King’s Eye and no King’s Ears at all. There need be no conflict between Greek and non-Greek sources on this point: after all neither the gaušaka nor the officials in Babylonia and Persis is actually attested as a spy.

2 PROVINCIAL SUBDIVISIONS OF SATRAPIES

Among officials associated personally with the satrap one particular group consists of their so-called hyparchs.\(^{50}\) Occasionally such persons are also described as

\(^{49}\) Cyr. 8.6.16, Oec. 4.6; perhaps some royal journeying in Persepolis texts or e.g. Ael. PH 1.31 f. belongs to inspection trips. King’s Eye: Aesch. Pers. 980, Hdt. 1.114.2, Arist. Acharn. 92 f., Plut. Artax. 12.\(^{50}\) Tamos (Thuc. 8.87.1), Arsaces (ibid. 108.4), Stages (ibid. 16), all hyparchs of Tissaphernes; Artheus, hyparch of Cyrus (Xen. An. 1.8.5), Condalus, hyparch of Mausolus (Ps. Ar. Oec. 1348a18). Additionally, the evidence about Philiscus (Dem. 23.141 f., Xen. Hell. 7.1.27, Diod. 15.70.2) and Zenis and Mania (Xen. Hell. 3.1.10 f.) amounts to their designation as hyparchs of Ariobarzanes and Pharnabazus respectively, as well as making clear that they are examples of a whole class of similar satrapal hyparchs. (So too, perhaps, Xen. An. 1.2.20: Cyrus executes a royal scribe and ἐξερήτω τῶν ἵππων διανομὴν.)
hyparchs of particular regions, and this was probably true in other, though not necessarily all, cases.\footnote{This brings us, therefore, to the various geographical subdivisions of a satrapy. Attested titles in Greek sources draw our attention to such areas as Ionia (hyparch: Thuc. 8.31.2), Ionia, Aeolis and neighbouring areas (satrap \textit{alias epimeletes}: Diod. 14.19.6), Troadic Aeolis (satrap \textit{alias hyparch}: Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.1.10 ff.), Lemnos (hyparch: Hdt. 5.27), Lycia (\textit{arkhontes}: FX VI pp. 32 ff. = SEG 27.942), and Cataonia (\textit{Aspis qui Cataoniam tenebat}: Nep. \textit{Dat.} 4.1). There is also the case of Sogdiana, which seems to have hyparchs but no satrap, unless we assume that Sogdiana was a subordinate part of the Bactrian satrapy (not something clearly attested). The relevant sources give varying hints about the internal nature of such areas. In Lycia it is still the (Carian) satrap whose authorization is required for the Xanthian decree which incidentally informs us about the \textit{arkhontes}. In Troadic Aeolis we have a region of small \textit{poleis} held by the hyparch's garrisons, who may be her 'private' troops rather than mercenaries strictly in the pay of her superior Pharnabazus. (I believe this to be the most logical explanation of Pharnabazus' apparent and imprudent failure to pay these mercenaries after Mania's murder by her son-in-law: cf. Tuplin n.d.(b).) To Pharnabazus she owes tribute and military service (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.1.12-13). The hyparch of Ionia is similarly found in a military context (cf. n. 51) as is another of Tissaphernes' hyparchs, Stages, who is twice active in the same area of central Ionia but never actually designated hyparch of a particular region (cf. n. 51). I think that he fairly clearly \textit{has} such a region, but it will be smaller than the likes of 'Ionia' or 'Lycia'. Not all hyparchs are alike, and in the last analysis the title lays more stress upon their subordination to someone else than upon their control of a particular sort of 'hyparchy'. (Hence, of course, the word can as well be used of a satrap in his capacity as subordinate of the king: cf. n. 22). Another approach to subdivisions of western Anatolian satrapies has been made by Sekunda n.d.(a) and (b), who sees Hellespontine Phrygia and Lydia as consisting of a small number of what he calls 'dukedoms', each providing contributions to the satrapal cavalry \textit{via} ties of personal loyalty between individual cavalrymen and the 'duke'. There may be something in this, but identification of actual 'dukes' is tricky. Spithridates is the paradigmatic case (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.4.10, 4.1.21, \textit{An.} 6.4.24, 5.7 ff., \textit{Hell. Oxy.} 21), but Itamenes, for example, is on Xenophon's evidence (\textit{An} 7.8.15) too lowly a figure to be another instance (see Tuplin n.d.(b)).}

At the other end of the empire Briant 1982a:197 ff. has interpreted the evidence about Sogdian hyparchs in the Alexander historians as revealing a series of dynastic realms centred upon \textit{petrai}, defensible strongholds housing stores of tribute collected by the hyparch-dynasts from their subjects, but this seems to me to go beyond the actual evidence for Achaemenid conditions, which treats the \textit{petrai} as places of refuge rather than standard local 'capitals'—though we may well believe in the hyparchs' right to mobilize the populace for military purposes.\footnote{Relevant sources are Arr. \textit{An.} 4.18.4 ff., \textit{Curt.} 7.11.11 ff., Polyaen. 4.3.19 (Rock of Ariamazes, Sogdian Rock), Arr. \textit{An.} 4.21.1 ff., \textit{Curt.} 8.2.19 ff., Plut. \textit{Alex.} 58, Strabo 11.11.4 (Rock of Chorienes or Sissimithres). Sogdian hyparchs: Arr. 8.108.)

\footnote{Tamos (cf. n. 50) is hyparch of Ionia (Thuc. 8.31.2). Zenis and Mania control a specific, tribute-paying area (Xen. \textit{Hell.} 3.3.10 ff.). Note that Stages is twice associated with the Teos/Colophon area (Thuc. 8.16, Xen. \textit{Hell.} 1.2.5), Arsaces with the Adramyttium/Antandros area (Thuc. 8.108).}
Turning to areas where the evidence is predominantly non-Greek we may note first the case of Babylonia. The relevant evidence comes in various, not easily interrelatable forms. (i) The Nabondius Chronicle (ANET 306) reports that Cyrus appointed governors (paḫat) in Babylonia immediately after the conquest; but the only more precise information in that text concerns Ugbaru, governor of Gutium, who represents a rather special case (cf. Zadok 1981/2:138 n. 65). (ii) A number of documents refer to ‘administrative districts’ (piḫatu/paḫatu = N.AM) named after prominent cities, viz. Babylon (common), Borsippa (VS 3.182, 5.48, 92, TEBR 80), Dilbat (VS 6.71, Dar. 265, 295), Kish (Dar. 194, 245), and Sippar (Cyr. 26). The terminology continues neo-Babylonian practice, so we can probably add Nippur, Uruk, and Der to the list, even though they are only attested before 539. The purely geographical nature of the references in the texts means that no officials clearly associated with these districts are mentioned. One would expect the man in charge to be a bel piḫati, but this is an excessively vague term, equally applicable at various levels of secular and temple administration, and one could only identify a particular bel piḫati as governor of an administrative district of the sort in question here if there were appropriately specific evidence in addition to the mere title—which seems never to be the case. In any event the areas in question appear to be of relatively limited extent (considering, for example, how close Babylon, Dilbat, Borsippa, and Kish are to one another—they would all fit within the presumed area of the single Palestinian ‘province’ of Dor [see below]), and the terminology seems to disappear in later Achaemenid texts; so we are possibly not dealing with anything of great significance in our present context. (iii) The term piḫatu is occasionally (e.g. PBS 2/1 43, 72) used of canal-managers and the very existence of such officials (under whatever title) and of ‘judges of the Sin Canal’ and the like (cf. n. 47) doubtless shows that canals constituted administrative units. They might even be regarded as royal administrative units, insofar as the managers were crown-agents (cf. p. 133). But they are also, of course, extremely specialized and extremely local units: to speak of canal ‘provinces’ (Zadok 1978:281, 309) is a misleading perpetuation of Akkadian terminological vagueness. (iv) More important here are the various ‘governors’ whose title and/or area of competence suggests a higher position in the hierarchy, e.g. the governor of the Sealand (the area of the Tigris/Euphrates mouths) whose deputy appears (in a private capacity) in YOS 7.106, or Sīḫa ‘the satrap’ (PBS 2/1 2: the Persian word is used in Akkadian transcription), or Belšunu, governor (lu.nam) or ‘satrap’ of Babylon in 421–414 under the Persian satrap Gobryas, who is on record both in business documents relating to his and other proprietors’ land and as adjudicator of a dispute about missing temple property (Stolper n.d.(a), (b)), and who is clearly too grand a figure to be merely in charge of what the earlier documents call the piḫatu of Babylon.

Other relatively copious material concerns Beyond the River (of which, incidentally, Belšunu was later satrap) and Egypt. In the former biblical texts, confirmed by inscribed coins and seals and by papyri from Wadi Daliiyeh (Samaria)
and Elephantine, reveal ‘provinces’ (phwḥ or mēdinah) such as Judah and Samaria (and also, less fully attested, Gaza, Ashdod, Dor, and others), under the command of native governors (pht or pehah)—in the case of Samaria a succession of members of the same family—and with other officials such as prefects (sgn'), treasurers, and scribes (all appear in the Samaria papyri) and judges, commissioners, overseers, and chief officers (Ezra 4.8 f.—if these indeed are provincial officials). On conventional interpretations of Nehemiah 3 the province of Judah at any rate was further subdivided into districts (pelekh) and half-districts (hasi pelekh) under chiefs called sar (Stern 1982:237 f., identifying 6 pelekh), but it has recently been suggested that the text is actually talking about groups of workers doing conscript labour (on the rebuilding of Jerusalem) as a form of tributary obligation (Demsky 1983, adducing Akkadian pilku). Be that as it may, the provinces certainly continue Assyrian and neo-Babylonian divisions and are perhaps the type of thing the author of Esther had in mind when saying that the empire consisted of 127 provinces (1.1, 8.9, 9.30); the word used is the same and (granted that some satrapies may have been richer in subdivisions than others) the total is reasonably consistent with the number of provinces per satrapy to be presumed for Beyond the River and for the other terminologically parallel case, Egypt.

Here there seems no reason to doubt the continued existence of the traditional nomes of Upper and Lower Egypt, though the direct evidence in Egyptian texts is not copious. Equally, it is clear that there were units called ‘provinces’, two being attested by name, Thebes and Tlr.s (the south). Although the latter is designated a ts in P. Berlin 3110, which is a standard word for nome, it is evident that the provinces were larger than nomes, since Aramaic evidence implies that Tlr.s, which includes Elephantine (AP 27.9, P. Berlin 13582), is adjacent to Thebes (AP 24.33 f.) and pre-Persian period evidence for the term is against its application just to Elephantine or to an area larger than the Elephantine nome but smaller than the whole region down-river as far as Thebes. These provinces may be an innovation as compared with the Saite period, when there is no evidence for Tlr.s as an administrative unit with associated officials (contrast a XXII dynasty reference to the scribe of the royal account of the ts of Tlr.s57). There is also no evidence for Persian subsatrapal units larger than the province, for the concept Ptores (also ‘the south’) variously used of an area starting in Middle Egypt (P. Ryl. 9 1/2 (Persian),
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7/13 (Saite) and (apparently) of the whole area south of the delta (P. Bibl. Nat. 215 verso) can be a purely geographical concept in both cases. (Ptores, in the larger sense, is last attested as an administrative unit long before the end of the Saite era.\(^{58}\)) On the other hand, the (different) hieroglyphic terms used in the titles of Atiyawahy 'governor (rp't) of Coptos' (Posener 1936: nos. 26, 30) and anonymous 'governors (hrjt) of nomes and cities' (ibid. no. 6 II.6) might be evidence for city-governors, including ones in nome-capitals, as distinct from nomarchs, though the former at least is archaic and could be essentially honorific, like his other title srs of Persia (Posener 1936: 24–30, Schott 1967: 88 f.). (This possibility is a perennial problem of Egyptian titulature.) Granted a province, nome, and (perhaps) city hierarchy, some attested officials fit in easily, e.g. the scribes, judges, *tipati and *gauhka of the province (AP 16.6, 17.1, 27.9),\(^{59}\) the 'chief (…) of the nome' (P. Cairo 50060) and 'scribe of the nome' (P. Vienna 10.150),\(^{60}\) the commander (rab hayla) of the Elephantine/Syene garrison establishment (a person seen as much in judicial roles as in strictly military ones),\(^{61}\) the eponyms (? commanders) of the degelin within the garrison.\(^{62}\) But there are also various problems.

1) The azdakara (an Iranian title) who appear once might be city, nome, or provincial officials,\(^{63}\) and Mithridates 'the boatman' of AP 26 is of uncertain status. Is he the chief of a 'house of boats' of the sort attested at Saqqara (Aimé-Giron 1931: nos. 5.11, 11a.4) or merely a subordinate official within such an institution; and does the institution, if we are right to postulate it at all, count as part of the provincial structure or stand in a more direct relation to the satrap, to whom the matter in issue in AP 26, repair of a boat, has been directly referred?

2) P. Berlin 13552 speaks of the ts of Osorwer, an Egyptian whose house at Elephantine is a possible grain-storage place in P. Loeb 1. (He is also named in P. Berlin 13562, 13571.) Porten 1968: 45 n. 26 identifies him as a fratarak (see below), and wonders whether he was actually a Persian who had taken an Egyptian name (for which practice cf. Posener 1936: no. 33). Might he not alternatively be a nomarch?

3) In BP 8.23, (6 Tishri (VII) Darius year 8) the rab haila Waidrang is given the additional title hpthpt'. There is little doubt that this means 'guardian of the/a seventh' (OP *haťaxva-pāā:- Henning 1968, Bogoliubov 1974, Hinz 1975: 46), but the proper interpretation of this is another matter. I have just two observations.

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58 In P. Rylands 9.5/14, 18, 6/1 ff., 7/11 ff., 10/1 ff. it is the area from the south watch tower of Memphis (some 60 km south of Memphis: Yoyotte 1972) to Elephantine and is ruled by the Master of Shipping. In 10/8 it is designated ts.
59 On gauhka cf. above p. 120. *Tipati (Ar. typt') has been variously explained (Porten 1968: 50 n. 83). Hinz 1975: 92 denies that it recurs in Elamite garb in PF 1250, 1902. Possible provincial accountant: AP 68.11v.2, 11v.1.
60 The former pays temple tax; the income of the latter's office is 'given' to another party like the income of religious offices in many other documents. Both are probably not directly part of the Persian administration.
62 Cf. Porten 1968: 29 f., who also notes 'centurions'; and add Saqqara 3.6, 15.2, 63.3, 113.2. The Persons named in the formula lpr PN (under control of PN) in Aimé-Giron 1931: 5.11f, 11a.1, 2, 28.2 may be other such military officers.
63 AP 17.5.7. Grelot 1972: 282 restores the text to locate them in 'the fort Elephantine'. One could as well read 'fort Syene' or even 'the province'. They are associated with the scribes of the province. The same text mentions 'Bigdan and his colleagues' without surviving title.
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(i) The suggestion (Kraeling ad BP loc. cit., Henning 1968:138) that *hpthpt* represents a step on the promotion-ladder between *rab haila* and *fratarak* (the latter an office Waidrang held by 410 bc) is somewhat insecure, since Waidrang is once again plain *rab hayla* in AP 25.24 (3 Kislev (IX) Darius year 8) and it might be the case that *hpthpt* was simply a regular ancillary title of the *rab hayla*, normally ignored in Jewish Aramaic documents. (ii) The recurrence of *hpth* (i.e. ‘seventh’) in Saqqara 63.4 in a fragmentary context also naming *degel* members (i.e. soldiers) suggests that we may be dealing with command of military units not administrative ones. It is certainly not safe to assume that our picture of the satrapy or its provinces/nomes (cf. Hinz loc. cit., Porten 1968:44) has to accommodate their division into seven districts.

4) P. Berlin 13582 refers to one Prnw as being ‘in charge of *Tttrs* and the (? ) fortress of Syene’ in 488/7. The view that Prnw is identical not only with a homonym at Elephantine in P. Loeb 1 (which he is) but also with Prrt = Pherendates, satrap of Egypt before and after the date of P. Berlin 13582 (P. Berlin 13539–40) is incorrect. The names are (pace Spiegelberg 1928, Zauzich 1978) different (see Hughes 1984)—the non-Egyptologist can only wonder bemusedly why anyone should ever have thought otherwise. We do not therefore have to explain why a satrap should temporarily have a title relating solely to southern Egypt. But there is still a problem in the combination of the hierarchical levels of province (*Tttrs*) and city (‘the (?) fortress of Syene’ probably does not distinguish between the town and some institution within it in view of the interchangeable use of ‘Syene’ and ‘the fort Syene’ in Aramaic texts). Do we conclude that a provincial governor was normally also city-prefect of the provincial capital? Or does the specific reference here rather imply that these would usually be separate offices?

5) A number of Aramaic documents use the titles *fratarak* and *sgt*, whose interpretation poses certain difficulties. The *fratarak* (always an Iranian) appears both at Saqqara (Saqqara 27.5—the text also mentions judges) and Elephantine (AP 20.4, 27.4, 30.7 = 31.6). AP 20.4 names him as co-member with the *rab hayla* of a Tribunal of Nefa’, and it is clear from the order of names in that text and from the personal career of Waidrang that the office is superior to that of *rab hayla*. Although Waidrang writes to his son and successor as *rab hayla* to order the attack on the Jewish temple (AP 30.7 = 31.6), it need not follow that his normal residence was not Elephantine/Syene. Several possible interpretations of the *fratarak* suggest themselves. (a) Nomarch (Porten 1968:47, Grelot 1972:200)—but I think one might expect nomarchs to be Egyptian, though, of course, the border nome and the Memphite nome could be exceptional. (b) A provincial military commander—the trouble with this is that it involves postulating an official for whose existence there is no independent evidence. (c) Provincial governor (Bresciani 1969:324 f., Ray n.d.). This is the best solution. AP 37.6 is not a serious objection, since the assumption that it designates the Thebes provincial governor as *pqyd* is unfounded; and although Palestinian parallels (p. 123) might lead one to expect the term

64 Two more apparent Persian officials on record at Elephantine in the same period are Artabanus (P. Loeb 1) and Ravaka (P. Berlin 23584).
65 The word may actually be a verb, not a title, and even if not (so Porten 1968:54 n. 102) could designate an estate-manager (this being the title’s association elsewhere in Egypt (AD passim) and Babylonia (cf. p. 124)).
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pht, the only attestation of that title in Egyptian Aramaic is in reference to a plurality of evidently lower-rank officers (Bresciani 1960, Fitzmyer 1962) and we need not after all assume the Palestinian and Egyptian cases to be identical: the fact that the Egyptian provinces are a Persian innovation could account for a special (Iranian) title.

Sgn' differs from fratarak in two respects. Firstly, although it is not a specifically Iranian title, it is attested in two other parts of the empire. Samaria Papyrus 14 (cf. Cross 1974:18, 1986:7) is a document executed before 'Yeshua, son of Sanballat and Hanan the sgn', the latter being therefore an associate/subordinate of the provincial governor (for other texts establish that Yeshua held that position). The word recurs in Nehemiah 5.17 of persons who ate at the governor's table in Judah, and Stern 1984:81 sees them as commanders of small military garrisons. Further east, one interpretation of the inscribed mortars, pestles, and plates found at Persepolis is that they refer to a hierarchy of officials in Arachosia, a treasurer responsible for three fortresses, each of which has a sgn' (? fortress commander) and sub-treasurer. There is no proving that the officers in Palestine and Arachosia are substantially comparable with the Egyptian case (though they are at least all of lower stature than the provincial governor), but their existence makes it unsurprising that one should encounter sgn' in an Egyptian province. This, however, leads to the second difference between fratarak and sgn'. Whereas we do find references to actual, individual and named frataraks, the sgn' appears only in legal formulae which envisage or preclude legal proceedings 'before sgn' or judge' (AP 8.13, 10.13, 20) or 'before sgn' or lord' (AP 47.2, 7, BP 9.19, 10.13) or 'before sgn' or judge or lord' (BP 12.18). (We also once get 'before judge or lord' (BP 1.6).) It is commonly supposed that 'lord' refers to the satrap or the fratarak, whereas sgn' therefore designating either the fratarak or the rab hayla. Of these the latter is preferable since it keeps the sgn' down to a level more consistent with that in non-Egyptian evidence. But it may be worth airing a different approach. The purpose of the formulae under discussion is evidently to preclude further legal activity 'in any court whatsoever'. But it is clear from particular cases that the legal problems of members of the Elephantine garrison could fall within the competence of various persons (the fratarak, the rab hayla, the latter's assessors, royal judges, provincial judges, plain unqualified judges), and if we essay precise identification of 'lord', sgn' and 'judge' we run the risk of rendering the formulae ineffective. Bearing in mind that all the terms are in themselves quite vague and capable of referring to a variety of specific officials, it is possible that 'judge' covers any relevant official whose titular role is solely judicial and lord and/or sgn' covers other persons whose functions are wider than, though can include, the judicial. In

66 Bowman 1970 publishes the texts, but they should be interpreted as by Levine 1972, Naveh/ Sakhed 1973, Vogelsang 1985:85.
67 For preclusion of suit without naming of possible judges cf. AP 5.8, 6.12, 6.14, 25.16, 29. 20.10, 16, 25.10, 17, 28.12, 14, 43.8, BP 3.12, 4.12, 15, 22.5, 6, 15.7, 32.5, 8.5, 11.8, 12. Note also PBS 2/1 21, where suit is precluded before 'king, satrap or judge'.
68 'Lord' can be used of the satrap (AD 3.3, 4.2, 10.1, AP 16.8, 17.5, 27.2, perhaps 33.7, 13, 34.6) but also of lesser persons: estate holders (AD 7.4 f), governor of Judah (AP 30.1 f), anonymous addressee of AP 27, Mithravahist (AP 70), various Jews (AP 37.1, 38.1, 12, BP 13.1, 9). The word is not confined to Achaemenid Aramaic cf. Dupont-Sommer 1948:43 f. (Sate). Sgn' can designate a 'chief' carpenter (AP 26.9, 22).
other words, the reference of lord and sgn' may differ depending on whether one or both are mentioned in the formula (thus helping to explain why the formula’s variations do not apparently matter); and sgn' should be no more as the title of a particular official than is ‘lord’. The argument would fall, of course, if anyone could demonstrate that the varied contents of the formula and the regular appearance of a title never attested in its own right in the Elephantine archives related to the particular and varied kinds of prospective legal action and point at issue. But to date there seems to be no reason to think that this is the case.

3 INDIVIDUAL PLACES AS ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
After this prolonged consideration of material from Elephantine, we may turn to other evidence about cities or other individual places (as opposed to regions) which may count as administrative units. In fact, even villages could have their local authorities. The 10,000 had dealings with a komarch in northern Armenia, while Saqqara 22 perhaps refers to a village elder (though in itself qiryah could mean ‘town’ as well as ‘village’). One naturally assumes that these are native, and that they represent long established structures; Xenophon, though, does note that the Armenian komarch spoke Persian, as indeed did other inhabitants of a village in the same region (An. 4.5.10, 34). Iranian rule is pretty intrusive if a village-head can do to speak the conqueror’s language. But at this level it is rather the intrusion of actual Iranians that is of particular interest, for the mere existence of manipulable local structures in any individual community, be they the magistrates of a polis or the officials of a Babylonian town, is (as stressed at the outset) relatively banal. So far as cities are concerned, one could perhaps find this in the Iranian hyparchs of Sestos (Hdt. 7.33, 78, 9.115 f.) and Cyme (id. 7.194). Are they Persian city-governors imposed upon local administration? Should one assume that this was common, that it is reflected in Diodoran passages which report the issue of royal instructions ‘to satraps and to cities’ (14.80.7) or ‘to satraps and the cities they ruled’ (14.98.3)—the word satrap being used in both cases of a lowlier official than the satrapal viceroy—and that parallels can be found in the praefectus of Pasargadae (Curt. 5.6.10) or Damascus (id. 3.8.12, 13.2), Batis, the man in charge of Gaza in 333/2 (Arr. An. 2.25.4, Curt. 4.6.7, Joseph. 11.320), Rhathines the eparch of Gordium in 395 (Hell. Oxy. 21.6), the ‘satraps’ of Pura and Makkas in PF 679–681, or Atiyawahy the ‘governor’ of Coptos (p. 124)? The answer is probably no. The Sestos hyparch seems to be active in an area wider than just Sestos (he is therefore a type of regional hyparch), and the same was true at Cyme for all we know (or else the hyparch relates to the place’s special role as fleet base). Indeed, it could be true

69 Xen. An. 4.5.10, 24, 27–30, 32, 34–5, 6.1–3. There were several villages in the vicinity (cf. 4.5.23 f., 30 f.) and at first sight two different komarchs are mentioned (4.5.10 and 4.5.24, with all subsequent references being to the latter), leaving open the possibility of a komarch for each village (cf. 24: ‘the komarch of this village’). More probably however the komarch in 4.5.24–6.3 is in charge of all the villages (he has relatives in several (32) and it is he whom Cheirisophus and Xenophon later cross-examine), and when Cheirisophus and his contingent enter a village πῆς τῶν κώμων at 4.5.10 we should understand that they expected to find this one komarch but did not do so.

70 e.g. iš III. temi of Uruk (San Nicolò 1941:12 f.), Borsippa (VS 6.128) or Babylon (Camb. 276), iš IV of Sippar (San Nicolò 1941:34), Ishammi of Sippar (YOS 7.106), ‘city-chief’ (la muhhi uru) of Sippar (Camb. 19) or Handidi (BE 8.80), iš III. of Babylon (DAR 154, 206) or Kuta (BM 84.12-11.214), šamšu of Nippur (BE 9.23, 10.76, PBS 2/1 70—the city-quarters were under a paqdu; Zadok 1978:275).
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in some of the non-Greek locations just mentioned, where one’s greater uncertainty about the nature of native administrative institutions makes it dangerously easy to assume direct rule of a city (as opposed to a region centred upon a city) through an externally imposed official.71

Various other sorts of evidence confer special status upon individual places within a satrapy. The satrapal capital itself obviously comes into that category (when it can be identified), as do provincial capitals. But what about other locations? The evidence for satrapal palaces/residences beyond capitals is inadequate to lead to any particular conclusion.72 That about treasuries is a little better. Major treasuries (places storing silver in sizeable quantities, as well as other valuables) were to be found in royal and satrapal capitals, and some of the vague references to ‘the (royal) treasury’ or the like may also relate to such installations.73 Leaving aside Timaeus’ claim that the Ephesian Artemision was rebuilt in the second half of the fourth century using Persian parakataxhekat recovered from the temple, which may have little relevance to the ordinary system, even if it is credible at all,74 several bodies of material do relate to treasury-sites of lower status. In Egypt there was a Royal House or Royal Treasury at Elephantine, which supplied payments in kind and in silver and is associated with ‘officers’, scribes, and treasury accountants.75 The fact that the grain income in AP 24 is labelled as ‘from TTRS’ or ‘from Thebes’ suggests that the treasury works at provincial level and we may assume that the presence of a treasury in a provincial capital was a standard phenomenon. The voluminous ‘Philisto-Arabian’, ‘Philisto-Egyptian’ and Yehud coinages will be a confirmation of this, if they were in fact minted at provincial treasuries (Stern 1982:221 f., 1984:111).

71 In the case of Pura one should note that Karki’s ‘satrap at Pura’ and travelling thither in Year 21, month 7 (PF 681) may be the presumed satrap of Carmania, for whom cf. PF 1300 (same date).

72 Possible examples: Hdt. 3.122 (Magnesia), Neh. 3.7 (Jerusalem), Diod. 16.41.5 (Sidon: cf. Clermont-Ganneau 1921, Contenau 1923), Xen. An. 3.4.10 (Belesys’ palace in Syria), 3.4.24 (unattributed palace 8 days north of Nineveh), 4.4.2 (palace of satrap of Armenia), 4.4.7 (palace of hyparch of W. Armenia).

73 Some basileia in E. Iran may be relevant (Arr. An. 3.25.1-6, 30.6, 4.5.3, Curt. 6.5.24, Strabo 72:5). The basileia of Askalon (Ps. Syll.78) is the seat of the governor of Ashdod, the Lachish residence that of the governor of Idumaea (Stern 1982:249). For residences/paradiseis in satrapal capitals cf. Xen. Hell. 4.1.15 f. (Dascyleium), Oc. 4.20, Diod. 14.80.2 (Sardis), Xen. An 1.2.7 (Celainai).


75 Timae.556 F150b. Artemidorus dismissed the story, claiming that there were no parakataxhekat and that if there had been they would have been burned.

76 House: AP 2.12 f., 43.8, BP 11.6. Granary: AP 2.14, 11.6, (7)50.6, BP 3.9, 6.7, 10.4, 11.4. Overlap of terminology in AP 2, BP 11 guarantees their identity; and both are connected with payment of rations (BP 11.4, AP 2.5, 43.8) and salary (AP 2.16, 11.16). The gurri (granary) which appears as store-place for cereals not yet paid as rations (AP 24.41) and as the royal granary partly destroyed in the Elephantine riots (AP 27.5) is perhaps part of the same institution; AP 24 shows that it supplies both Syene and Elephantine. In P. Loeb 1 corn is to be assigned to the treasury (translation doubtful)—perhaps at Elephantine. The ‘bank’ of the man in charge of TITH and Thebes (P. Berlin 13582) is obscure. AP 2.12 f. apparently names ‘scribes of the treasury’ (wsr); and the treasury (wz) accountants of AP 26.4, 23 are evidently officials of the Royal House.
Babylonian texts refer to a considerable variety of storehouses, treasuries and the like. Many are of no particular relevance here, but at least seven categories of ‘royal’ or otherwise special storage places present themselves. A number of Murāšu archive texts from Nippur disclose the existence of the nakandu šarri, ‘royal storehouse’ or ‘treasury’, which was in the control successively of Manustanu (the king’s nephew) and Artaḥšar (see below p. 135) and employed the labour of a category of dependent person (the šušane). Unfortunately nothing much emerges about its functions as an institution (Stolper 1974:131 f.). A different set of Murāšu texts repeatedly names the bit šarri (royal house) as recipient of ĭlku (or a part thereof) paid on bow fiefs (cf. pp. 153), and the same name recurs in an earlier text, VS 3.159, where a tax called miksu is paid to the royal house in accordance with royal law. (Ellis 1974 discusses the earlier history of miksu but is unhelpful on the Achaemenid period. In CT 22.5 it appears to denote a canal toll. The word appears in Aramaic guise in Egypt as a silver tax in Saqqara 19.) It is at least possible, however, that in this document bit šarri is simply an abbreviation for the ‘royal bit miksu’, an institution (at or near Gibi) mentioned in ROMCT 2.35 as the locus of a slave-sale. It is not unlikely that the (Egyptian) rab miksu named in a private capacity in VS 4.194 had some connection with this institution, and more or less certain that its personnel included a *hamarakara (accountant), for one appears as a witness in ROMCT loc. cit. (There is also a royal hamarakara in BE 10.13, perhaps to be connected with a royal treasury of one sort or another; a hamarakara of Artaḥšar (PBS 2/1 84), one time controller of the nakandu šarri (above); and other less well-defined bearers of the title (BE 10.59, 80, 82, 97, Eilers 1940:56).) In the case of the bit sutum šarri (royal storehouse) attested at Sippar (Camb. 202, 256, 359, Cyr. 74) and Uruk (YOS 7.88) the only fiscal function for which evidence comes to hand is the supply of foodstuffs to what seem to be temple officials and workers, but the royal bit kari (evidently a storeplace despite the current translations ‘quay’ or ‘harbour’) is intimately associated with the crown and its agents in connection with rent due to the superintendent of royal dates (ROMCT 2.23, at Isin), payment of the ‘King’s Share’ (BE 8.85; cf. p. 149) and disbursement of ‘royal’ barley for uppaiata, i.e. OP *upayata, the word used in Elamite garb in the Persepolis documents for (royal) food supplies (Dar. 244, Stolper 1977:254 f.). Evidently this is the storeplace for the produce of specifically royal property. Finally there are two institutions not designated ‘royal’ but nonetheless evidently linked with the Persian organization of Babylonia. In BE 9.19 a debt is to be paid ‘in the enclosure at the hanbara gate’, where hanbara = OP *hampara, Elam. ambaraš, the standard word for storehouse in the Persepolis texts. We can tell nothing of its functions, but the unique use of foreign terminology in a formula where numerous parallels lead us to expect an Akkadian term must disclose a special institution (Stolper 1977:254), though perhaps one at an administratively low level. Much more substantial is the kašir (treasury) whose chief was the Iranian Bagasaru, variously called rab kasir and ganzbara (Dar. 105, 296; the former title recurs much later as that of a witness in PBS2/1 68, but the ‘scribes of the bit kasiranu’ of Camb. 384 are not relevant, at least to Babylonia, if Zadok 1976a is correct in thinking that the document was written in Persis). We
only hear of the *kasir* casually, in documents concerned with Bagasaru's private business transactions, but bearing in mind that the latter's landholdings were round Babylon we may well be dealing with the treasury of the capital itself. The same may, of course, be true of the 'royal house' and the *nakandu šarri* of Murāšu texts (that is, these could be other examples of vague references to royal treasuries actually relating to installations in royal/satrapal capitals: cf. n. 73). But the other items just reviewed must fairly certainly be located at a more 'provincial' level.

At the centre of the empire the Persepolis archives reveal treasuries explicitly attested as such or as locations of 'treasury workers' at Persepolis (Cameron 1948:9, Cahill 1985), Pasargadae (PF 62–3), Shiraz (59–61, 128, 865, 877, 1944), Matezziš (70–1, 2017, Pfa 30; also Camb, 384 with Zadok 1976:69 f.), Rakkān (PF 65–6, 866, 1947), Hirān (58), Hunar (406), Kaupirriš (405), Ankarrakkan (863), Kurpur (879, 1158), Narezzäš (878, 1825, 1852) and Uranduš (864).76 To these Koch 1981 adds a further eight by identifying the officials Karkiš and Šuddayauda in ration documents bearing Seal I77 and in some entries in account texts as successive *Hofschatzwarte* in 508–503 and 502–497 BC (Hinz 1971:283 thought they were *Vize-Intendanten*) and then tracing their worker-groups on the assumption that the latter will in fact be 'treasury-workers'.78 (If so, not all worker-groups at treasury-sites were treasury-workers, since we find such groups under other apportioners and assigners in 508–497 at many of the relevant places. But that is not particularly surprising. The facts that we do not find workers associated with Karkiš and Šuddayauda at all explicitly attested treasuries and that explicitly attested treasury-workers and treasury officials can be discovered who are connected with other higher authorities are a little more worrying, but might have special explanations.79) Assuming Koch is right, we have therefore at least 19 treasuries in the Persis/Elam administrative region outside Persepolis itself. Almost all are in Hallock's Persepolis-Shiraz-Narezzāš area—necessarily so in the case of Koch's additional items, since their identification depends on use of seal 1, which is characteristic of the area. (Where a further more precise localization can be made in terms of Sumner's division of the area into two 'urban regions' [cf. above p. 115] the treasuries are more often in the Shiraz district than the Matezziš one: this will

76 Unnamed treasuries appear in PF 67–8 (prob. Rakkān, cf. 65–6, 73–6, 129–31, 1442, 1788–9, 1800). 73–5 and 76 name two sets of otherwise unknown officials and should concern two treasuries not among those named in the comparable texts, 58–66. The anonymous treasury-worker sites in 1013–5 and 1120 are associated with Shiraz (reason unclear) and Barniš (?cf. 1212) respectively by Koch 1982:235, 243. The Persian *gazophylakiai* in Strabo 15.3.6 may be only Persepolis and Pasargadae, but 15.3.3 is perhaps acceptable evidence for Achaemenid treasuries at Gobae and Taace.

77 But no similar documents with other seals, cf. Koch 1981: 235 (Karkiš), 240 f. (Šuddayauda): in the latter case Koch postulates a distinct homonym. Koch does, however, count PF 1105 (Šuddayauda, seal 312: workers in the fort) and 1109 (Karkiš, seal 252: workers of Irdabamma), although 1042–3 (Karkiš, seal 76: workers of Irdabamma) is discounted and we do not have to assume that treasury and fort are institutionally equivalent.

78 The additional places are Mandumattis, Parmizzan, Šala/Kuntarrurizzan, Tenkuš, Tukrā, Uškannāš, Zikara. The summary tabulation at Koch 1981:244 f. suffers from certain omissions and inaccuracies.

79 Karkiš and Šuddayauda do not appear at hunar or Kaupirriš: an accident perhaps, but possibly worrying since these places are not badly represented in the archive and happen to be the only two treasuries outside the Persepolis/Shiraz/Narezzāš triangle. The treasury 'delivery man' at Rakkān gets rations under a sealed document of Zissawis in 502–1 BC (PF 1947:31): perhaps individual functionaries were dealt with differently from worker-groups? Treasury-workers at Kurpur are assigned by Midadda (PF 1158). This has no date, so he might be a short-lived *Hofschatzwart* between Šuddayauda and Barakhtama (attested from 495 BC).
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be partly a function of the disparity in size between the two regions, though one notes a particular concentration in the western end of the Shiraz region, directly connected with Shiraz itself.) The only treasuries outside the Persepolis-Shiraz-Narezza triangle are Kaupirriš (chief city of the Kamfiruz area) and Hunar, which is evidently in the Fahliyun (cf. its association in PF 11, 2019, 1092 with places to be located there), but this is presumably to some extent an accident of evidence: one can surely assume, by analogy with the rest of the data, that the Kamfiruz and Fahliyun areas actually had more than one treasury apiece. So far as function is concerned, these treasuries clearly resemble (e.g.) the Elephantine Royal House in not being confined to the storage of silver, as is evident from the types of treasury-worker employed in them (PF 864-6) and from the delivery of hides to them (58-76), possibly for use in manufacture of leather goods (Hinz 1971:268, Koch 1981:232,-Cahill 1985:375, relying on an argument from silence, doubts whether the Persepolis treasury itself had managing functions). But it is not entirely clear that the treasuries were storeplaces for grain or the like to be used as rations for ‘treasury workers’ or any other category of worker or (e.g.) garrison soldier. The surviving evidence gives us little in the way of titles for local treasury officials, and the large number of places involved, including some (especially among Koch’s additional items) which are only rarely mentioned in the archive in any capacity, suggests that the treasuries cannot all be ‘provincial’ ones of the sort suggested by the Egyptian evidence. (A similar problem of classification affects e.g. Arad, a garrison-site where a (non-Iranian) *ganzabara is on record (Stern 1982:45), and the three Arachosian fortresses mentioned above (p. 126), under the overall supervision of a treasurer and each having its own sub-treasurer, where we have to choose between satrapy/province and province/sub-province as the spheres of responsibility of the treasurer and sub-treasurer respectively.) We can, however, be reasonably sure that the Persis treasuries form a different, smaller and more important category of storage place by comparison with the ‘granaries’ and ‘storehouses’ found in the Persepolis archives both at treasury sites and elsewhere, not to mention the many other locations at which provisions or supplies are provided for workers or high officials or travellers but which are never explicitly designated ‘storehouse’ or anything else. It is perhaps with sites like this that one should compare e.g. the evidence in Xenophon’s Anabasis for villages in Syria (1.4.9, 19), Babylonia (2.2.13f., 3.4, 21f.), north Mesopotamia (3.4.17f., 31, 5.1, 12) and Armenia (4.4.2, 7, 5.24) as convenient sources of accumulated natural produce for hungry mercenaries (though it is rare for attested Persepolis archive storehouses to be actually called ‘villages’ and some at least of the Palestinian sites where excavation has revealed storepits or granaries (Stern 1982:237).

A different sort of distinction between places within satrapies is suggested by a rare Greek attempt to describe systematically their internal workings, viz. that

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80 A treasurer (kanzabara, *ganzabara) appears at Rakkan (1947.19) but the Elamite synonym kaphusašu normally refers to workers not officials. The delivery man (1947.10f.) and scribes (866.7, 1947.17) are also kurtaš.
81 For the importance of villages in the imperial landscape cf. Briant 1982:137f.
82 Muran: granary (1636), village (1857). Hidal: storehouse (200), village (2057). Tandari: royal food-supply (116, 124), village (1736). Some eight other villages are named, and anonymous references occur in 45, 694, 1573, 1967, 2033, 2057; the places often being sources of supplies.

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conducted by Xenophon in two related but distinct passages, *Cyropaedia* 8.6.1 f. (a purported account of Cyrus’ institution of satrapies) and *Oeconomicus* 4.5 f. (a commentary on the Persian King’s great interest in agriculture and war). Prominent in both is the question of garrisoning, on which matter the following consistent picture seems to emerge (cf. Tuplin n.d.(b)). Every satrapy contains a complement of *phrouroi*, all receiving payment which comes (ultimately) from the satrap and is drawn, like tribute, from local resources, all engaged in protecting the province (a job which is the satrap’s responsibility), and all under commanders who are subordinate to the satrap but (like him) appointed by the king, in an attempt to ensure that they are not *necessarily* incapable of resisting satrapal disaffection. The garrisons are not, however, uniform, since a distinction is drawn between *akra* garrisons (guarding relatively few important urban citadels) and troops distributed widely and in small units through the *khōra*. This physical contrast corresponds to four further administrative distinctions. (a) Each *akra* garrison has a phrourarch, but the *khōra* troops are organized under chiliarchs, commanders of artificial units defined in principle by numbers, not by topographic settings (i.e. fortresses). (b) There are various hints that the *akra* garrisons are ‘King’s Men’ in some unexplained fashion not true of the *khōra* garrisons (since all receive pay from the satrap, this is not a distinction connected with source of remuneration). (c) All *phrouroi* receive payment, but Xenophon occasionally reserves the word *mistho-phoroi* for *akra* garrisons, as though their maintenance depends more totally upon direct and literal payment. One might guess at a distinction between ‘pure’ mercenaries and e.g. maintained military communities. In short, the analysis appears to suggest a special category of places which are ‘royal garrison’ sites. Unfortunately systematic comparison with evidence in Greek and near eastern sources about actual garrisons does not triumphantly vindicate this analysis, and one has to abandon absolutely strict interpretation of Xenophon’s descriptions to avoid significant inconcinnities. One may note among other things that Xenophon’s use of ‘chiliarch’ in this context is otherwise unparalleled in Achaemenid period sources (though, as we will see, there is something relevant in a hellenistic source), that, although there are traces of ‘royal’ forts, they do not all appear in the sort of urban centres Xenophon leads one to envisage, and that the apparent distinctions between ‘pure’ and other mercenaries is hard to maintain, at least so long as it is allied to the distinction between royal and other garrison sites. (This is one of the apparent strict implications of Xenophon’s picture which needs to be abandoned.) At the same time, another interpretation of garrison distribution, Briant’s thesis that the empire’s basic fiscal units were military circumscriptions centred upon fortress-treasuries (1982a:191 f.), also proves hard to justify, at least from actual Achaemenid evidence. Among the known treasury sites which might be held to exemplify the scheme—Briant adduces those of Persis/Elam (whose role as garrison-sites is not strictly attested83) and the Elephantine Royal House, and might have added Arad and the Arachosian forts—Elephantine certainly corresponds to an administrative unit larger than those Briant has in mind: for he appeals

83 Hinz 1971:266 f. finds treasury guards in PF 864-5, but the text only says treasury-workers. Only Persepolis and Shiraz are on record in the archives as having both a fortress and a treasury.
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in this context to Xenophon’s chiliarchs, who are precisely not in places like Elephantine which must be a good candidate for a royal garrison-site on the Xenophontic scheme. And we have already noticed that the status of the other sites is at least hard to judge.

4 ESTATES

So far I have been pursuing ‘public’ administrative units. But in the general context of Persian methods of exploiting the empire, there are other sorts of unit of perhaps equal significance, namely parcels of land (including villages, even cities) placed in the hands of various beneficiaries of the ruling and exploiting power. ‘Estates’ of one type or another (sometimes spawning their own internal administration) matter for a rounded impression of what the empire was like quite as much as satrapies or provinces. First there is the real estate of the King and other members of the royal family. Babylonian documents refer to e.g. royal canals, reservoirs, usbarra-land (an Iranian term of uncertain import), fiefs of the royal table, throne fiefs, royal treasury land, royal land, not to mention stables, barley, poultry, cattle, and dates (the last three appearing in references to the officials in charge of these commodities). Only a certain amount can be seen of the administration of such property. The man in charge of feeding the royal cattle receives payments listed in a text labelled ‘palace account’ by its editor (Michigan 89). The job of the superintendent of royal dates includes collecting rent from royal property (ROMCT 2.23–25). In Muruš documents the ‘land of the royal treasury’ is held by a fief-collective of šumane of the royal treasury ultimately subordinate to very high-ranking persons (cf. above, p. 129, below, p. 153). Again, canal managers, who are mostly Babylonian, whose powers include conscription of labour from other landowners and whose subordinates include canal inspectors, are themselves subordinate to a class of mašennu-officials (sometimes Iranian, sometimes not, and at least once designated ‘royal’ [BE 9.59]) which appears to be concerned with all sorts of crown property (in one text the Muruš firm pays rents on ‘all lands which are crown property’ to the mašennu’s agents). They are in turn associated with *frasaka (investigators), their household includes a fief-collective of canal-workers, and one of their servants is foreman of another collective of grooms. They are perhaps immediately subordinate to the satrap: one recorded canal rent goes to a servant of the satrap Gobryas (Stolper 1974:61 ff.).

Outside Babylonia royal property appears in the form of villages near Priene (Tod 185.9 f.—assuming continuity from Achaemenid conditions) or herds of Median horses (Strabo 11.13.7) or royal paradeisoi or indeterminate ‘royal land’ in Egypt

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85 Nehem. 2.8, Arr. An. 6.29.4, Strabo 730. For other paradeisoi cf. n. 130; they are not normally called specifically ‘royal’, but note Plut. Artes. 25 (at a royal stathmos), Diod. 16.41.5, Curt. 7.2.22 ff. (for royal diversion).

86 Meeks 1972: passim. Royal land is also mentioned in P. Lille 22, 23 under Nectanebo I, but is
or a 'royal estate' in Persis (PF 1987) or an irrigation system in Chorasmia (Hdt. 3.117; see below, p. 144).

As for the rest of the royal family, Greek sources knew of cities or villages or land (especially in Egypt and Syria) being allocated to provide the Queen with clothing. They also knew of Queen Parysatis’ villages/cities in western Media, while Babylonian texts provide evidence for her holdings in Babylonia, as also for an ‘Estate of the Queen’. Irtasdana, Darius’ wife, has an estate in Persis (PF 1836–7), as does her son Arsames (Hallock 1978:113) and another royal lady, Irdabamma (PFa 27): there is also mention of a ‘village of Irtasdana’ (PF 718). Back in Babylonia we hear of a Crown Prince’s Estate and of landholdings of various other ‘sons of the (royal) house’, and, apart from two references to accountants in Persepolis texts (PF 1837, PFa 27), it is again Babylonia, and especially the Murasu archive, which provides most evidence of the internal workings of such estates (Stolper 1974:89ff.; but cf. n. 89 for the sixth century Crown Prince’s Estate). They consist of various types of land (including royal usbarra-land and bow-fiefs) and they are administered by managers who can be slaves (e.g. BE 10.84–5) and who receive rations from the estate-produce and/or fief holdings of their own within it. Such managers are variously designated paqdu or ustabar (the latter being a Persian term only attested in the later Achaemenid period and sometimes found with the additional qualification ‘of the king’). Various other officers are also visible, e.g. judges of Parysatis’ estate. All these people tend to be Babylonians, although ustabar-officials with Iranian names appear in e.g. BE 10.9, 15, BM 54025 = Eilers 1940:107.

Beyond the confines of the royal family similar sorts of pattern emerge. Greek sources speak of the satrap Tissaphernes’ Carian oikos (something substantial enough to merit full-scale military attack) and generalized references to satrapal idia or royal gifts to successful officials may conceal (among other things) similar sources of wealth. Governors of Judah often ‘acquired land’ while in office (Nehemiah 5.14f.) and evidence has been claimed for tax-exempt satrapal estates in Moṣah and Gibeon (Stern 1982:209, Briant n.d.(a)). A text from Babylonian Satir (TEBR 31) mentions governor’s land in a boundary definition and Herodotus’ account of the Babylonian satrap’s personal perquisites (Hdt. 1.192) generally not very evident in any Late Period sources (Lloyd 1983:327).

87 Xen. An. 1.4.9 (Syria, Parysatis), Hdt. 2.98, Athen. 33F (Egypt), Plat. Alcib. I 123B, Cic. Verr. 3.33.


89 BE 10.5, 31, 45, 59, 101, PBS 2/1 51–2, 90, 133, 202, Stolper 1974:89ff. The Crown Prince’s Estate appears also earlier in the Achaemenid period: VS 3.210 (where a debt of barley owed to it is collected by an agent of the man ‘in charge of the tax-demand of the Crown Prince’s Estate’), 5.60, 129 (which both mention the steward, rab biti, of the estate, a type of agent encountered in other Persian landholdings (see below)). Cyr. 177 records the loan of silver which is the Crown Prince’s property, and there were Crown Prince’s palaces (YOS 7.8 [Uruk], CT 57.36 [Sippar]).

90 Stolper 1974:96f. (at least nine individuals).

91 Tissaphernes: Xen. Hell. 3.2.13, Nep. Ages. 3.1. (His ‘property’ realized 920 talents in 395/4: Hell. Oxy. 19.3)

92 Idia: Thuc. 8.45.6, Xen. Hell. 1.5.3, Hell. Oxy. 19.2. (The idia phoroi of Xen. Hell. 2.1.4, 3.8 are a special, controversial case: Lewis 1977: 119, Tuplin n.d.(a).) For satrapal treasure in the form of metal, clothing etc. cf. Polyæn. 7.23.1 (Mausolus). Idrieus was ‘the richest man in Asia Minor’ (Isoc. 5.103).

Gifts: Xen. Oec. 4.7f., Cyr. 8.1.39. Satraps were also, of course, on salary scales like the dignitaries of the Persepolis archive.
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surely presupposes land-holding, as does the title ‘steward of Gobryas’ estate’ in a document also referring to the ‘canal of Gobryas’ (PE 8.80; and cf. TEBR 89). The Elamite version of DB 47 even appears to describe the fort Aršāda as the irdamātu (estate) of the Arachosian satrap Vivana. Much more informatively, texts from Babylonia and Egypt illustrate the estates of the Egyptian satrap Arsames in some detail.93

Nor is it only satraps that come into question. On the one hand Artoxares (Arthaśār) an influential court figure in Ctesias (688 F 14–15), turns up as landowner in eleven Babylonian texts (Lewis 1977:21) and Xenophon envisages the elder Cyrus giving members of his personal court oikoi, khōrai and servants (? kurtāš-workers) in provincial areas which will provide them with dasmos and be available for direct use on the occasion of official visits to the relevant area (Cyropaedia 8.6.4–5). On the other hand Xenophon also says (ibid. 10) that members of the satrapal court were given land, and this proposition can be easily illustrated from Near Eastern sources. The Persepolis archives refer to a number of estate holders, including some known in official capacities in other texts.94 An Iranian secretary of the Babylonian satrap turns up in BE 9.48 as owner of a field, and an ustarbar (cf. p. 134) who bears two names, one Babylonian and one Iranian, has a plot described as ‘gift of the king’ (nidintu šarrī; Eilers 1940:107). Belšunu (cf. p. 122) possessed both crown-grant land (nidintu šarrī again) and land not so designated, which may have been his prior to appointment (YBC 11586, Stolper 1986 and n.d.). Bagasaru the treasurer (cf. p. 129) owned and received income from land near Babylon (some of it held jointly with a member of the Egibi banking family) which he administered through a rab biti (Dar. 105, 296, 527, 534, 542). More generally there are plenty of Iranian landowners in Anatolia, Egypt, and Babylonia known to us only by name, some of whom will be officials of the satrapal entourage. Some texts speak of, for example, the farm of Bagadata (BE 9.65) or the ‘estate of the Persian’ (VS 4.87/8, BE 10.101) or the canal of Uštana (BE 9.65).95 Another treats the town of Rabia as virtually belonging to (a different) Bagadata (BE 10.9). In BE 9.48 Bagamiri, son of Mitradata, leases property (some of it acquired from his late uncle) and a dwelling-house to the Murašu firm for a 60-year period.96 In UET 4.99 Bagiš lends a large quantity of barley through the agency of his rab biti; the latter’s title indicates that Bagiš has a considerable estate (cf. above) and in a similar fashion we can identify additional estate owners in the Murašu archive because documents associate them with ‘managers’ with the same

94 e.g. Šutezza (PF 150–5), Išitimanka (180, 1802), Irtupiya (330, 1527, Fort. 1091), Dauris (PF 331), Dayakka (581), Bakabada (1256), Bakankama (1857), Marriya (1898), Milparma (2027), Miturna (2070), Uštana (2071). The estates appear to be close to place(s) of official activity in the cases of Šutezza (150–4 with 520–1, 637–8, 640–1) and Išitimanka (1802 with 405, 925–8). Other named estate holders appear in 444, 1855, 1857, 2025, 2075. Anonymous estates: 1368, 2079. On Persis estates see now Sumner 1986:26–7 (incorporating investigations by Stolper).
95 Note also certain Persian toponyms (one a palace site) discussed in Zadok 1976a:72. Elsewhere in the empire note the fortified manor-house of Asidates in Xen. An. 7.8.8 ff.
96 Distinct from Bagamiri, son of Aspadasta, a bow-fief holder (BE 9.106, 10.50, PBS 2/1 77, 192) but conceivably identical with a Bagiš ... attested as estate manager in the Queen’s Estate in the same year.
titles and functions as those known in royal estates. For the sort of landholdings we are now considering seem in general to be characterized by the same type of internal administration. The most copious and interconnected evidence is that about the estates of Arsames and two otherwise unknown Persians, Warohi and Warfis, in Egypt. From this emerges a picture of the owner running his estates or domains through a manager (or managers) who are responsible e.g. for supervising the workers (gardu) and slaves within it and collecting 'tax' due from it (the term used, mndt, is one also applicable to royal tribute, and it comes in a form which can be carried to Babylon, i.e. silver). In performing his duties he is sometimes associated with accountants and can call upon the services of a local military commander, though there is no proving that this is a private militia as has sometimes been claimed. His rewards include a dw$n (AD 2), apparently a grant of either land within or some sort of revenue from the estate. (He is also a slave owner.) This recalls Babylonian evidence, as does another text (AD 8) which also casts light on the sources of Arsames' 'tax': this records Arsames' assignation to an Egyptian of a domain (baga) consisting of land which, if untenanted, would be directly incorporated into the estate. In return the assignee pays rent (hlk) to the estate, which we now see consists at least partly, like Babylonian counterparts, of smaller, dependent estate-units. (The use of the term hlk also particularly recalls the payment of ilku (etymologically cognate) by Babylonian bow-fief holders to the authorities of the larger estate of which the bow-fief was part (see pp. 153 f.). But it would perhaps be unwise to infer that the Egyptian case is in all respects parallel.) The situation in AD 8 must be distinguished from that of Warohi's domain: this too is given to him by Arsames, but appears to be quite separate from the latter's holdings, the gift being from Arsames qua satrap, not qua estate owner. I say this without prejudice to the imponderable question of whether Arsames has his Egyptian estates because and only so long as he is satrap. Either way he will doubtless have them thanks to royal grant.

It is this sort of background that we should have in mind when we read in a Greek source about the khora of Memnon or of Tithraustes or of the King giving an oikos or land to such worthies as Miltiades' son Metiochus (Hdt. 6.41), Parrinus (PBS 2/1 70, 98, 102, BE 10.103), Ipraduparna (BE 10.114), Umartaqpa (PBS 2/1 10), Ummatu (CBS 12981), Gibbu (PBS 2/1 43), Artamana (CBS 4998), Mitata (BE 10.114), Pinibri (BE 10.29, TuM 2/3 148). In the Kasr archive there are many Iranian proprietors of real estate (Stolper n.d.).

97 Manager: passim. They are variously Egyptian, Babylonian and, at least once, Iranian (Maspat, AD 12). Succession of father by son appears in AD 2.
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Phylakos of Samos (id. 8.85), Democedes of Croton (id. 3.132) and even the deposed Babylonian King Nabonidus. But we should beware of putting everything under the same head. The various texts relating to donations of cities, though consistent in some cases with the recipient actually residing in and ruling the city in question (this was certainly the position of Themistocles at Magnesia and of the Gongylids and Demaratids in Aeolis), are perhaps strictly speaking gifts of portions of royal revenue not of estates which happen to coincide with whole political units. Again, there are various land-grants distinguished from the above by being much smaller (no question of internal administration, though the recipient may lease it to another tenant) and more explicitly tied to the provision of service or other dues to the crown, e.g. Babylonian bow-fiefs, landholdings of Egyptian garrisons (cf. pp. 152 ff.), the settlement of exiled Delians and of Egyptians in Aeolis (the former at least carrying military obligations), the apparent concentrations of Iranian settlers, perhaps 'military colonists', in three distinct areas of Lydia and in Cappadocia, and the land in Egypt occasionally described by a demotic term later associated with Hellenistic katoikoi. A final, and quite different, sort of 'settlement' is that of transplanted prisoners of war (cf. n. 28)—quite different because these are the tools and objects of exploitation, not its beneficiaries, creating wealth for the king and getting (as Persepolis texts show) no more than bare subsistence in return. It is time now to turn to that other, most obvious form of exploitation, viz. tribute.

II TRIBUTE

1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Tribute was fundamental to the empire. In Aeschylus (Persæ 585) the fear that Persian power might collapse is the fear that subjects will no longer keep Persian

103 Beross. 680 F9, a residence in Carmania. Abydenus 685 F6 speaks of hegemonit (cf. the claim that Astyages was made ruler of Hyrcania: Ctes. 688 F9a, Just. 1.6.6). It is tempting to suppose that Timagoras and Calligecitus (Thuc. 8.6, 39) and Nicogenes of Aegae (Plut. Them. 26) are also beneficiaries of royal or satrapal land grants.


105 In Pytharcus' case (n. 104) one wonders if the cities are more than villages—in which case estate-holding may be the appropriate category. Similar doubts are possible with Lycon, given that Ctesias calls Parysatis' villages 'cities' (n. 88, Ctes. 688 F16 (65)). For a gift of villages and the right to Persian dress by Alexander, presumably imitating Achaemenid practice, cf. Plut. Alex. 31.

106 Delians: Thuc. 5.1, 32, 8.108.4. Egyptians: Xen. Cyr. 7.1.45, Hell. 3.1.7. Anderson 1970:168 questions the claim that this settlement went back to the sixth century. In the same general area we have Hyrcanian and Assyrian royal mercenaries at Comania (Xen. An. 7.8.13).


laws, do proskynesis, or pay daskos: compare the formulae of royal inscriptions mentioned earlier (p. 133) and note that tribute also appeared as a symbol of Persian power in the Suez Canal stelae (Posener 1936: no. 8.6). Herodotus’ claim that Persis itself was non-tributary (3.97.1) accords with this symbolic character, but it is not straightforwardly true. The inclusion of Persis in a List of Peoples associated with the formula about tribute in DB 6–7 might be an oversight, but the Persepolis documents certainly establish that some tribute payments went on in Persia (Koch 1980). Perhaps the exemption applied only to the nobility (Briant 1982a:342, 501)—but in that case why did Herodotus not have a figure, albeit a low one, for Persian tribute?—or only to silver tribute (Dandamayev 1972:43).

Darius says that his subjects bore him tribute, and this is not merely a figure of speech. Throughout Herodotus’ Tribute List (3.89–96) the size of an area’s tribute is consistently expressed as ‘such-and-such a sum went to Darius’, the metal being presumably supplied in bullion form and certainly stored thus, perhaps after further refinement (cf. Oppenheim 1947), to be coined as and when required, and for other evidence we can turn to Polycletis’ remarks (128 F3) about the treasuries in Susa built to receive the tribute (both silver and other non-perishable natural produce), to the large silver accumulations captured by Alexander (see below), to statements in Greek sources about satraps sending tribute (including horses) to the King or about a rebellious regional governor stealing quae regi portarentur (Nep. Dat. 4.2), and to various Persepolis texts which refer to treasure or silver or tax being transported to Susa or Persepolis or from Susa to Matezziš. But we should not necessarily assume that all the silver tribute quota of a particular region was carried off to Mesopotamia or Iran. Herodotus himself notes that a portion of the Cilician phoros (28 per cent) was retained in the satrapy to pay for garrison cavalry and arrangements of this sort may have been quite common: after all, Xenophon (Cyropaedia 8.6.3) makes it appear that the satrap’s payment of garrison misthos and execution of other unidentified functions (ἄλλο τελούσαν δὲ τι ἄν δήγη) was standardly a consequence of tribute-collection, and Herodotus (3.91.3) records tribute in kind (corn) levied in Egypt for Persians and epikouroi in the satrapy. This supposition may help with the problem some have perceived in the surprisingly small percentage (about seven per cent) of the theoretical total tribute income for 520–331 BC which Alexander actually found in Susa and Persepolis and the surprising parsimony of the king in providing cash to pay for the military defence of his own interests e.g. in western Anatolia. Cawkwell 1968:4 confronts

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109 Susa (Arr. An. 3.16.7, Diod. 17.66, Curt. 3.2.11, Plut. Alex. 36, Strab. 15.3.39, Persepolis (Plut. Alex. 37, Diod. 17.70, Curt. 5.6.3, Strab. loc. cit.), Pasargadae (Curt., Strab. 11.6c.), Ecbatana (Strab. loc. cit.).
111 PF 57 (tax, Maturban-Susa), 1357 (treasure, Babylon-Susa: carried by Paitasa, elsewhere a tithe-collector), 1342 (silver, Susa-Matezziš: carried by a treasurer, elsewhere attested as bazikara, tax-handler), 1495 (tax, Barikana-Susa), PPa 14 and (unpub.) Q 809 (treasure, Kerman-Susa). Paitasa also appears thrice accompanying groups of horses (PF 1394, 1472, 1570), which might be tribute (so Koch 1980:123).
112 For sources cf. n. 109. I assume 120,000 talents at Persepolis (Diodorus, Curtius) and some 180,000 for Susa, Persepolis and Pasargadae, respectively into 4.5% and 6.5% of the theoretical total (190 x 14,560 talents). There is no figure for Babylon, and all we know about Ecbatana is that Darius III removed seven or eight thousand talents thence (Arr. An. 3.19.5, Diod. 17.74.4, Strab. loc. cit.).
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this difficulty by discarding Herodotus’ clear statement that a silver tribute was levied from all areas of the empire in favour of Polycitus’ claim (128 F3) that it was confined to the paralia, with the remaining (inland) regions paying produce instead (dyes, drugs, hair, wool, animals). The Achaemenid kings certainly did receive tribute in kind (see below), but we have evidence for silver-tax payments in the Persepolis documents113 and in Babylonia (below pp. 153 f.)—and this despite the fact that silver is not native to Babylonia—so Polycitus’ simple picture is certainly wrong (inspired, perhaps, by his awareness of the irrelevant fact that only the empire’s fringes had coinage economies). The problem about the bullion in Susa and Persepolis is better solved by supposing that only a certain proportion of the silver-tribute income had ever been in the major treasuries at the empire’s centre. A recent discussion of the Persepolis treasury would make that proportion very low indeed or even eliminate it altogether. Cahill 1985 argues that the Persepolis treasury was above all a place of storage for gifts symbolic of the king’s power not a centre for receiving tribute income and redistributing it into the imperial economy. He is not entirely clear about how he regards the bullion element of the treasury’s contents, but the implication of his overall argument appears to be either that the bullion was not tribute at all or that, if it was, its transfer to Persepolis was in any case of ceremonial significance and the proportion of tribute transferred in this fashion was never much more than the circa five per cent represented by what Alexander eventually found there (cf. n. 112). The first of these alternatives stands in flagrant contradiction to the literary and inscriptive evidence unless one assumes that Persepolis was so totally a ‘ritual’ city outside the ordinary administrative structures as to be irrelevant to statements, even royal ones, about tribute being ‘brought to the king’—a view which I find a little difficult to square with the existence there of an archive like that from the Fortification (irrespective of whether that archive was originally stored in the treasury). The second alternative is therefore the better one. But the small surviving corpus of treasury tablets, almost entirely concerned with silver payments given to workers in partial or (rarely) total replacement of payment in kind and interpreted by Cahill as something quite exceptional, is surely an unreliable reflection of the whole range of the treasury’s activities and Cahill must be overestimating the purely symbolic import of the bullion holdings. The fact that the treasury contained some things which were not easily redistributable does not prove that everything it contained was practically in that category, and on Cahill’s own view Susa was ‘presumably a place where ‘taxes and other revenues for imperial purposes [were] collected and stored’ (1985:387)—this in contradistinction to Persepolis—and yet some 50,000 talents were discovered in the Elamite capital by the Macedonians. I should suppose, therefore, that the proportion of silver tribute income actually brought to the king and stored in the major treasuries of Mesopotamia and Iran was decidedly higher than five or seven per cent.

In 3.89 Herodotus attributes the establishment of a regular silver-tribute system

113 Cf. n. 111. PT 85, an Akkadian text mentioning silver tribute, found at Persepolis, was probably written there or at least in Persia: cf. Zadok 1976a (who identifies a Babylonian presence at Matezzi in 526–21 bc, and would have PT 85 written there), Stolper 1984 (publishing another Akk. text definitely written at Persepolis in Darius’ reign).
to Darius, his predecessors having merely received unregularized gifts. The same view is asserted by Polycitus 128 F3, is certainly assumed in a story in Plutarch Moralia 172F and Polyaeus 7.11.3 about Darius' first tribute assessment, and is presumably implied by Plato's claim (Laws 695C) that Darius incorporated into the law 'the dasmos of Cyrus which he (i.e. Cyrus) had promised to the Persians'. Other texts, however, appear to deny Darius' primacy. Some are admittedly of doubtful weight. Xenophon's willingness to attribute tribute demands to the elder Cyrus (Cyropaedia 7.4.2, 8.1.9, 6.1 f. etc.) cannot be regarded as reliable evidence, nor can Arrian's statement that the Indians paid tribute according to the assessment of Cyrus (Indica 1.3), in view of uncertainty as to whether India was within the empire at the time (Indians are missing in the List of Peoples in DB 7, though appear regularly thereafter). Even Cyrus' own statement in the Akkadian Cylinder Text (ANET 316, Berger 1975:199) that the kings of all the world 'brought heavy tribute and kissed my feet in Babylon' must be treated cautiously: for since the text relates to Cyrus qua king of Babylon and belongs firmly and exclusively in the tradition of Mesopotamian royal building texts (Harmatta 1971, Kuhrt 1983), the expression of universal recognition of the new king's power by reference to tribute may be dictated by that tradition and the claim that tribute was actually paid may be valid only for the ex-Babylonian empire. (Wiseman's hint, 1967:504, that the fragmentary royal statements about tribute coming to Babylonia in BM 82684 + 82685 may be Cyrus' is far too speculative to help.) The other evidence at odds with Herodotus' statement in 3.89 is provided by Herodotus himself, when he says that Smerdis remitted tribute for three years (3.67.3) and speaks of Libyans and Cyreneans agreeing to pay tribute to Cambyses (3.13, 4.165). This does at least show that different views were current already in the fifth century (which will help to explain Xenophon's line in Cyropaedia), but still does not settle the truth of the matter; it was all too easy for classical Greeks to assume casually that the Achaemenid king had always received tribute as he did in their own time. On the whole, Herodotus' clear statement, when not addressing himself to the question casually, that Darius introduced a change seems to deserve precedence. The best view is perhaps this: the Achaemenid empire had come into existence by the Persian king's successive acquisition of large existing imperial entities (Media, Babylon, Lydia, Egypt), each with its own internal tradition of royal 'tribute'. These traditions were maintained separately for the benefit of the new Achaemenid ruler (and may in some cases have involved elements of relatively unregularized gift-giving). What Darius did was perhaps to create a somewhat greater degree of uniformity between the different areas of the empire (e.g. by laying down some uniform principles of assessment) and certainly to order a new actual assessment, which quite possibly increased the burden.

How great was that burden? One encounters some informal indications. Herodotus declares that Persian demands led the Babylonians to prostitute their daughters[114] and less frivolously Nehemiah 5.6 reports heavy borrowing in order to

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[114] Hdt. 1.197. (A different connection between Persia and Babylonian prostitutes appears in Plut. Mor. 173C: maintenance of public prostitutes was a requirement imposed after a Babylonian revolt. This is evidently a reworking of what appears in Hdt. 1.156 about punishment of rebellious Lydia).
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pay the king’s tribute. Cook 1961 saw the impoverishment of classical Ionia in terms of tribute, but this is a special case of an area (in his view) paying taxes to two imperial powers. At an earlier date Miletus, for example, was said to be at a height of prosperity after 40 years of Persian rule (Herodotus 5.28, Roebuck: 1959: 131—but contrast Tozzi 1978: chapter 5). Resentment of the tribute burden is, nonetheless, a possible explanation of the Ionian revolt, and it is more or less explicitly attested as a cause of rebellion in Egypt (Diod. 11.71.3, Curt. 4.7.1, Briant n.d.(b)). The recorded indications of royal tax rates in Babylonia are not obviously unduly harsh, though doubtless one can only really judge a particular obligation in the light of all a taxpayer’s obligations to state, temple or whatever, and the payment of royal ilku could certainly lead to debt. The only global figure on offer is that in Herodotus’ tribute list (3.89—96), where each nomos is assigned a figure in Babylonian silver or Euboean gold talents and a final total is produced of 14,560 Euboean talents. But the manuscript figures do not add up, and the simplest emendation to make them do so involves postulating a conversion rate of 78 instead of 70 Euboean minai to the Babylonian talent. The general order of magnitude is not perhaps much affected, though, and even some rather radical criticisms of Herodotus (e.g. the claim of Armayor 1978 that the individual nomos figures are Herodotean inventions) allows that the total may come from a reputable source. Cawkwell 1968:4 notes that it is credible in the light of Antigonus’ later annual tribute income of 11,000 talents (Diodorus 19.56.5). Compared with Athenian tribute income and allowing for the different scale of the two empires the figure is not disproportionately large.

On the other hand, tribute was not just a matter of silver payments. Several texts distinguish between obligations in silver and in kind, subsuming both under the heading of tribute. Herodotus’ own list notes fish and corn in Egypt, horses in Cilicia, eunuchs in Babylonia. The pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica (1345b28–1346a5) includes some produce taxes in the satrapal revenue, but τὰ καραγά γῆς καὶ ἄγορα αῖα τέλη could be cash dues. (For a full list cf. p. 146). The taxes of Beyond the River enabled its treasurers to provide both silver and commodities to the Jews, and when Strabo (11.3.8) says that the Cappadocians sent the king 1500 horses, 2000 mules and 50,000 sheep in addition to argurikon telos and that the Medes ‘paid’ (ἐπερευνούν) nearly twice this the animals are clearly tribute. At a more

115 cf. Nehem. 9.36: ‘today we are slaves and all the land’s produce goes to the king whom Thou has set over us’. Nehem. 5.6 also mentions, though not specifically in connection with tax payment, pledging of children for a debt, a procedure rarely attested also in Babylonia (Dundamayev 1976:438 f.). Voluntary temple servitude appears in Late Period Egypt (Lloyd 1983:315), as does abandonment of land due to tax burdens (P. Rylands 9.6/15 (Saité)).


117 The Indians pay 360 Euboean gold talents, i.e. 4680 silver talents. The other 19 nomoi should therefore produce 9880 Euboean silver talents. All MSS, save one, at 95.1 make the total 9540, and the exception (S) has the correct figure in rasura (i.e. as a correction). The actual total of individual figures for the 19 nomoi is 7600 Bab. talents. This equals 9880 Eub. talents if 1 Bab. talent = 70 Eub. minai. A complicated attempt by Descat n.d. to ‘explain’ the figure of 9540 also involves the wrong exchange rate.

118 3.91.2 (fish, sold for silver; 2.149); 90.3 (360 horses); 92.1 (500 eunuchs). Cilician and (cf. below) Median horses turn up in Egypt according to one reading of P. Aram. Florence 11913 (Milik 1960); contrast Bresciani 1959, Hoftijzer 1962, Swiggers 1980.

local level, an army land-tax mentioned at Saqqara included silver and materials.\textsuperscript{120} We also have individual references to tribute in kind. Horses recur at Aspendus and in Armenia,\textsuperscript{121} sheep, goats, and cereals in Persis (PF 267–73). Several passages in Xenophon and biblical sources clearly connect tribute and agricultural produce.\textsuperscript{122} It is tempting to think that the cereal stores destined for the Elephantine garrison in AP 2 and 24 (drawn in one case from the provinces of Tères and Thebes) represent tax payments and to suggest a similar explanation of the foodstuffs recorded in ostraca at Beer-Sheba (Stern 1982:45, Naveh 1973, 1979), Arad (Stern loc. cit., Naveh 1975), Yatta and Tell 'Ira (Naveh 1985).

Nor does so-called 'tribute' (whether in silver or kind) exhaust the range of offerings to the Achaemenid kings, there being (at least) two other areas worthy of note.

(i) A major element in the iconography of Persepolis is the extensive representation of the bringing of clothes, precious objects, animals, and the like to the King found in the so-called Tribute Bearer reliefs on the staircases of the Apadana, Palace H and the Palace of Darius (Walser 1966). Despite the modern label, these should not be regarded as an image of the tribute system: the delegates are presenting \textit{gifts} and the composition symbolizes the empire's respect for the king not its mundane fiscal subjection to him (Root 1979:227 ff., Cahill 1985:387 f.). Nor is it \textit{merely} a symbol if Cahill 1985 is correct to identify the constituents of such gifts in some of the contents of the Persepolis treasury. Gifts of this sort are normally additional to ordinary tribute, but Herodotus (3.97) notes that the Ethiopians, Colchians and south Caucasians, and Arabs had the privilege (cf. 3.91) of paying no tribute but merely offering regular gifts. Since Ethiopians and Arabs appear regularly in royal Lists of Peoples and therefore implicitly as payers of \textit{bazis} we have a contradiction in the evidence. Either the two sources refer to different groups of Ethiopians and Arabs (and Herodotus failed to notice the ones who did pay tribute) or the King was disinclined to distinguish gift and tribute when glorifying his own power (but did not think the Colchians worth a mention). The suggestion of Eph'äl 1982:206 f. that the frankincense given by the Arabs of Gaza/Ienysus was simply a tax upon the profits of supervising the incense trade on behalf of the King is an interesting variation of the second type of solution but one not obviously extensible to the other areas involved.

(ii) In an attempt to give some impression of the enormous wealth of Babylonia Herodotus reports (1.192) that the whole empire was divided up for the provision-ing (\textit{trophe}) of the King and his army and that under this system Babylonia was responsible for the provisions of four months out of every year. Herodotus says explicitly that this was additional to \textit{phoros}, but leaves a crucial question unanswered: is this additional to \textit{silver} tribute or to \textit{all} species of tribute? Similar

\textsuperscript{120} Saqqara 24.11. In another Saqqara text (Aimé-Giron 1921:56) the same tax apparently only involves silver. In Saqqara 31 something, (?) natural produce, goes from the 'fields of the army' to the Royal House.

\textsuperscript{121} Arr. An. 1.26.3, Xen. An. 4.5.25, in both cases bred as 'dasmos for the king'. Cf. also nn. 110, 122.

\textsuperscript{122} Xen. Oec. 4.11, Xen. An. 3.4.31 (barley, wine, oats for horses 'collected for the satrap of the country'), Nehem. 13.10 f., I Esdr. 4.6 f., Joseph. AJ 11.46 f. And (?) cf. the storage jars of Judah (p. 147).
questions arise with certain texts about the King’s Table,123 with Xenophon’s statement that satraps had to send the ‘good things’ of their satrapies to the king (Cyropaedia 8.6.6) or indeed with the building materials of the Susa Palace foundation texts (cf. n. 20), where the named sources amount to a list of peoples of the empire. Whatever the answer, the simple fact that such income existed is significant enough. The collection of natural produce and its redistribution as rations and salaries to agents of the ruling power is a central fact of the Persian system. Some evidence of this has always been there in the literary sources, alongside the perhaps more prominent references to apparently intermittent gift-giving on the part of the king or others. Heraclides 689 F2 knew that the king’s doryphoroi and peltasts received food as misthos. The guardians of Cyrus’ tomb got sheep, wine, and cereals (Arr. An. 6.29.7, Strabo 15.3.7), and the members of the royal harem received food allowances (Esther 2.9). The governor of Judah was entitled to claim 40 talents’ worth of food per day for his table (Nehemiah 5.4 f), the Babylonian satrap got horses as well as silver (Herodotus 1.192), and some said that Cyrus rebelled because of an inadequate salary (Plut. Artex. 4). It is also possible that stories in Achian Varia Historia 1.31 f. about giving natural produce to the king during his travels are a dim reflection of documents about royal provisions in the Persepolis archives (PF category J). But documentary evidence has immeasurably enriched the picture with payments in kind to garrisons in Egypt124 and (perhaps) Palestine (cf. p. 142) and Persis (PF 1857, with Sumner 1986:26 f.), rations for garda in Egypt and Babylonia125 and above all the whole bureaucratic system in Persis/Elam (p. 115) for distributing salary, rations, and provisions to the king and his court, high functionaries (some receiving prodigious amounts every day), kurtash-workers, travellers of varied status, and even to animals—which brings us back to Greek evidence and the villages which had to feed the Babylonian satrap’s dogs (Herodotus 1.192.4) or provide maintenance for a favourite royal camel (Plut. Alex. 31, Strabo 737). Silver is, of course, by no means absent from the overall picture: even in Persis the later series of Treasury Tablets shows the regular replacement of some portion of payments in kind with silver, though when grain is so replaced it is a sign of crisis (Hallock 1985:603, Hinz 1971:274 f). But it cannot be too much stressed that to a very large degree the empire ran not only not on coinage but not even on precious metal.

The Achaemenids are notorious for an interest in gardens and in agriculture. Strabo reports a Persian song about 360 uses of the date-palm (742C) and makes agricultural skill (as well as the manufacture of the tools of war and hunting) play a role in Persian education (15.3.18). Cyrus astonished Lysander by his planning and

123 Ctesias 688 F53 (dinner discussed in On the Tribute of Asia), Deinon 690 F12 (what is consumed is a quasi-arpkhê from the whole empire). Id. F23a implies that Ammoniac salt and Nile water were brought for the Dinner. 22b speaks of Nile and Danube water put in the gaza as a confirmation of the empire’s extent. Strab. 735 (Assos wheat, Syrian wine, Eulauus water).

124 AP 2.5 (as restored in Grelot 1972), 24.39, 42, 43.8, BP 11.4. (Cowley’s restoration of the relevant word, ptp', in AP 37 is wrong.) It is possible that some/all of the otherwise unexplained lists of names in AP 12, 19, 23, 51, 53, Aimé-Giron 1931:no. 87 are connected with ration distribution. Saqqara 46 may also be relevant; and a different word for provisions appears in Saqqara 25. Soldiers did also receive salary (prt) in silver: AP 2,16, 11.6, (7) 16.4, Grelot 1972: nos. 22 & 25, Bresciani 1960: no. 1.

planting of a paradeisos at Sardis (Xen. Oec. 4.20 f.), and this was just one aspect of the general requirement upon a satrap to ensure that this khora was well-populated and productive, provided with an abundance of trees and other agricultural produce (Xen. Oec. 4.8, 15, Cyr. 8.6.16). (Arsites’ refusal to contemplate a ‘scorched earth’ strategy in 334—‘not one house belonging to his subjects was to be burned’ (Arr. An. 1.12.9–10)—has been thought a reflection of this, though it should be noted that Artaxerxes II, Darius III, and the Cilician satrap Arsames were less sensitive.126) We accordingly find evidence for the establishment of new crops in imperial areas, e.g. Gadatas’ transplantation of crops from Beyond the River to Ionia (SIG3 22), the planting of Chalybonian vines in Damascus (Posidon. 87 F68), or the introduction of pistachios in Aleppo, sesame in Egypt and rice in Mesopotamia (Ghirshman 1954:182). It looks as though population and cultivation increased in Achaemenid Babylonia (Stolper 1974:199 f.) and there is talk of technical innovations in control of water-supply (Oppenheim 1985:578). The king certainly owned the canals, deriving direct profit from this on top of the profits raked off from the results of using canal water (Stolper 1974:61 f.). Royal interest of this sort is reflected in some Greek texts about Babylonia,127 and elsewhere the Persians took good care of the Memphis dyke (Herodotus 2.99.3), encouraged the extension of qanat irrigation in Hyrcania,128 and exacted payment for water use in Chorasmia.129 The numerous paradeisoi attested in literary sources,130 Babylonian documents (Sippar: CT 22.198 i, Cyr. 222; Uruk: YOS 3.133; Nippur: CBS 13039) and the Persepolis archives, where at least 15 partetas locations are named as playing a role in the bureaucratic system (PF index s.v., Hinz 1975:72), are actually only the tip of a phenomenon whose causes, it will be clear now, were thoroughly hard-headed; and Briant has even suggested, not entirely fancifully, that paradeisoi were actually meant inter alia to symbolize the whole empire’s agricultural adornment—for profit as well as pleasure.131 Certainly when Darius prays (DPd 3)

126 Xen. An. 1.6.1 (401 bc), Curt. 3.4.3 (334/3), id. 4.9.7 f., 12 f., 10.12 f., Diod. 17.55.2 (332). Curtius does observe that Arsames ought to have been protecting his satrapy.

127 Arr. An. 7.21.5, Strabo 16.1.9; Hdt. 1.189 (Cyrus’ punishment of R. Gyndes is presumably a fanciful tale inspired by Achaemenid waterworks).

128 Polyb. 10.28.3: those who brought water to previously uncultivated regions were entitled κακτέος τὴν χώραν for five generations, the privilege being presumably exemption from water-charges like those in Chorasmia (n. 131); cf. Briant 1982a:427 f. Archaeological evidence has been claimed for Achaemenid qanats in other areas, but in some cases the recent trend is to attribute the inception of such systems to other, sometimes substantially earlier, periods and stress lack of demonstrable Achaemenid intervention even later on (Oman: Salles n.d. Quirf: Potts 1984:109. Bacteria: various views in Briant 1982a:424, 1984:47 f., Gardin & Lyonnet 1978:9–136 f.) An Achaemenid date can still be maintained at e.g. El Kharqeh (Egypt), al-Ula (Hejaz): Briant 1982a:424, Nasif 1980. For irrigation-works near Persepolis cf. Summer 1986:13 f.

129 Hdt. 3.117: here it is not a question of extending cultivation but of the king extracting revenue on top of pharos.


the twin royal concerns for georgika and polemika). Famine is not just a natural disaster but a direct fiscal catastrophe. And the connection of georgika and polemika in the Xenophon passage just mentioned is simple: if military control is good, there will be peace and the land-workers will produce the maximum dasmos—to pay among other things for the military control.

2 SATRAPIES AND PROVINCES
So much, then, in general terms. What can be said in more detail about the ways in which tribute was collected? The largest visible tax unit is the satrapy. In Herodotus' Tribute List the 20 nomoi are satrapies, Ezra speaks of the tax of Beyond the River,¹³² the satrapal economy in pseudo-Aristotle (1346b20f) is entirely a matter of collecting revenue to feed the royal economy, Alexander orders the Hellenistic Phrygian satrapy to provide 'the same tribute as under Darius' (Arr. An. 1.17.1), and in Xenophon’s analysis of satrapal duties oversight of dasmos is stressed (Cyr. 8.6.3, 16, Oec. 4.5.11). Accordingly we find satraps pressed for arrears by and dispatching due dasmoi to the king,¹³³ the revolt of satraps cuts off royal income (Diod. 15.90.4), and at a more local level it is to the satrap that the hyparchs Zenis and Mania give their phoroi (Xen. Hell. 3.1.12), while the food stores in north Assyrian villages ‘collected for the satrap of the country’ (Xen. An. 3.4.31) may represent tribute payments. When Curtius reports that the Mallians and Oxydracae once paid tribute 'to the Arachosians', the latter phrase presumably stands for the Arachosian satrap.¹³⁴

The satraps' role could include assessment: they performed this task for Darius at the supposed institution of the system (Plut. Mor. 172F, Poly. 7.11.3) and Artaphernes made a new assessment of Ionia after the revolt (Hdt. 6.42.2). The complaints of Darius (SIG 3 22) about Gadatas' exaction of phoroi from Apollo's phytourgoi and his insistence upon their cultivating profane land (in order to increase the tribute-producing area) represents royal reaction to a bit of piecemeal satrapal assessment—assuming, as most historians do, that Gadatas was a satrap (rather than e.g. a paradeisos-keeper as suggested by Dandamayev 1984b:114). Mausolus certainly was and is represented as responding to demands for phoroi by instituting eisphorai (Ps. Ar. Oec. 1348a46)—the satrap can evidently invent what imposts he likes to meet the King's global requirements.¹³⁵

Artaphernes' assessment of the Ionian tribute was based solely upon measurement of the cities' land, but Herodotus does not explain how exactly this led to an assessment being fixed. Evidence has been produced for the existence in Babylonia of a detailed land register (karamarri), showing property boundaries, ownership, and tax obligations,¹³⁶ and traces of the same may be discerned in Persis,¹³⁷ while the Edfu donation text mentions information about land from the 'Office of

¹³² Ezra 6.8 (1 Esdr. 6.29 [Coile Syria and Palestine], Joseph. AJ 11.16 [Samaria]).
¹³³ Thuc. 8.5.5, Ar. Oec. 1348a4f, Xen. An. 1.1.8, Isoc. 5.104.
¹³⁵ It is also indirectly relevant that Mausolus can grant atelia to a city outside the empire, Cnossos, ὀρφαγς Μαύσολους ἄρχει (Labraunda 40).
¹³⁶ Dar. 551, BE 9.55, CBS 12859, with Stolper 1974:47f., 1977:259f. Stolper would also connect the didakka and hatru of army-scribes (p. 120) with this register.
¹³⁷ cf. PF 779, 1245 recording a karamarras (person) who also (Fort. 3562) 'writes people down', a function further associated (1620, 1242-3, Fort. 3568) with 'making inquiries' or 'investigating'. (The word for this is cognate with patifrasa [n. 44]).

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Writings'. But the claim advanced by Stolper (n. 136) that Artaphernes was constructing a similar register of Ionian land is only questionable coherent with Herodotus' implication that Artaphernes assessed each polis rather than all individual land-holdings (cf. p. 148). The point of his measurements may have been simply to re-establish how much cultivable or otherwise useful land each polis had, from which an assessment might be calculated by some rule of thumb. (Descat n.d. suggests, on the basis of a hellenistic text from Sardis (cf. p. 147) and of reworking of Herodotus' Tribute List figures, that the rule involved a valuation for tax purposes of 60 darics for each area of one parasang perimeter. The argument is speculative, to say the least.)

That tribute requirements were generally calculated on land is obviously credible in view of everything already said. But there are traces of various other sorts of basis. The pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica claims (1352b27) that Alexander revived an obsolete, presumably Achaemenid, tax on imports into Babylonia. Various passages in Ezra (4.13, 20, 7.24) provide an apparently complete list of the three taxes applicable to inhabitants of Beyond the River which are under the control of the Treasurers of that satrapy, viz. minda, bēlo and halak. Minda is a rather general word for tax, used elsewhere of 'the tax of Beyond the River' (Ezra 6.8), the 'King's Tribute' (Nehem. 5.3), tax paid on garrison colony land (cf. n. 150), a land owner's income from tenants (AD 10, 11), and even the wages earned by a slave hired out by his owner (Saqqara 21.1—Akkadian mandattu is used in a similar context: Dandamayev 1976:436, 440, 1984a:331). Halak recalls Babylonian ilku, a land tax (cf. pp. 153 ff.), or the tax owed elsewhere of 'the tax of Beyond the River' (Ezra 6.8). The middle term, which recurs in Egypt (Saqqara V, XXIV, Delaporte 1912:73, 78–80, 95), is perhaps here a tax on something other than land: the NEB renders it poll-tax. An even fuller list of satrapal revenues is provided by pseudo-Aristotle (1345b28f), embracing taxes on agricultural produce, animals, commercial activity, a poll-tax (epikephalaion), and a worker-tax (kheironaxion)—for which last compare an impost in Saqqara 19, apparently charged in accordance with the number of gardu-workers in a particular tax unit.

Just as we can attempt to divide satrapies into constituent general administrative units, so we can attempt to discern smaller tax entities within them. The results are partially parallel. We have already noticed the hyparchs Zenis and Mania collecting phoroi for Pharnabazus (Xen. Hell. 3.1.12). Pseudo-Aristotle (1348a18f) records stories about Mausolus' hyparch, Condalus, gathering taxes to feed the satrapy's tribute quota. Condalus can apparently exercise some discretion in deciding upon what persons and materials to assess and exact dues, but the stories are sometimes disconcertingly far-fetched. For example, Condalus informs the Lycians that the King has ordered everyone to shave off his hair (in order to provide an eccentric tribute in kind) and then agrees to commute this to a cash payment—this being an example of levying epikephalaion. Excavations in Palestine have produced many storage-jar handles stamped with the name of the province of Judah (and sometimes also the title phh, 'governor'). Stern 1982:205 f., 237, 1984:108 argues that these are stamps of governors and lesser officials and that the practice is

connected with tax-collecting, thus making the province a tax-unit in some sense. Certainly they must mark the jars’ contents as somehow belonging to the provincial government or administration, just as do the earlier uninscribed imitation Achaemenid jar stamps (Stern 1982:209 f., 1984:109). The fact that Stern takes the latter, like the Mošah stamps (from the name of a Jewish town), to be the trademarks of produce from royal estates (rather than of the tax income of the province) illustrates the uncertainty of any particular interpretation and may even damage the logic of his inference from the disappearance of the latter types and subsequent appearance of the Judah stamps that the province of Judah only came into existence after 450 BC. (Of course, the mere appearance of the Judah stamps and coins may in itself establish the truth of the proposition irrespective of earlier phenomena.) In any case, there can be no certainty about the precise relationship between stamped jars and the ‘King’s Tribute’, and the same problem arises with two other items, Nehemiah’s agricultural tithe to support Levites in the Temple (Nehem. 13.10 f.) and Bagoas’ tax of 50 drachmai per lamb on temple sacrifices (Joseph. AJ 11.297). Both cases do, of course, illustrate a governor’s right to invent new taxes. In Egypt Saite nomarchs are said to have played a role in tax-gathering (Lloyd 1983:334) but there is no such evidence for the Persian period; on the other hand, the corn of Titris and Thebes in AP 24 might, as already noted, be provincial tax dues. Xenophon’s analysis of the garrison system (above pp. 131 f.) envisages chiliarchs in charge of garrison units in the khôra. Otherwise unattested in the Achaemenid period, they find a parallel in a hellenistic text from Sardis,139 which describes an estate consisting of villages and kleroi and says that these entities owe particular sums of phoros to a named chiliarchy.140 If this text is a guide to Achaemenid practice (Atkinson’s downdating of the dispositions to which it refers to the late third century in contrast to the original editors’ late-fourth century date makes this a real question) it emerges that one tax-collecting unit, much smaller than province or hyparchy, was the area controlled by a chiliarch (there is no telling whether the chiliarch has a role as assessor too). The fact that it is villages and kleroi that are encumbered, not just the estate they constitute, presumably shows that chiliarchies do not come into the matter because Mnesimachus, and his putative Achaemenid period predecessors, are some special sort of estate-holder: the implication is rather that all tax-liable parcels of land in a given region would owe phoros initially to the chiliarch.

3 TOWNS AND VILLAGES
Mention of villages brings one to place- rather than area-units. When Herodotus says (6.59) that newly-acceded Persian kings remit tribute arrears ‘from all the cities’ he is doubtless guilty of an unduly hellenic formulation, but various other texts confirm that the city is a possible tax-unit. Thus Aspendus breeds horses for tribute (Arr. An. 1.26.3), Cyrene and Barca submit to phoros (Hdt. 3.13, 4.165),

139 Buckler & Robinson 1912 (republished as Sardis VII.1). See Atkinson 1972.
140 col. 1.3 f. Later Mnesimachus’ holdings are resumed as (i) ‘villages, kleroi, attached oikopeda, laoi plus families and belongings, wine-jars (?), phoros in money and work, other income from the villages and much else’ (col. 1.11 f.) and (ii) ‘villages, kleroi, khôria and oiketai’ (col. 2.5). Buckler & Robinson 54 assume that everything besides villages and kleroi is not subject to tribute in its own right.
Cyrus sends Artaxerxes due dasmoi from certain Ionian poleis (Xen. An. 1.1.8), the king of Cypriot Salamis is to pay tribute (Diod. 15.8.2), and after the conquest Alexander makes various dispositions about the phoroi previously paid by Ilium (Strabo 593), Ephesus, and Mallus (Arr. An. 1.17.10, 2.5.9). There is also Herodotus' account of the Ionian reassessment (6.42.2). After saying that Artaphernes summoned angeloi from the cities and compelled the Ionians to make mutual arbitration agreements, he continues 'He compelled them to do this and he measured their land and fixed phoroi for each of them (ékáρσωια)'. At first sight this might refer to assessment of all individual landowners in the relevant city territories. But the synthekai made by 'the Ionians' are, of course, between cities, and the plural ékáρσωια, i.e. 'for each group', can, in the context of city-dwellers, only mean 'for each city'. Herodotus is therefore clear that the satrap carried out his assessment city by city, providing each polis with a tribute-quota. This does not prove that the cities were thereafter free to match it by whatever means they wished, but this is without doubt the simplest hypothesis.

After cities, three quasi-civic communities in Caria (two koina, one using polis terminology, and a syngeneia) which are on record granting tax exemptions to individuals, but excepting from these grants imposts variously described as basilika telē, basilikoi phoroi, and apomoira (a royal tax term in Ptolemaic times). Three preliminary points. 1. When cities within the empire grant general tax exemptions there is never any reference to royal taxes. Since the cities owed tribute qua cities, this phenomenon simply shows that the city could decide how to produce its quota, and on whom to make the burden fall, as it saw fit. 2. One of the Carian entities, Koarendeis, is also on record making an ateleia grant covering geōrgia and all other incumbent obligations with no further qualification. Here, therefore, it is behaving like a city. 3. Another Carian entity, Plataseis, while insisting that the honorand pay basilika telē, does exempt him from 'whatever royal or civic epigraphai may fall upon it' (Labraunda 42). There are therefore some royal imposts which apply to Plataseis as a koinon and from contribution to which they can choose to exempt any individual—again behaviour just like that of a city. So long as we treat the three royal imposts as parallel there are three possible conclusions (Hornblower 1982:161 f. favours the first). (a) These imposts are actually obligations upon an individual (or upon an individual as member of some other entity than the ones in question here) and the texts are merely noting for safety's sake that these obligations are unaffected. Hence the Koarendeis can fail to mention the point without this actually mattering and the Plataseis can waive the apparently different basilikai epigraphai. (b) The imposts are obligations upon the entities (as tribute is one upon a city) and it merely happens that on some occasions these entities chose not to waive their right to collect contributions to such obligations, a choice which no city is ever recorded as making, and which the Koarendeis themselves once did not make. (c) The imposts are (again) obligations on the

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142 Xanthus (FX VI p. 32 f. = SEG 27.942), Kios (Tod 149), Erythrai (Tod 155), Miletus (Tod 195, if this be pre-334). Cf. also Sinuri 75 A–B.

143 SIG2 311. Note also the Kildareis of Robert 1950:14.
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entities, but the rules about tribute, imposed by the Persian authorities, were such
that the entities were not permitted to exempt persons who would normally be
liable. This view requires us to assume that in those grants of *ateleia* which do not
mention royal imposts it is simply taken for granted that bestowal of *ateleia* always
refers to those *telē* which the authority in question is allowed to waive (i.e., in the
hellenistic formula, those δὲν ἡ πόλις κυρία ἐστὶ). The disadvantage with solution
(a) is that in at least two cases the text is certainly so formulated as to make all the
imposts mentioned appear of comparable status vis-à-vis the exempting author-
ity. The disadvantage of solutions (b) and (c) lies in the subjectification of the Plataseis to
two royal obligations. One could say that the *basilikai epigraphai* are extraordinary
imposts, not covered by any hypothetical rules against waivers. But that creates the
paradox that the city’s own *epigraphai* (the only civic impost mentioned) also turn
out to be intermittent and extraordinary. These disadvantages can be mitigated by
not treating the three royal imposts as parallel. Let us assume, instead, that in the
Plataseis text *basilikai epigraphai* refer to the community’s regular obligation to pay
royal tribute, whereas *basilikai telē* are an individual’s obligation, mentioned
superfusurously but perhaps understandably given that *basilikai epigraphai* have (also
superfusurously) been explicitly mentioned and waived. In the other texts *basilikoi*
*phoroi* and *apomoi* are community obligations (equivalent to *basilikai epigraphai*)
which the communities chose not to waive.

The villages of the Mnesimachus estate (p. 147) owe *phoros* to the appropriate
chiliarchy, which seems to make them tax units in their own right. Comparably
specific evidence from actual Achaemenid period sources is not all that plentiful.
There is little to be gained from Saqqara 22 which Segal optimistically links with
village taxation (no word for taxation appears, and the word translated ‘collected’
or ‘exacted (taxes)’ appears elsewhere only in texts which Segal prudently classifies
merely as ‘commercial’). Alexander’s letter to Priene (Tod 185) shows him levying
*phoroi* from local villages, apparently *qua* royal property. This may continue
Achaemenid practice, but we are getting very close here to direct landlord/tenant
relations, at the furthest remove from tribute as we normally understand it. One
may compare the King’s Share (PBS 2/1 32, 59, BE 8.85, 9.73) and King’s Harvest
(CBS 12922) attested in Babylonia in connection with crown property, as well as the *upayata* (cf. p. 129) of the ‘town’ Iqāša-ilī (VS 6.160). Also in Babylonia,
Herodotus reports (1.192.4) that four villages were *ateleis* on condition of
providing sustenance for the satrap’s dogs. It appears, therefore, that villages would
normally be liable to *telē*. Or does Herodotus just mean that individual villagers
were let off individual taxes in return for special food production (put another
way, that the village only came to constitute a tax unit for the (effective) dog-tax)?
Similar uncertainty affects the 17 horses for royal *dasmos* found in an Armenian
village by the 10,000 (Xen. An. 4.5.24). It is tempting to regard the persophone
*komarch* as the local official through whom higher authority channels its demand
for tribute and to identify the village, therefore, as the unit of assessment (Briant
1982a: 152). But even granted the premise, the conclusion need not follow.

4 TEMPLES
Given the importance of temples in landholding, especially in Egypt and
Babylonia, one looks with particular interest at their role in the tax system. On the western fringe of the empire Gadatas’ injudicious attempt to extract phoroi from Apollo’s phytourgoi (p. 144) presumably reflects the assumption that as a general rule sacred land is as liable to taxation as any other sort (assuming that he was not simply claiming tribute on the secular land he was trying to get them to cultivate). But for more copious evidence about the inter-relation of temples and the Persian administration one must look to Babylonia.

Achaemenid kings can be found making offerings to the Babylonian temples, e.g. wine from Beyond the River (Weisberg 1967:10) or ‘provisions before the statue of Bel’ (Joannes 1980:156(13)—though the execution of this is actually the duty of a temple prebend), and we have already noticed payments from the royal storehouse to temple personnel (p. 129). But other texts referring to workers apparently within the temple economy who are ‘on royal provisions’ (YOS 7.16, Camb. 333, Dar. 72) or to the king’s fixing of norms for temple-slaves’ rations (YOS 3.45, 81, 106, Dandamayev 1984c:501) possibly (in the first case) and certainly (in the second) concern payments actually made by the temple, evidently in connection with work done for the king (in YOS 3.45 a royal agent oversees the slaves’ activities). Moreover, the Achaemenid kings departed from late neo-Babylonian precedent in exempting themselves, their families and entourage from regular tithes to the temples of the sort generally incumbent upon the satrapy’s population (Dandamayev 1969b). In short, it is the king’s receipt of obligations from the temples and his interference in their administration that is most prominent.

Various hints of such interference come in texts which say that failure to carry out some task will be a sin against (or will earn the punishment of) the king or the satrap. Sometimes the task is explicitly an obligation of temple to royal administration of the types noted below, but elsewhere we can only assume a direct or indirect royal interest in e.g. an artisans’ oath of temple-service (YNER 1.1), the production of sacrificial animals (YOS 7.160, TCL 13.162) or fish (VS 20.87) for the temple, the supply of shepherds or a weaver (YOS 7.25, BIN 2.114), arrangements for guarding the Eanna sanctuary (BIN 1.169, GCCI 2.103; and cf. YOS 7.154), payment of quit-rent by bird-handlers (TCL 13.168), theft of temple property (YOS 7.192, TCL 13.142; cf. p. 119) and so on.

More specific and explicit evidence comes in a variety of forms. A temple fief owes royal telitu-tax in YOS 7.38 (cf. Joannes 1982:13). The income of a temple prebend can be royal property (YOS 7.79). Weisberg 1967:10 may refer to undefined dues to be transported from Eanna (Uruk) to Babylon, and two fourth-century documents (UET 4.48–9) apparently concern delivery of ‘taxes of temple slaves’ to the king (the details are disputed, witness the varied summaries in San Nicolò 1950:227, Oppenheim 1950:190, Dandamayev 1984c:125, 546. The word for tax is OP *bara). But the major categories of evidence concern labour obligations and the supply of animals and natural produce, sometimes designated as the king’s meal (susbuti) or ‘provisions’ and sometimes explicitly having its sources in the materials of temple sacrifices.144 Connected with the latter is the so-called

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144 Labour obligations. King/Palace: CT 22.121, 244, YOS 3.133 (including establishment of para- dans: Dandamayev 1984b:: 114), YOS 7.77, 146, Michigan 89, BIN 1.7 (all connected with royal cattle), YOS 7.187. Satrap: TCL 13.150, 152, YOS
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'royal basket' (quppu) which received those portions of temple income earmarked for the king (cf. San Nicolò 1941:31, Weisberg 1967:12, Dandamayev 1984c:56 f.). In BIN 1.7 we hear of soldiers guarding it during transport to Babylon, but most of our evidence for its existence comes from the title of the royal temple official at Uruk in charge of it (for a selection of references see San Nicolò 1941:20 f.). The designation 'royal' is sometimes dropped, so the person 'in charge of the basket of Ebabbara' may be the corresponding official at Sippar: one may certainly assume that there was one there and in all major temples. Nor were they the only royal officials introduced into temple administration, the senior echelons of which included a 'royal commissioner and overseer' at Uruk (San Nicolò 1941:18 f.) and Babylon (TCL 13.193), and a 'high officer and royal commissioner' at Nippur (Biggs 1978:132(26)). It is important to stress, however, that this intrusive royal supervision is in principle merely a continuation of late neo-Babylonian trends, though the royal commissioner at Sippar is not attested until Cambyses' reign and the 'royal commissioner appointed in Eanna' and 'royal scribe appointed in Eanna' (YOS 7.107, 114, 118, 130, 131, 164, 198, TCL 13.170) are attested only in his reign, when they temporarily replace the long established qipu. It should also be noted that there were evidently royal commissioners below the very senior levels: in ROMCT 2.5 prosopographical considerations guarantee this, and some of the numerous individuals with the title who appear casually in documents, e.g. as witnesses, are probably in the same category (there is even one with an Iranian name in UET 4.1–2). The kings were clearly very concerned that the exaction of their dues should proceed with the maximum efficiency.

In Egypt the surviving picture is somewhat different. Initially Cambyses sought to impose restrictions on some temple income. The relevant text (P. Bibl. Nat. 215, verso d. 1–17 = Spiegelberg 1915:32) is obscure but seems to say that a whole range of commodities (ship timber, firewood, flax, livestock, fowls, silver, corn, (? incense, papyrus) were no longer to be given to the temples, apart from three near Memphis (Yoyotte 1972). Instead the priests were wholly or partly to supply them for themselves, in some cases from specially designated areas. Figures are given which may express the silver value of some of the commodities, more than 1.5 times Herodotus' figure for the satrapy's silver tribute (cf. Bresciani 1969: 335, 1985:506). The implications of all this are somewhat unclear to me (and the information sits somewhat uneasily with Cambyses' alleged favour for the Neith temple at Sais: Posener 1936: no. 1). What sort of 'gifts' are outlawed, do they...
come from temple tenants or outsiders, was the royal treasury planning to absorb the commodities which would otherwise have been given? In a sense the question is of passing importance, since Darius’ codification of traditional Egyptian law (p. 112) ought to have swept the dispositions away. They do not constitute the only sign, however, of restraint upon temple wealth, even aside e.g. from claims about Xerxes’ confiscation of huge amounts of land from the gods of Buto (Urkunden I.11 f.). For example, private donations to temples of the sort extensively attested under the Saite disappear from view, though royal donations continue, if the Edfu text is reliable (Meeks 1972:153, 1977:653). Since such donations provided costs for funerary cults, a function the need for which did not suddenly cease in 525 BC, the change must represent external interference in the temple’s finances, and helps create the suspicion that there may have been other such interferences. All the same the temples certainly went on possessing land and receiving income from it. When such land was sold the temple continued to receive a tithe;\textsuperscript{145} when it was leased provision still had to be made about payment of tax to the temple.\textsuperscript{146} Several demotic papyri record temple tax receipts (P. Strassburg 5, P. Loeb 46, P. Cairo 50060), in the last case from an impost on beer and wine paid by a ‘chief’ (\ldots of the nome’, soldiers, pastophoroi and other untitled persons. By contrast one can find no clear evidence for the state’s levying of tax upon the temple, a problem which also exists in the Saite period, when just one possibly relevant text comes to hand.\textsuperscript{147} Nor is it only a matter of silence, or a difficulty confined to temples. Herodotus says that members of the warrior class (makhimoi) possessed 12 \textit{aurea} estates which were tax free, a privileged position only paralleled among priests,\textsuperscript{148} and it is regularly assumed that this was true of the Persian period.\textsuperscript{149} It begins to look as though the royal treasury’s sources of income in Egypt were not distributed very evenly over the whole satrapy. Other evidence is meagre: we have already noticed possible income from tax in kind (p. 142), and Saqqara 19 records an (?) annual silver-tax of some sort (the payers are Egyptian). But paradoxically we can see as much evidence of revenue from the empire’s own garrison troops as from native subjects. Members of garrisons at Elephantine and elsewhere apparently had some lands on colonial tenancy from the King;\textsuperscript{150} four Saqqara papyri seem to concern tax from such land to the royal treasury (24, 31, 74a, Aimé-Giron 1921:56) and a somewhat obscure Elephantine text (AP 17) has been interpreted as referring to tax upon colonial allotments (mnt) received monthly by

\textsuperscript{145} P. Louvre E 7128 = Malinine/Pirenne 1950/1: no. 18. For earlier practice cf. ibid. nos. 15–17 (P. Turin 246, 247, P. BM 10117).
\textsuperscript{146} This is absent in P. Loeb 45, but see P. Aram. Bauer-Meissner = Grelot 1972:no. 1. (The relevant word for tax [\textit{mnt}] recurs in an ostracon [Segal 1969:173].) For earlier practice cf. P. Louvre E 7833A, B, 7836, 7839, 7845A (all in Hughes 1952).
\textsuperscript{147} P. Rylands 9.21/16, cf. Meeks 1979:644.
\textsuperscript{148} The text about Darius’ legal codification (p. 112) gives special mention to three classes, priests, warriors and scribes, but there is no evidence about tax privileges for the last-named.
\textsuperscript{149} cf. Lloyd 1983:309, Bresciai 1958:134 f. (Although Herodotus speaks of the existence of the \textit{makhinoi} in the present tense (2.164 f.) and draws an implicit distinction between their numbers in the fifth century and earlier, he casts statements about their privileges in the past tense.)
\textsuperscript{150} Holdings of \textit{degel} or army: AP 16.2, (7)80.5. Holdings of individuals: AP 7.2, 8.2, 33.6, BP 12.5. The crucial aramaic term is \textit{makhin}, also used of the ‘possession’ of a government boat by an Egyptian in AP 26.3. See Grelot 1970:30 f. Porten/Szaboin 1982, 1985 take the term to denote hereditary property holders, but do not deny that it could designate ‘military colonists’. The word \textit{mnt} (portion) in AP 1.3, 1.7 has also been thought to refer to \textit{klēroi} (Porten 1968:52, Grelot 1972:76).
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three groups of officials, including provincial scribes, and accounted for by them to the satrap (Porten 1968:52). (It is fair to add that the same text has also been read as referring to payments by the said officials to the troops (Grelot 1972:280 f.).)

5 BABYLONIAN LAND-TAXES

Turning back to Babylonia a good deal of evidence comes to hand of taxes and other obligations incumbent upon various sorts of non-temple land. Imposts upon specifically crown property have already been mentioned (cf. pp. 133). What we are concerned with now is 'military' fief-land and land (or individual tax payers) whose status is undefined in the sources.

One of the best attested elements of landholding in Babylonia consisted of (theoretically) inalienable but heritable family-held fiefs, known as bow-fiefs or (more rarely) horse- or chariot-fiefs. These are attested only from the start of the Achaemenid period (Dandamayev 1967, 1983) and the bulk of the information comes from the Murasu archive at Nippur in the reigns of Artaxerxes I and Darius II. But the phenomenon was certainly general in Babylonia, the terminology being attested at Babylon, Borsippa, Šahrinu, Šatir, Sippar, Ur, and Uruk (Joannes 1982:9); and the use of the term 'bow(-fief)' in the Akkadian version of DB 14 (Voigtlander 1978:17, 55) for that which Gaumata took away from the 'army' or 'people' suggests that something comparable existed elsewhere in the empire, perhaps specifically in Persis.

The evidence for taxes and other obligations upon such fiefs runs as follows, (i) In the Murasu archive the normal impost upon fiefs, although there is the odd exception (e.g. the payment called PA.U sarri in BE 10.15), is an annual silver tax designated as ilku, running at between 10 shekels and 17 minai, with a constant rate over time for any given fief (Cardascia 1951:100 f., Stolper 1974:206 n. 30). This tax was collected by the foremen (ṣaknu) of the collectivities (ḥadru), chiefly ethnic or occupational in title, into which the fiefs were grouped. (Such ṣaknu, it should be noted, represent a quite substantial layer of officialdom within the satrapy, one drawn largely from the Babylonian population and imposed upon the ḥadru to represent it in relation to a higher authority (Stolper 1974:121 f.). They also seem, as collectors of a quasi-military tax—see below—to bear a distant similarity to holders of the same title in seventh century Assyria (Postgate 1980:75).) The further progress upwards of the proceeds of ilku-taxation is rarely visible, but there is in principle at least one further stage before the royal treasury is reached, that of the large estate-holders within whose estates the fiefs are often located (Cardascia 1951:104 f., Stolper 1974:121 ff.). The significance of ilku will be further discussed below.

(ii) Non-Murasu documents of earlier (the majority), contemporary and later date

151 See in general Cardascia 1951, 1958, 1977, Stolper 1974:14 f., 111-47, Joannes 1982:8-45. Inalienability is deduced from Lutz 1928:269 f. = Cardascia 1951:179 f. = Ebeling 1952, where adoption is used to alienate a fief (another example of adoption appears in VS 6:188). But contrast TEBR 31, apparently a sale of a bow-fief. In BE 9.99 a bow-fief is actually called niština sarri, 'gift from the king', but even in default of such description one must assume that bow-fiefs are normally in origin royal grants. However UET 4.41/42 and Walker 1973:127 (17) describe fiefs as property of gods, suggesting that they had been granted by a temple (cf. Ries 1976:40). The reverse phenomenon occurs in VS 5.55 where a bit ritti, characteristically a temple fief is 'property of the king'. ROMCT 2.9 mentions land which is both a bit ritti and a bit azanu (?quiver-fief, i.e. bow-fief).
also refer to silver payments incumbent upon bow-fiefs. In many cases such payments are given no descriptive title (Dar. 199, 307, VS 4.77, 96, 125, 6.194, 277, TEBR 1), but elsewhere we find the terms *ilku* (VS 4.127, Michigan 43, TEBR 2), ‘front of the bow’ (VS 6.60, ROMCT 2.9, TuM 2/3 220–1) and *telitu* (Camb. 13). The documents rarely illuminate the official agencies by which these payments are received; but TEBR 2 does mention ‘receivers of the *hadru*’ collecting *ilku*, and in Michigan 43 it is paid to the *talunu* of a collective just as in the Murasu texts. (Both these texts are contemporary with the Murasu archive.)

(iii) There is also evidence both in the Murasu archive and elsewhere for (labour) service obligations falling upon fiefs. In VS 6.302 eighteen bow-fief holders have to help move a boat and in VS 6.160 payment for work connected with the royal quay and delivery of *upayata* (cf. p. 129) comes (probably) from a fief-holder. VS 6.155 refers to a payment of silver for (i.e. in lieu of) royal work charged against the chariot fief of a temple official; and three Murasu texts speak of *pirqu*, apparently a *corvée* duty (BE 10.43, PBS 2/1 28, 107). Also noteworthy is TCL 13.203 which stipulates more generally that persons sharing a bow-fief shall ‘serve the king’ in proportion to their share. The Akkadian term used here recalls (a) VS 6.188, where share in a fief carries the obligation to ‘perform *ilku*-service for the king’ and (b) BE 10.15, CBS 12794, where *palah Lugal*, ‘service of the king’, is an obligation incumbent on some land, though one fulfilled by a silver payment. It is possible that all these texts are actually referring to *ilku*-service (or its monetary equivalent) and relate more to military than labour service. (The fief in BE 10.15 belongs to a group whose ‘professional’ designation appears to be military: Ries 1976:40.)

This range of evidence about obligations is matched if one turns to documents not explicitly concerned with bow-fiefs and their holders. There are many references to *ilku*-payments (Michigan 15, 24, 26, Cyr. 89, Dar. 323, BE 8.100, TCL 13.197, 198, VS 4.109, 121 + 122, 123, 132, UET 4.60), including one where it appears to be in flour not silver (Berens 105). Other texts mention *telitu* (CT 22.5, 57.17–25), *miksu* (CT 22.5; cf. above p. 129), various ‘gifts’ to the king or palace (ROMCT 2.23, Pohl 2.10, YNER 1.2, TCL 13.153) and ‘money for military outfitting’ (see below p. 129). One of the royal ‘gifts’ is received by a palace steward and passed by him to a minor city administrator (TCL loc. cit.) but otherwise, as before, the official agencies involved are not evident. Labour or service obligations also recur: requisitioned *urašu*-labour (cf. n. 144) is found in Cyr. 8, 224, TCL 13.173, VS 6.119, 150, the obligations being fulfilled by fixed payment or by actually hiring a substitute. UET 4.48–9 apparently records one Kusurea’s hire of persons to perform a task connected with taxes (cf. p. 150), while in UET 4.1–2 adoptive children are required to ‘do the service for the Gods and the King’ charged against (the land of) their parents. And just as VS 6.188 spoke of *ilku* as a service performed, not just a tax paid, so Strassmaier 8th Congress 31 and TuM 2/3 172 require someone to perform (literally ‘go’) the royal *ilku* incumbent on some land.

This brings us to the further consideration of the significance of *ilku* promised above. In Murasu texts, by contrast with all other evidence, there is a regular formula which itemizes the constituent parts of *ilku* as ‘soldier of the king, flour,
barra, and the other dues of the royal house’ (Cardascia 1951:98 f. For barra cf. above p. 150. Ilku and ‘other dues’ recurs in UET 4.60, and we have noted a case of ilku paid in flour, but these are at best very partial parallels for the formula from outside the Murasu archive.) The first item shows that ilku, which essentially means ‘service’, is specifically connected with military service—not surprisingly since we are here (as in some non-Murasu texts: above) dealing with fiefs named after a species of armament. Evidently ilku contains at least an element corresponding to the obligation to provide a royal soldier. We have already seen examples of the principle of money in lieu of service (including some which may refer to ilku under a different name). In specifically military contexts the principle can be illustrated by various other phenomena. A large number of texts from the reigns of Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius refer to (money) for the outfitting of a soldier, often appearing as an annual payment. What is happening is that land-owners are providing money to pay a substitute to undertake their technical obligation to do military service—and not only money but provisions as well. A century later we find the same thing in UET 4.109 (397/6) where Kusurea supplies pay, provisions, and armament for another person to undertake his royal andesu-service (apparently a Persian term signifying military levy). None of these texts relates explicitly to bow-fiefs. But a similar situation is in fact attested apropos of such a fief in 530 BC, when a pair of fief-holders provide a royal soldier, one Nabubelšunu, plus travel provisions and money (Camb. 13; cf. Joannès 1982:19, Dandamayev 1983:57), and such a substitution also appears to occur in Dar. 430 (bow fief) and (perhaps) Dar. 154 (chariot fief). These texts can in turn be compared with a set relating to bow-fiefs from a period of nine days in 422 BC. Five of these (BE 10.61–2, PBS 2/1 54, 167, 194, CBS 4992) are mortgages to cover debts for dress, equipment, provisions, and (perhaps) money in connection with a military expedition to Uruk. Nothing is said about an actual soldier, but in the sixth text we encounter an agreement between two joint-fief holders according to which one of them will actually go as a cavalryman to Uruk, while the other will provide equipment and one mina of silver for provisions (Lutz 1928, Cardascia 1951:179, 1958:5 f., Ebeling 1952). Clearly each fief was expected to provide an actual soldier and appropriate equipment and provisions. (Nothing establishes whether the soldier could be an outsider as was apparently the case 108 years earlier.) The first year of Darius II’s reign saw a huge number of mortgage agreements between fief holders and the Murasu; normally the nature of the debt lying behind the agreements is unstated, but occasionally it is connected with payment of ilku, and it has been suggested that this was actually true in the majority of cases (Stolper 1974:162 f.). But if this is so the sums involved show that what is here being called ilku cannot be the regular annual tax from which we began (Joannès 1982:23). This situation has been hypothetically connected with large-scale mobilization in Babylonia in the context of struggles for the throne after Artaxerxes I’s death (Stolper loc. cit.) and in this case ilku will be describing the sort of actual costs attendant upon mobilization seen in the texts from 422 BC.

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We have therefore to distinguish between (i) an annual monetary levy symbolizing the obligation of the fief holder to provide soldiers and provisions and (ii) the right of the king to call for additional actual supply of soldiers, equipment and provisions.\(^{153}\) Since the copious Muraşû archive only yields clear signs of this right being exercised in two years, it may have happened only rarely and in times of relative crisis by the later fifth century (for a further example see UET 4.109, above); and the Babylonian evidence as a whole could reflect the King’s increasing reliance upon mercenary service paid for by taxation.

6 INDIVIDUAL TAX-PAYERS

Finally, after the tribute of satrapies, smaller regions, cities, villages, temples, and estates, some cases where tax payment cannot for the most part be clearly associated with any entity larger than the individual. Appropriately, perhaps, this brings us back to Persis. (On all of what follows see Koch 1980.) Eight Persepolis texts (267–273) refer to large or very large groups of sheep and goats received as tax (baḍīt—_the word for tribute in royal inscriptions_) and variously entrusted to individual officers (in one case for use in payment of food rations) or ‘withdrawn’ (again, once, for provisions) or used in what are apparently attempted trading transactions. Among the persons named in the texts is one Apiptrakka, known elsewhere (PF 1942.29) as a tax-handler. A further document, PF 2008, provides an account of sheep received as tax and entrusted to Makama for Harrena to apportion. These names provide connections both with the first set of texts (where two different persons named Makama appear in PF 268–9) and with another pair of tablets which offer some further details. In PF 2025 Raubasa and his colleagues, ‘payers of the land’ (Hallock) or ‘Bergzahler’ (Koch), take a total of 574 sheep and goats for the King’s Tax and entrust them in two unequal groups to Makama the cattle chief at Urudush (a treasury site, incidentally) and Umizza the herdsman at Hiran. The first group pertains to the _dalalaki persons_ in Hallock’s rendering, though Koch says that _dalalaki_ means _Steuerabgaben_, the second were ‘at the sheepfolds’. In both cases the apportioner is (once again) Harrena. The tablet emanates from Pharmaces’ chancellery, and in PF 2070 we have a letter from Raubasa and his colleagues to Pharmaces giving some more information about the animals entrusted to Umizza. (i) Raubasa had got them from six persons at Hiran: four (one a woman) have no title but are just said to be ‘at the estate of Miturna, the ansara official and slaughterer’, while the other two are a royal rara worker and a treasurer. (The only indication of origin in PF 267–273 is the mention of Marduka people in 273.) (ii) Umizza has now taken the animals to Pharmaces. Raubasa and his colleagues also say that they sent the tax-handlers to Pharmaces, and it may be

\(^{153}\) With such exceptional cases Joannes 1982:22 associates VS 4.96 (519 BC, ‘supplementary silver on the bow-fief’ and ‘first receipts of silver on bow-fields’) and VS 4.126, Michigan 26 (both 513 BC, both connected with a year’s service in Elam). But Michigan 26 at least explicitly refers to urafa-service, not therefore on the face of it military. I assume that texts such as TuM 2/3 183 and PBS 2/1 114 which relate just to payments for ‘wages and provisions’ for two or three ‘soldiers of the king’ do not have to be taken as referring to actual soldiers on campaign. If so, the ‘soldier of the king’ element of _ilku_ may theoretically correspond to wages/provisions (rather than e.g. equipment) for a soldier (Cardascia 1951:99). But the facts that (i) wages and/or provisions are valued at 1 mina in PBS 2/1 114 and in the levy text of Lutz 1928 etc. (n. 151) and (ii) 1 mina is quite a common _i/lku-rate_ do not (pace Cardascia 1951:181 f., 1958:76 f.) constitute a significant coincidence.
that Umizza is to be construed as one such. At any rate we do have here more of a picture than usual of the journey of tribute from the individual payer up to highest administrative echelons—though one would still like a clearer statement of what Pharnaces was going to do with the animals.

Another series of documents concern, in Hallock's translation, 'deposits' of various commodities 'to the account of' named persons (generally otherwise unknown and sometimes female), and it has been subsequently suggested, on the basis of the historical associations of the relevant Elamite verb, that they are really tax payments by private Persian landowners (Hinz 1971:189, Koch 1980:106 f.): it is to such people that other documents refer in which corn is described as 'from the people' (PF 113, 200, 454, 1973–7, 1985). The payments include cattle, corn, fruit, dates, figs, nuts etc. and may be tithes, since the seal of Patiasa the tithe-receiver (1942) sometimes appears on the tablets. Another associated person is the ruṣdabaziya, land-tax official (PF 1968). Koch does not raise the question of the relation between the tax involved here and that in the first set of texts discussed above. Certainly distinct from both of them is what is found in yet another category of documents to which attention is drawn by occasional appearances of a bazikara (tax-handler). These, it is argued, relate to a leasing practice by which the administration supplies seed and then claims a ten or thirtyfold return (depending on type of crop). The land involved can be either crown or private property, and the proceeds mostly go to provide provisions (i.e. worker rations), though a proportion is withdrawn and disappears from sight. The distinction between this lease income and the tax discussed above is underlined by a further circumstance. In some accounting texts a further deduction of a tenth or thirtieth is made from the former, something which also happens with the income of direct working of crown land by kurtaṣ but not with the tax received from private tax payers. Koch 1980:136 suggests that these extra deductions went to the personal provisioning of the king.

The material assembled in the preceding pages is easy to summarize in the literal sense of condensation, but difficult in any more interesting sense. I have shown that general analysis of imperial officials leads one’s attention to such entities as satrapies, subregions (e.g. provinces, hyparchies of varying size, nomes, (perhaps) garrison chiliarchies), cities, individual fortresses, treasury sites and smaller storeplaces, villages, estates and their constituent estates, fiefs, etc. There are also plenty of attested officials whom it is hard to 'place', and perhaps types of region for which no pertinent official title survives. Again, evidence about tribute collection relates it to many of the entities just mentioned, as well as to temples or individuals. The problem lies in the interconnection of the highlighted details. Is 'hierarchy', with its implications of continuum of authority from top to bottom the appropriate term to use of the various agents of the ruling power within a satrapy? How should we envisage the inter-reaction of phenomena that look bureaucratic and ones that look


\[\text{Account texts with headings 'set aside', 'provided for provisions', 'withdrawn' (e.g. PF 1955–65, 2075–6, PF}a\text{32); all texts in Hallock 1969: categories}\]

\[\text{F ('setting aside...'), G ('providing for provisions').}\]

feudal? Granted the various types of evidence about taxation, how do we picture the actual stages of the process by which a satrap ends up with so and so much silver to forward to the king? Put another way, at how many removes do the tax payments I have described stand from 'The King’s Tribute'? When an Egyptian estate owner pays *halak* to Arsames’ estate, was he thereby making an (indirect) contribution to the royal tribute, or was he also encumbered with other unattested direct payments to that end? What is the relation between this Egyptian’s situation and the Babylonian fief-holder paying *ilku* to a foreman put in position by the superordinate estate-holder? How far should we go in assuming that bow-fief procedures were to be found all over the empire (is a single attested *kleros hippikos* in hellenistic Magnesia ad Sipylum (SdA 492) good ground for postulating an extension even to western Anatolia)? What was, after all, the relation between *phoros* and the King’s *trophe*?

One may, perhaps, still look for further assistance from the Persepolis archives. Despite the oddities of the area they cover, exhaustive analysis of the inter-relations of places, persons and seals can in principle reveal possible structures; and there are also, of course, many texts both from Persepolis and from Achaemenid Babylonia still awaiting mere publication, let alone analysis and combination. The proposition that ‘there was no uniform infrastructure of Achaemenid rule in the satrapies, and no general system for the collection of tribute can be discerned’ (Cook 1983:173) may be destined to stand (it may even be the simple truth), but we can at least hope to acquire better information about and understanding of the manifold varieties and of such 'system' as there may have been in particular satrapies.
## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Cuneiform Texts... in the British Museum. (CT 22.1–248 translated in E. Ebeling, <em>Neubabylonische Briefe</em> (Munich 1949).)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dar.</td>
<td>J. N. Strassmaier, <em>Inscriften von Darius</em> (Leipzig 1892)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DB etc.</td>
<td>texts in R. G. Kent, <em>Old Persian</em> (New Haven 1953).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF, PFa</td>
<td>Texts in Hallock 1969 and 1978 respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pohl 1, 2</td>
<td>A. Pohl, <em>Neubabylonische Rechtsurkunden...</em> An.Or. 8 (1933), 9 (1934).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Texts in Cameron 1948.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEG</td>
<td>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strassmaier</td>
<td><em>Actes du 8e Congrès International des Orientalistes, IIe partie, Ib</em> (Leiden 1893), 8th Congr. 281 f.</td>
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TEBR  Texts in Ioannes 1982.
TL  E. Kalinka, Tituli Asiae Minoris I (Vienna 1901).
TuM 2/3  O. Krückmann, Neubabylonische Rechts- und Verwaltungsurkunden (Leipzig 1933).
Urkunden II  K. Sethe, Hieroglyphische Urkunden der griechisch-römischen Zeit (Leipzig 1904).
XPa etc.  see DB etc.
YBC  unpublished Yale University Library tablets.
YNER 1  D. Weisberg, Guild Structure and Political Allegiance . . . (Yale 1967).
YOS 7  A. Tremayne, Records from Erech . . . (New Haven 1925).

Aramaic and Egyptian demotic texts are normally published with translations. Where the place of publication of demotic texts is not stated it can usually be located in E. Lüddeckens, 'Papyri, Demotische', Lexikon der Ägyptologie IV 750–899. Akkadian texts, on the other hand, are often initially published only in hand-copies of the cuneiform tablets. The whereabouts of such translations as exist can be sought in R. Borger, Handbuch der Keilschriftliteratur I–III (Berlin 1967–75).
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ADDENDA

p. 120: on the King's Eye see Cassio, *CQ* n.s.35 (1985), 41–2.
p. 126: on *ga* see now J. Greenfield, *Or.* 33/5 (1984/6), 153.